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While some believe that eugenics ended after World War II, eugenics heavily influenced 
the development and evolution of diagnoses of gender variance. Where eugenicists applied the 
terms “degenerate” and “unfit” to those deemed undesirable in the early twentieth century, so too 
did sexologists, many of whom were also eugenicists, when describing and constructing the 
diagnostic category of transvestite. I trace the evolution of trans-diagnostic categories and argue 
that eugenics significantly influenced how both sexologists and transpeople understood 
transvestism in the 20th century, particularly in relation to race, sexuality, and disability. 
Reflecting the common eugenic strategies of the first several decades of the 1900s, many 
sexologists commented on degeneracy, heredity, and disability within texts focused on 
transvestism. Their eugenic leanings were also evidenced by anxieties concerning transvestites 
marrying and reproducing, two actions that eugenicists sought to control. The wide influence of 
eugenic ideology in sexological writings made the separation of eugenics and transvestism 
irreversible. Reading texts about and by transvestites and transsexuals while recognizing the 
discursive and historical context in which they wrote, I point out the ways in which 
understandings of gender and eugenics were mutually productive in these writings. While current 
descriptions of transsexuals do not include terms like “degeneracy,” its vestigial meanings 
remain. The present-day search for causes and “cures” for transsexualism are rooted in this 
history of eugenics. Recognizing and acknowledging this history is crucial for understanding 
what is at stake for inhabiting these diagnoses, and for how trans* communities will negotiate 
them moving forward.  
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At the turn of the 20th century, eugenics emerged as a movement that would dominate 
approaches to numerous academic fields such as medicine, law, and psychology. Sexology, the 
scientific study of human sexuality, was a field that intersected ideologically with eugenics 
throughout the 20th century. I argue that this intersection heavily influenced the development of 
“transvestite” and “transsexual” as diagnoses, and that this history has shaped 1) the ways in 
which we access and conceive of the diagnoses and identities associated with gender non-
conformity; 2) how transactivism has evolved over the last six decades; and 3) the development 
of Transgender Studies as a field. Trans* subjectivities are produced and accessed at the 
intersection of race, sexuality, and disability, and these subjectivities reflect the discursive 
influence of eugenics present in the creation of the diagnoses and in the medical fields from 
which they emerged.1  
My research is the first to examine the intersection of eugenics and sexology at the site of 
these diagnoses. Many believe that eugenics, the social movement focused on “bettering” the 
human population through selective breeding and sterilization, ended after World War II. 
Recently, scholars from multiple disciplines have disputed this claim, including Siobhan 
Sommerville in Critical Race and Queer Studies, Ladelle McWhorter in Philosophy, and Ellen 
Samuels in Disability Studies. One manifestation of eugenics is found in the histories of 
diagnoses of gender variance. Just as eugenicists applied the terms “degenerate” and “unfit” to 
those deemed undesirable in the early twentieth century, so too did sexologists use these terms 
when describing and constructing the diagnostic category of transvestite. However, most 
                                                
1 The “*” following the words trans is used to indicate the various subjects that might be included in the umbrella 
term of “trans.” For example: transgender, transsexual, transwoman, transman, transmasculine, transfeminine, and 
can also include individuals who are gender non-conforming or non-binary. The use of “trans*” is not without 
contest. See: Danie Diamond and Eli Erlick, 2016. 
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historical works about eugenics do not discuss transvestism or its later manifestation, 
transsexualism. Similarly, the scholarship on transvestism and transsexualism focuses mostly on 
the intersection of sexology with popular culture, medicine, and psychiatry, and fails to engage 
with eugenics. My dissertation fills this gap as I trace the evolution of trans-diagnostic categories 
and argue that eugenics significantly influenced how both sexologists and people diagnosed with 
transvestism understood transvestism in the first half of the 20th century, particularly in relation 
to race, sexuality, and disability, and how we continue to engage with trans* subjectivities in 
2016.  
Below, I will provide some brief comments on the emergence of gender diagnoses that 
articulated and defined this deviance. I will then provide an overview of the social milieu in 
which the sexologists – the physicians studying human sexuality – operated. Next, I will outline 
my methods and archives. Lastly, I provide a chapter outline for the dissertation.  
 
Emerging Subjects 
According to Michel Foucault, the discursive formation of the “homosexual” as a subject 
position rather than an aberration had occurred by 1870.2 At the time, concepts of “gender 
identity” and “sexed bodies” did not exist - they were conceived of as one and the same; 
feminine men and masculine women were understood to be embodying not gender deviance but 
sexual deviance. The medical professionals of the time understood gender identity, sex/sexual 
identity, and sexuality/sexual orientation as normatively linked in ways that should produce what 
we would call today heterosexual, feminine women with female bodies and heterosexual, 
                                                
2 Foucault argues that the 19th century homosexual “became a personage, a past, a case history, a life form, and a 
morphology… Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality… The sodomite had 
been an aberration; the homosexual was now a species.” Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1976). 43. 
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masculine men with male bodies. During the first half of the twentieth century, “sex” was used to 
indicate not only the biological aspects of sex (chromosomes, genitalia, hormones), but also what 
we understand today as gender identity and gender expression. According to feminist historian 
Joanne Meyerowitz, “sex signified not only female and male but also traits, attitude, and 
behaviors associated with women and men and with erotic acts.”3 ⁠ Sex was generally understood 
as deterministic of not only gender identity and expression, but also of occupational aptitude, 
clothing preference, as well as sexual inclinations.  
Newer understandings of “gender” as distinct from “sex” emerged and evolved over the 
course of the twentieth century, and this distinction emerged largely from conversations among 
sexologists writing and talking about transvestism. Magnus Hirschfeld in 1910 began to 
distinguish sexual deviance from “other emotional characteristics” – transvestism. Sexologist 
Robert Stoller in the 1960s, along with John Money and Richard Green, all worked to define 
“gender” as something distinct, but related to, biological “sex.” The emergence of gender 
marked a shift in the discursive construction not only of gender and sexuality more broadly, but 
gender deviance in particular.  
Originally called “eonism,”⁠ and later transvestism, cross-dressing and other 
manifestations of gender deviance became “diagnosable” at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Sexologist and eugenicist Magnus Hirschfeld ⁠ brought the term transvestite into scientific and 
popular use. Magnus Hirschfield first used “Transvestite” in 1910, yet it was not until the late 
1940s and early 1950s that “transvestite” and “transsexual” were widely used outside of a small 
group of sexologists. Sexologists David O. Cauldwell and Harry Benjamin would coin and 
popularize the term “transsexual.” Until the late 1940s and even into the 1950s, transvestism was 
                                                
3 Joanne J. Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002). 3 
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widely used as an umbrella term, with “transsexual” being a rare and “extreme” form of 
transvestism. ⁠ Cauldwell, while publishing prolifically on the topic, refused to endorse surgeries 
that would “change” sex. Harry Benjamin, however, would step in where Cauldwell would not. 
Benjamin published The Transsexual Phenomenon in 1966, one of the only comprehensive texts 
on transvestite and transsexual diagnoses at the time, and advocated for surgical intervention 
when deemed appropriate. Benjamin helped to network patients with sexologists, 
endocrinologists, and surgeons throughout the U.S. and Western Europe.  
This network of physicians would codify “transvestism” and “transsexualism” as 
diagnoses while simultaneously establishing gender expectations for all members of the social 
body based on a white, ablebodyminded, and heterosexual norm.4 Critical historian Julian Carter 
demonstrates how normality discourse in the beginning of the 20th century represented 
whiteness. He also argues that normality “provided a common, and deeply sexualized, 
vocabulary through which an increasingly diverse group of whites could articulate their common 
racial and political values to one another.”5 Anyone could be normal, “so long as they willingly 
subjected themselves and their children to the bourgeois erotic and relational disciplines that 
certified their allegiance to the social and civic order on which white American civilization 
rested.”6 The social and civic order of white America was heterosexual, able-minded, able-
bodied, and middle-class. As the conflation of these categories became concretized at the turn of 
                                                
4 This term has emerged as a way to refer to both able-bodied and able-minded rhetoric and notions of ability. More 
than this, though, it builds off of Margaret Prices notion of “bodymind” that acknowledges the ways in which mental 
and physical processes both give rise to and affect each other. In her words, “mental and physical processes not only 
affect each other but also give rise to each other – that is, because they tend to act as one, even though they are 
conventionally understood as two – it makes more sense to refer to them together, in a single term.” Pulling from 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s articulations of disability, Price also utilizes the concept of “misfitting” that directs 
attention to “the co-constituting relationship between flesh and environment.” See: Margaret Price, "The Bodymind 
Problem and the Possibilities of Pain," Hypatia 30, no. 1 (2015). 169; Babette Rothschild, The Body Remembers: 
The Psychophysiology of Trauma and Trauma Treatment (New York: Norton, 2000).; Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, 
"Misfits: A Feminist Materialist Disability Concept," Hypatia 26, no. 3 (2011). 
5 Julian B. Carter, The Heart of Whiteness: Normal Sexuality and Race in America, 1880-1940 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2007). 6 
6 Ibid. 154.  
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the 20th century, it became impossible to discuss whiteness without always already referencing 
normality, heterosexuality, normative gender expression, class, able-mindedness and able-
bodiedness, among other categories of embodiment and identity that were rendered “normal” and 
in alignment with the social and civic order of the time.  
 
Eugenics and the Social Milieu of the 20th Century 
Whiteness 
Sexologists lived in an environment in which eugenic ideologies were not only present, 
but ubiquitous. Eugenic discourses were co-constitutive with discourses of white racism. In his 
work on white ignorance as a cognitive phenomenon, Charles W. Mills discusses what he calls 
“white normativity,” and defines it as “the centering of the Euro and later Euro-American 
reference group as constitutive norm.”7 In her review of various epistemologies of ignorance, 
feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff summarizes Mills approach as follows:  
One of the key features of oppressive societies is that they do not acknowledge 
themselves as oppressive… there is a dominant view about the general nature of the 
society that represents its particular forms of inequality and exploitation as basically just 
and fair… it is very likely, however, that this dominant representation of the unjust 
society as a just society will have countervailing evidence on a daily basis that is at least 
potentially visible to everyone in the society… Therefore, cognitive norms of assessment 
will have to be maintained that allow for this countervailing evidence to be regularly 
dismissed so that the dominant view can be held stable.8  
 
Discourses of white ignorance simultaneously masked and justified its affects. White ignorance 
in the U.S., and for U.S. eugenicists, follows the same pattern. These discourses influenced 
sexologists not only in their approach to sexological work, but how they understood the world 
more broadly. Eugenics became as popular as it did in part because of its foundations in long and 
                                                
7 Charles W. Mills, "White Ignorance," in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, ed. Shannon Sullivan and Nancy 
Tuana (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007). 20, 25. 
8 Linda Alcoff, "Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types," in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorace, ed. Shannon 
Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (Albany: SUNY, 2007). 48. 
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violent histories of racism in the United States. As Dorothy Roberts argues, “racist ideology… 
provided fertile soil for eugenic theories to take root and flourish.”9 Eugenic thinking relied on 
constructions of white superiority, a central concept for white supremacy.  
Eugenicists relied almost wholly on degeneracy for explanations for who was “unfit.” 
Even when they began to account for some environmental influence, the heredity piece of their 
logic remained dominant. Those with good genes could be ruined by environment, but those with 
bad genes were hopeless – no amount of influence and environment could fix their inherited 
“defects.” Racism informed this theoretical framework. Roberts emphasizes the impact of 
racism, emphasizing the long history of white supremacy in the U.S.: “White America has for 
over two centuries developed an understanding of the races as biologically distinct groups, 
marked by inherited attributes of inferiority and superiority.” White skin indicated superior 
breeding, intellect, physicality, and possibility. If given proper social support, white babies 
would improve the “race,” the nation. However, non-white babies, or white babies with any 
number of abnormalities or defects, would ruin the nation and drive it into chaos.10  
Gender and Sexuality 
Sexologists found many ways of talking about norms without directly referencing 
whiteness and heterosexuality. Rather than discuss the dysgenic aspects of raced, gendered, and 
sexual deviance, sexologists would reference psychiatric disability, poor upbringing, or 
environments that failed to offer proper training. Anthropologist Sherry Ortner speaks to this 
type of discursive elision, particularly how it pertains to conversations around class in the U.S. 
                                                
9 Dorothy E. Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1997). 59. 
10 In his introduction to Laughlin’s Eugenical Sterilization in the United States, Harry Olson wrote: “America needs 
to protect herself against indiscriminate immigration, criminal degenerates, and race suicide. The success of 
democracy depends upon the quality of its individual elements… [if] there is a constant and progressive racial 
degeneracy, it is only a question of time when popular self-government will be impossible, and will be succeeded by 
chaos, and finally a dictatorship.” Harry H. Laughlin, Eugenical Sterilization in the United States (Chicago: 
Psychopathic Laboratory of the Municipal Court of Chicago, 1922). v. 
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She argues that “although class goes largely unspoken in American social life, it is not 
discursively absent. Rather it is displaced into culturally more salient discourses… of gender and 
sexuality.”11 Ortner argues that for middle- and upper- class individuals, “gender and sexuality 
are projected out onto the world of class relations…the working class is cast as the bearer of an 
exaggerated sexuality, against which middle-class respectability is defined.”12 One of the ways in 
which this occurs is through dress. As Marjorie Garber argued in Vested Interests, clothing is 
central to the policing of social boundaries, marking out “visible and above all legible 
distinctions of wealth and rank within a society undergoing changes that threatened to even 
obliterate social distinctions.”13 This was particularly relevant for transvestites. While neither 
Ortner’s nor Garber’s analysis speaks directly to eugenics, the relevance of their logic to the 
issue of eugenics and its continuing influence on sexological conversations into the 1950s and 
60s is difficult to ignore. Sexologists’ continued to advocate eugenic ideals, but most often 
through conversations of “norms,” of “ideal” masculinity and femininity manifest in 
comportment, dress, and sexuality. Each of these norms and ideals were tightly aligned and 
almost synonymous with whiteness, heterosexuality, ability, and middle-class existence.  
 Before the medical articulation of gender deviance in the late 19th century, “normal” 
gender was less well defined. However, as cultural scholar Vron Ware notes, “different elements 
in this system of ‘race’ and gender identity have no intrinsic meaning; they work only in and 
through differentiation.”14 Ethics scholar Laurel Schneider, following this notion, argues that two 
opposing identifiers, in this case “normal” gender and “abnormal” gender, “are so interdependent 
                                                
11 Sherry B. Ortner, Anthropology and Social Theory: Culture, Power, and the Acting Subject (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006). 20. 
12 Ibid. 32-33. 
13 Marjorie B. Garber, Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety (New York: Routledge, 1992). 105. 
14 Vron Ware, "Defining Forces, ‘Race,’ Gender and Memories of Empire," in The Post-Colonial Question: 
Common Skies, Divided Horizons, ed. Iaian Chambers and Lidia Curti (New York: Routledge, 1996). 159. 
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that they cannot signify anything but the shape of their opposition.”15 As gender deviance was 
more clearly identified, this definitional work helped to create boundaries around concepts of 
“normal” gender. Through the continued solidification of the category “transvestite,” a 
discursive subject position is added to assist in defining normal gender, gender that was already 
coded as white, able-bodied, able-minded, and heterosexual. While this began in the early 1900s, 
the explosion of medical, popular, and personal coverage of transvestism following Christine 
Jorgensen’s global debut in 1952 made these intersections clearer than ever.  
Disability 
 Systems of race, gender, and sexual norms were fully informed by evolving notions of 
psychiatric disability and able-mindedness. The connections between race, particularly non-
white races, and disability are undeniable. Disability scholar Douglas Baynton argues that 
“Nonwhite races were routinely connected to people with disabilities,” as is evidenced by the 
language and performance of race and disability throughout the 19th and 20th century.16 For 
example, as Baynton notes, Down’s syndrome was called “Mongolism” because the doctor who 
identified it “believed the syndrome to be the result of a biological reversion by Caucasians to 
the Mongol racial type.”17 Similarly, “primitives” and “defectives” were displayed along side 
each other at the 1904 World’s Fair, signaling “similar and interconnected classification schemes 
for both defective individuals and defective races.”18 Histories of disability are embedded in and 
informed by histories of racism and white supremacy.  
                                                
15 Laurel Schneider, "What Race Is Your Sex," in Disrupting White Supremacy from Within, ed. Jennifer Harvey, 
Karin A. Case, and Robin Hawley Gorsline (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2008). 158. 
16 Douglas C. Baynton, "Disability and the Justification of Inequality in American History," in Race, Class, and 
Gender in the United States: An Integrated Study, ed. Paula S. Rothenberg (New York: Worth Publishers, 2003). 95.  
17 Ibid. 95. 
18 Ibid. 95. 
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The connection between race, class, and sexuality as categories of classification are 
embedded in understandings of disability, where “Ableist ideologies… viewed people with 
disabilities as inherently undesirable and deficient,” as abnormal.19 Disability studies scholar 
Leonard Davis writes about the context in which normalcy as a category was enforced in an 
ableist U.S. culture, where “the rise of the concept of normality was tied to the rise of eugenics, 
statistics, and certain kinds of scientific claims about the human body, race, gender, class, 
intelligence, strength, fitness, and morality.”20 The normality he references was utilized to 
encourage people to “conform to some white, Eurocentric, ableist, developed-world, 
heterosexual, male notion of normality.”21 He recognized that the “idea of normal was an 
effective rationale for a monocultural society that could define itself as the norm and standard 
[where] immigrants, indigenous peoples, people of color, and foreigners were always going to be 
abnormal and were ‘proven’ to be so using eugenically oriented biometric tests and measures.”22 
Desire for legitimacy required a disassociation from disability, pathology, homosexuality, and 
any other category that could be or had been associated with deviance, including blackness or 
any race that was not currently included in what counted as “white.” 
The rhetoric of developmental delays, or the lack of development in general, has a long 
history in the U.S. in relation to groups who existed outside the historical version of the “norm.” 
By the 1950s, transvestism was more often categorized as a psychiatric disability or 
developmental delay. This categorization marginalized those who inhabited those diagnoses and 
subject positions. It also reified medicalized notions of disability, particularly psychiatric 
disability. Baynton references a government document that discussed the “‘classification of 
                                                
19 Kim E. Nielsen, A Disability History of the United States (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012). 155. 
20 Lennard J. Davis, The End of Normal: Identity in a Biocultural Era (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2013). 1. 
21 Ibid. 3. 
22 Ibid. 2. 
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‘constitutional psychopathic inferiority… including various unstable individuals on the border 
line between sanity and insanity… and persons with abnormal sex instincts.’”23 While gender 
pathology was not officially given a name or diagnoses until almost sixty years later, the 
common element among anyone deemed “unfit” was the “presence or attribution of disability.”24 
A central aspect of the medicalization of transvestism and transsexualism was its classification as 
a psychiatric disability. Arrested sexual development, a type of psychiatric disability, was also an 
explanation given by doctors as the reason individuals desired to either dress in cloths of the 
opposite sex, or had the desire to be the opposite sex.  
Discourses of psychiatric disability also informed constructions of citizenship in the 
twentieth century. In 1950, four years after the end of the war, governmental and medical 
discourses converged in an article written by then director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover. “Let’s 
Keep America Healthy,” published in The Journal of the American Medical Association, 
compared the “life of the nation” to the “life of the individual.” Hoover asserted that the nation 
must be healthy “physically, intellectually and spiritual…. A nation [must be] kept strong, virile 
and healthy by the combined efforts of its citizens.”25 His comparison of the individual to the 
nation places the expectations of “health” onto the population and frames health as a requirement 
of citizenship. Following this analogy is a critique and dismissal of communism, a request to 
“defeat the Communist challenge… in a democratic manner.”26 However, in his conclusion, he 
returns to the “individual health” analogy, reminding readers that:  
                                                
23 Baynton, "Disability and the Justification of Inequality in American History." 102. 
24 Ibid. 95. 
25 John Edgar Hoover, "Let's Keep American Healthy," The Journal of the American Medical Association 144, no. 
13 (1950). 1094. 
26 Ibid. 1095. 
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A healthy nation… must receive the unstinting cooperation of all its component parts; if 
one part fails to carry its share the whole organism is weakened. America… must remain 
strong and healthy. This is the task of each and every person.27  
 
If an individual citizen fails to remain healthy, they make the nation weaker. Hoover does not 
directly mention sexuality or gender in his short piece, but concepts of intellectual health invoke 
psychiatric disability. The gender deviance of transvestites and transsexuals, deviance that was 
racialized, classed, and steeped in discourses of psychiatric disability, affected the ways in which 
individuals accessed the term “citizen.” The categorization of gender deviance often rendered 
transpeople ineligible for, or at least suspect in relationship to, full citizenship and the protections 
full citizenship afforded.  
Aligning transvestism and transsexualism with disability reflected a particularly 
racialized and heterosexist environment. While African Americans were often described as being 
less evolved and as less-capable intellectually, so too were women of all races throughout the 
19th and into the 20th century. Cynthia Eagle Russett provides historical context for this, tracing 
this rhetoric back to the Victorian era. She argues that “women and savages, together with idiots, 
criminals, and pathological monstrosities… were a constant source of anxiety to male 
intellectuals in the late nineteenth century.”28 This anxiety did not end in the 19th century, 
however, but continued well into the 20th and 21st century in the U.S. and was fully informed by 
medicalized understandings and ideals of mental and intellectual development.  
                                                
27 Ibid. 1095. 
28 Cynthia Eagle Russett, Sexual Science: The Victorian Construction of Womanhood (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989). 63. 
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Methodology and Archives 
Methodology 
My theoretical and methodological approach draws from feminist Foucauldian genealogy 
and Foucault’s theoretical framework and method that positions genealogy as a history of the 
present. I also draw from methods and theories utilized by scholars in the field of oral history.  
Genealogy helps us to question the founding assumptions of our daily lives. In Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice, Foucault discusses his understanding of genealogy as interpretation, 
noting that it should “disorder… break up what is extant… [it is] history that disturbs what was 
previously considered immobile… fragments what was thought unified…”29 Genealogy also 
attends to power, its role in discourse, and the material effects of this power. Seeking out 
subjugated knowledges, finding voices within discourse, and shifting our interpretation of 
histories and discourses is important work that is central to any scholarly commitment to feminist 
research. Genealogy makes visible those discursive constructs that operate all around us every 
day without us even noticing. 
Genealogy is a method that looks at the development of discourses and their effects, 
specifically in relation to the body. Emma Pérez reminds us that genealogy “asks that disciplines, 
their categories, their grids and cells be exploded, opened up, confronted, inverted, and 
subverted; genealogy recognizes how history has been written upon the body.”30 While many of 
the theoretical underpinnings of genealogy are useful for my project, three are particularly 
prescient. Genealogy provides scholars with the tools to 1) focus on the “interpretation of social 
practices;” 2) explore how the effects of these social practices are written onto the body; and 3) 
                                                
29 Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1977). 147. 




engage in the search for emergence, rather than the origins, of transvestite and transsexual 
subjectivities. Exploring the discourses of sexology, psychiatry, culture, and gender, as well as 
their interactions with medical and juridical institutions provides an entry point for my work. 
Using genealogy, I investigate how discourses of gender, race, disability, and sexuality inform 
the emergence of transvestite and transsexual diagnoses and subject positions, as well as the 
legacies of this emergence. 
I pair genealogy with theory gleaned by scholars in the field of oral history in my analysis 
of autobiographical writings by self-identified transvestite and transsexual individuals. Some of 
these writings were published by popular presses and were available to the public, while others 
are found only in the Kinsey Institute archives and were seen only by the sexologists to whom 
they were written. While not engaging in oral history proper, I will use the autobiographical 
writings available as data I can analyze using theories and methods from oral history. Oral 
history theory allows me to analyze these writings in ways that find strength in the distance 
between my 21st century context and the historical context from which the autobiographies and 
sexological writings emerged. The insights provided by queer oral historians Horacio N. Roque 
Ramírez and Nan Alamilla Boyd help me to attend to this temporal gap. They argue that, while 
many oral histories can be difficult to analyze, queer oral histories in particular are 
“methodologically tricky…[as] repressive forces have not always been evenly distributed across 
time and place.”31 Ramírez and Boyd discuss the difficulties of accessing histories of queer 
communities of color in particular, and acknowledge the difficulty of negotiating and attending 
to “other vectors of social position, experience, and identity” in our work.32 Ultimately, both oral 
                                                
31 Nan Alamilla Boyd and Horacio N. Roque Ramírez, "Close Encounters: The Body and Knowledge in Queer Oral 
Histories," in Bodies of Evidence: The Practice of Queer Oral History, ed. Nan Alamilla Boyd and Horacio N. 
Roque Ramírez (Oxford: Oxfrod University Press, 2012). 13. 
32 Ibid. 13.  
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history and genealogy allow me to make historical discontinuities explicit and to explore what 
these discontinuities can tell us about discourse, subject positions, and dominant memories of 
transvestite and transsexual identities and diagnoses.33  
My Archive 
In Archaeology of Knowledge, Michel Foucault offers a broad understanding of the 
“archive.” Foucault’s “archive” is not limited to material objects. Rather, discourse is also an 
archive, one that is comprised of historical statements. More specifically, Foucault understands 
the word archive to mean “the set of rules at a given period and for a defined society [that] 
defined… the limits and forms of a discursive formation.”34 Thus, the archive of a culture is “a 
general system of the formation and transformation of statements” into what comes be known as 
history.35 Foucault’s concerns move beyond the things that are collected, and instead on how 
these things create conditions of emergence for new artifacts, statements, and discourses.36 
Approaching the archive with this in mind creates space to engage the historical contexts in 
which this archive and its contents emerged.  
My archive consists of writings from the mid-20th century: sexological publications, legal 
documents, autobiographical texts, magazines and newspapers from the 1950s and 60s, as well 
as other discursive artifacts I encountered through which power was articulated during this time. 
Any discursive artifact that is related to gendered embodiment and gender “deviant” subject 
positions counts as evidence. I analyze this evidence in relation to the discursive context from 
which it emerged – I am interested in subject positions and what can be made transparent about 
                                                
33 Ibid. 5. 
34 Michel Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered My Mother, My Sister, and My Brother... A Case of 
Parricide in the 19th Century (London: Peregrine, 1973). 14-15. 
35 The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972). 130. 
36 Foucault project of history is distinctly different from his project of archaeology. What I am referencing here 
would fall more in line with “archaeology” rather than what Foucault names as “the history of ideas.”  
 
 15 
their construction by particular utterances or the existence of particular artifacts within their 
historical context. 
The artifacts I rely on for my research provide evidence of the ways in which people 
accessed subject positions and identities. It is also evidence of the ways in which individuals and 
communities (sexologist, transsexual and transvestite individuals, journalists, etc.) navigate 
medical, legal, and social discourse and the ‘facts’ and ‘truths’ that emerged from these 
discursive sites The autobiographical writings, paired with medical writings, will serve to 
contextualize the emergence of the “transvestite” and “transsexual” for individuals navigating 
these subject positions. This will then make visible the discursive investments in these terms in 
relation to whiteness, masculinity/femininity, sexuality, normalcy, and respectability. These life-
writings will also provide insight into how individuals encountered other institutions and 
discourses not discussed by medical writings.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 In chapter one, “Eugenics, Sexology, and Transvestite Subjectivities,” I trace the earliest 
constructions of transvestism in the 1910s within a culture saturated by eugenics. Transvestism 
as a term fell out of favor in the 1990s, but it was the earliest diagnosis of gender deviance. 
Reflecting the common eugenic strategies of the time, many sexologists commented on 
degeneracy, heredity, and disability when discussing transvestism; this remained true for texts 
focused on transsexualism when it emerged as a distinct diagnosis in the 1960s. Sexologists’ 
eugenic leanings were also evidenced by anxieties concerning transvestites marrying and 
reproducing, two actions that eugenicists sought to control. The wide influence of eugenic 




 In chapter two, “Bodies and Mayhem: Transsexualism after Jorgensen,” I track the 
evolution of both eugenics and sexology at the site of transsexual diagnosis following World 
War II. While transsexualism as a diagnostic category emerged before Christine Jorgensen’s 
world debut in 1952, her notoriety marked a significant shift in discourses concerning diagnoses 
of gender deviance. In particular, anxieties about “sex change” surgeries changed both the tenor 
and fervor of the discourse for sexologists, transsexual and transvestite individuals, and their 
representations in the media. The evolution of these discourses culminated in the publication of 
sexologist Harry Benjamin’s groundbreaking text, The Transsexual Phenomenon, which set the 
stage for diagnostic criteria and medical intervention for transsexual diagnosis then, and 
continues to influence standards of care today. 
 Literature emerging from the medical fields existed alongside autobiographical narratives 
written by transvestites and transsexuals. These autobiographies influenced the discursive 
construction of the diagnoses, concepts of abnormal gender, and the underlying aspects of 
eugenics and racism present in the categories - and they reached very different audiences. I 
analyze these writings in chapter three, “Disciplining Narratives.” Written over a timespan 
beginning in the early 20th century through the 1960s, these narratives added to the myriad 
understandings of transsexual and transvestite categories of identity and diagnoses. As with the 
literature produced through medical discourse, the popular autobiographies also engaged 
concepts of hermaphroditism, homosexuality, citizenship, marriage, reproduction, “mental 
illness” or psychiatric disability, sometimes in ways that were similar to that of medical 
professionals, and sometimes diverged in important ways. These autobiographies offer subject 
positions that differed from those produced by medical discourse. The authors also grapple with 
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competing discourses concerning race and gender within popular print culture that trafficked in 
degeneracy/respectability narratives, social and civic morality, and white supremacy.  
Chapters four and five move in a slightly different direction. I examine how the 
genealogy I traced in the first three chapters informs the present moment in the context of official 
diagnostic manuals, evolving terminology, activism, and also in the academy. In chapter four, 
“The Legacies of the Diagnoses,” I analyze how this history influences our present moment and 
how the echoes of eugenics and its goal to eliminate “degenerates” continues to affect who can 
and cannot access diagnoses of gender non-conformity, identities, and medical interventions 
today, as well as how this history shapes the ways transgender subject positions are conceived of 
and positioned within transactivist communities.37 New terminology, approaches to social 
justice, and evolving relationships among transgender individuals, diagnoses, and the media have 
fundamentally changed transgender discourses, but the histories of these discourses continue to 
affect their shape and trajectory. 
 In chapter five, “Disciplining Effects: Transgender Studies and the Legacies of 
Eugenics,” I trace the emergence of the academic and activist discourses that allowed for 
transgender studies (TS) as a field to emerge in the early 1990s. The context of these discourses 
and their emergence shaped TS and helped to define some of its “objects” of study. After 
highlighting some directions the field has taken and the functions it has served for transpeople in 
the academy, I will demonstrate several ways that eugenics continues to shape not only 
transgender studies but the medical and political discourses with which the field is continually 
engaged. A century-long history of gender diagnoses, identities, subject positions, and self-
making steeped in eugenic, racist, and ableist ideologies continues to have affects for transgender 
                                                
37 I use the term “transgender” here because, as of 2016, it functions as a common umbrella term for gender non-
conformity under which transsexual subject positions are often placed.  
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studies. Recognizing the co-constitutive work of the diagnosis alongside practices of self-making 
must be a part of the discourses within transgender studies today. Transgender studies must 
engage eugenic ideology because it was so discursively intertwined with the emergence of the 
very categories that, in part, constitute the field’s existence. Eugenics will never fail to be a part 
of TS’ discursive history, and it must be a foundational part of the scholarly work emerging from 
the field. 
 
The Future of Trans* Subjectivities 
This project reflects my commitments not only to interdisciplinarity, but also to 
understanding and analyzing how race, disability, and sexuality inform the ways in which we 
inhabit sexed and gendered subject positions. Ultimately, this work illustrates the lasting impact 
of century old eugenic ideology on the ways in which we conceive of and access trans* subject 
positions and diagnoses today. In the late 1800s, founder of eugenics Francis Galton believed the 
body “told the truth about one’s identity no matter how much one tried to disguise it.”38 Medical 
and legal classifications were, and continue to be, based on the “truth” of the body and those who 
change the gendered presentation of their bodies are often accused of hiding this “truth” – their 
sex assigned at birth. A belief in this “truth” has haunted transsexuals for over 100 years. 
Constructions of transsexualism are still rooted in ableist notions of psychiatric wellness. 
Transsexual narratives similar to those told in the 1950s are often still required for access to 
medical intervention today. In addition, whiteness remains central to constructions of “proper” 
femininity and masculinity, ideals that transsexuals are expected to embody. While current 
descriptions of transsexuals do not include terms like “degeneracy,” its vestigial meanings 
                                                
38 Quoted in: David Serlin, Replaceable You: Engineering the Body in Postwar America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 2004). 12-13. 
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remain. The present-day search for causes and “cures” for transsexualism are rooted in this 
history of eugenics. Recognizing and acknowledging this history is crucial for understanding 
what is at stake when inhabiting these diagnoses, and for how trans communities will negotiate 






















CHAPTER 1  
Eugenics, Sexology, and Transvestite Subjectivities 
 
“I repeat here that it is not our object to create a new human race of superior beings,  
but simply to cause gradual elimination of the unfit…” 
-August Forel, 190 
 
 
At the turn of the 20th century, the term “transsexual” had not yet emerged, and other 
terms like “transvestite” and eugenics were not in common use. However, the first four decades 
of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of both eugenics and diagnoses pertaining to gender 
“deviance.”1 “Transvestite” would evolve to become a broad diagnosis of gender and sexual 
deviance, and eugenics would grow into a nationwide movement advocating for the control of 
genetics in order to “improve” the nation. Eugenicists believed that the white race was not only 
superior, but that the future success of the nation depended on the perpetuation of white racial 
superiority, paired with the elimination of those deemed “unfit” based on notions of degeneracy, 
criminality, perversion, and disability.2 The influence of eugenics during this time and for years 
after, informed the way lawmakers and medical professionals attempted to discipline the 
population through laws, diagnoses, and medical procedures well into the 20th century.3 
 This chapter traces the discourses that shaped the environments in which “transvestite” as 
a diagnosis emerged. I also analyze how power moved within these discourses, and the material 
affects of this power for those deemed “gender deviant.” The production and emergence of 
                                                       
1 For a thorough and focused genealogy of eugenics, see: Nancy Ordover, American Eugenics: Race, Queer 
Anatomy, and the Science of Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).; Wendy Kline, 
Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001).  
2 Laura Ann Stoler argues that the “self” in the 19th century was “affirmed in the proliferating discourses around 
pedagogy, parenting, children’s sexuality, servants… hygiene: micro-sites where designations of racial membership 
were subject to gendered appraisals and where ‘character,’ ‘good breeding,’ and proper rearing were implicitly 
raced.” These discourses function beyond technologies for and disciplining of the self, they also demonstrate how 
intricately whiteness, American-ness, and citizenship were, and remain, co-constitutive. Ann Laura Stoler, Race and 
the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1995). 11. 
3 Troy Duster, Backdoor to Eugenics (New York: Routledge, 1990). Also see: Alex Stern, "Sterilization Abuse in 
State Prisons: Time to Break with California's Long Eugenic Patterns," Huffington Post 22 September 2013. 
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transvestite subjectivities is embedded in eugenics. Analyzing how they are intertwined 
illuminates how transvestite subjects—particularly those who sought medical intervention of 
some kind—were caught in a web of power that involved sexology and eugenics, but also 
medicine, law, politics, and culture. Furthermore, the diagnosis of transvestism was intricately 
intertwined with understandings of sexuality and disability. During this time, sexual deviance 
had not been differentiated from what we might now call gender deviance. Furthermore, much of 
the rhetoric of “psychopathology,” “psychosis,” and “feeblemindedness” were consistent among 
transvestite diagnoses as well as diagnoses specifically geared towards other “conditions” that 
were understood as psychiatric disabilities. 
 
Eugenics, Normalcy, and Abnormality 
Eugenics as a movement and an ideology began to command attention at the turn of the 
20th century. Francis Galton, the founder of eugenics and cousin to Charles Darwin, wanted his 
eugenical framework to be “a new, guiding religion for a secular, rational age: namely 
knowledge of, and control over, human procreation.”4 Eugenicists were anything but bashful in 
their articulation of what they desired concerning the elimination of the unfit.5 In 1906, notable 
eugenicist and psychiatrist August Forel wrote “I repeat here that it is not our object to create a 
new human race of superior beings, but simply to cause gradual elimination of the unfit…” 
                                                       
4 His first use of the term appeared in his book, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development, published in 
1883. Galton was a cousin of Charles Darwin. Lucy Bland and Laura Doan, eds., Sexology Uncensored: The 
Documents of Sexual Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 165. It is important to note, also, that 
eugenic influence was broad: eugenicists made research and articles about eugenics widely available beyond the 
public school system. McWhorter notes that “Between 1914 and 1948, 87 percent of science textbook discussed 
eugenics and 70 percent recommended it as practice.” Ladelle McWhorter, Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-
America : A Genealogy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009). 208. 
5 Michel Foucault recognized the reach of eugenics, arguing that “the medicine of perversions and the programs of 
eugenics were the two great innovations in the technology of sex of the second half of the nineteenth century… the 
series composed of perversion-heredity-degenerescence formed the solid nucleus of the new technologies of sex.” 
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage Books, 1976). 118.  
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Those deemed unworthy of children varied over time, but there were several consistent 
“categories” of individuals that almost always appeared on the list of the “unfit.” Forel, for 
example, created a list entitled “Types to Eliminate.” He wrote: 
First of all we must understand that negative action is much easier than positive. It is easier 
to mention the types which should not be allowed to multiply than those which should. 
These are, in the first place, all criminals, lunatics, and imbeciles, and all individuals who 
are irresponsible, mischievous, quarrelsome or amoral.6  
 
In 1907, one year after the publication of “Types to Eliminate,” California passed the first state 
eugenic law allowing for the sterilization of anyone deemed sexually perverse.7 Two years later 
in 1909 Karl Pearson, Galton’s successor, argued for the “scope and importance of the state” in 
relation to what he callused the “science” of national eugenics, advocating for the sterilization of 
all those deemed degenerate, including sexual inverts.8 Eugenic ideology was not invested in 
                                                       
6 August Forel, The Sexual Question: A Scientific, Psychological, Hygienic and Sociological Study, trans. C.F. 
Marshall (U.S.A. : Project Gutenberg eBook; Physicians and Surgeons Book Company, 1906). 512. 
7 “Sexual perversion” was a board term and included those engaging in homosexual sex acts, to unmarried women 
engaging in sexual activity. By 1932, twenty-nine other states had enacted sterilization statutes. As eugenics scholar 
Nancy Ordover notes, these laws allowed physicians to sterilize anyone “with a real or imagined physical or 
developmental disability.” Ordover, American Eugenics: Race, Queer Anatomy, and the Science of Nationalism. 79. 
Sterilization entered the public consciousness as an approach to bettering the race, making it less egregious to the 
general public. As eugenicists gained a foothold within organized medicine as well as the larger cultural milieu, the 
number of sterilizations rose steadily over the next 23 years, with an average of 2,273 sterilizations annually being 
performed on women by the 1930s, an average 10 times higher than the average number between 1907 and 1920. 
Kline, Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom. 4. 
During the 1930s, over 20,000 sterilizations were performed. The sterilization laws, while aimed primarily at 
criminals and individuals with disabilities, also affected individuals seen as sexual perverts. Historian Estelle 
Freedman writes “along with the goal of preventing the reproduction of the insane, feeble-minded, and mentally 
defective population, these laws sanctioned the sterilization of sexual perverts.” Estelle B. Freedman, Redefining 
Rape: Sexual Violence in the Era of Suffrage and Segregation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). 175, 
emphasis mine. Some of these laws required the sterilization of sodomites if convicted several times of the same 
crime or, in Nebraska, as a prerequisite for discharge or parole. Ordover, American Eugenics: Race, Queer 
Anatomy, and the Science of Nationalism. 80. 
8 Karl Pearson, developed the method of biometrics to help to make eugenics a broader and more encompassing 
ideology. Biometrics is a statistical methodology that categorized “the human population in terms of different 
physical and mental characteristics, and correlating them between parents and offspring,” and allowed eugenicists to 
identify “fitness’ and ‘unfitness’… and traced back through family lines of heredity.” Rather than focusing on 
individuals and procreation, Pearson shifted eugenics in a more biopolitical direction by providing a tool allowing it 
to be applied to the level of the population. His methodology also marked a shift in focus; rather than examine only 
those who are currently “unfit,” it was important to examine their entire genetic and hereditary history. By 
expanding the purview and interests of eugenics, Pearson was responsible, in part, for the ways in which eugenics 
played out at various levels of power in the U.S. during that time. Bland and Doan, Sexology Uncensored: The 
Documents of Sexual Science. 165. 
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“individual rights,” but rather the future of the race, in those who were “eugenically valuable” 
and could produce normal offspring.9  
 Definitions of who was “eugenically valuable” and notions of normality shifted, but one 
thing remained consistent: whiteness. Diagnosing “transvestism” and identifying those 
individuals as abnormal implicitly supported eugenicist aims of “building a better” white race. 
The diagnoses relied on eugenic ideals and worked to maintain a white, able-minded, and 
heterosexual definition for the “normal” subject. Queer theorist and critical historian Julian 
Carter argues that discourses of “normality” emerged at the turn of the twentieth century, and 
that they appeared to be politically neutral, but always housed ideologies of white racial 
dominance and the heterosexual reproduction that perpetuated it. Because eugenics heavily 
influenced sexology as a discipline, ideologies of normality, white racial dominance, ableism, 
and heterosexuality were foundational to the construction of “transvestite,” a term that emerged 
in this first decade of the 1900s just as sexology was establishing itself as a legitimate academic 
discipline.  
 
The Implications of Etiology 
 In the late 1800s and early 1900s, sexologists’ writings did not reflect a conception of 
gender transgression as something distinct from transgressions of sexual desire or sexual 
                                                       
9 Eugenics was part of a larger movement now referred to as scientific racism. Feminist scholar and theologian 
Laurel Schneider, in her work on racism in the 20th century, traces some of its roots to the emergence of scientific 
racism n the 19th century. She argues that the discourses and logics created by “race scientists” in the 19th century 
“made sex and gender foundational to a racial theory of white supremacy” through conceiving of whiteness and 
maleness as the ideal. As whiteness and maleness also because synonymous with class status and wealth, “gender 
and race both became instruments of class by mirroring the priorities of those already in positions of power,” and I 
would add ablebodymindedness to gender and race. The establishment of these categories and their material effects 
began well before sexology was emerged as a discipline. French and German race theorists in the 19th century were 
collaborators in constructing what Schneider calls “the ‘natural’ rightness of white upper-class sex and gender 
practices as paradigmatic of true and originally human ideals, thus radicalizing those practices and solidifying them 
in a class structure.” It constructs and theories like these that influenced the shape eugenics would take in the 20th 
century. Laurel Schneider, "What Race Is Your Sex," in Disrupting White Supremacy from Within, ed. Jennifer 
Harvey, Karin A. Case, and Robin Hawley Gorsline (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2008). 154, 157. 
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behavior. “Inversion,” for example, one of the original terms for homosexuality, did not actually 
describe male sexual desire for other males, which was in some ways inconceivable for 
sexologists at the time. Rather inversion described female sexual desire for a man located in a 
male body. In his 1886 work Psychopathia Sexualis, sexologist and psychiatrist Richard von 
Krafft-Ebing outlined various degrees of inversion, indicating that homosexuality and male 
femininity were various manifestations of a similar condition.10 Dressing in the clothes of the 
opposite sex was classified as a fetish or perversion, and as inversion, rather than as a condition 
or diagnosis all its own. Krafft-Ebing clearly articulated what he believed caused inversion and 
other abnormalities like it: degeneracy.  
 Eugenicist and sexologists alike relied heavily on “degeneracy” as an explanation for a 
number of sexual and gender “perversions,” and aligned perversions with criminality and 
psychiatric disability. For example, eugenicist F.E. Daniel argued in 1893 that heredity 
controlled more than sexual perversion – it also controlled criminality and insanity, establishing 
a close association among the three. He advocated for the criminalization of sexual perversion, 
arguing that a cure for this “illnesses” was castration. Countering Daniel’s call to criminalize 
these sexual anomalies was Havelock Ellis, a well-known eugenicist and one of the founders of 
the sexology. Ellis, both in 1896 and again in 1897, advocated for the decriminalization of sexual 
inversion in all of its manifestations – including homosexual sex acts and cross-dressing – as 
long as adult individuals engaged in their “abnormal acts” in private. He argued that if others did 
not witness these acts and if they did not cause a public disturbance, they should not be illegal.  
 Sexologists differed in their explanation about what “caused” perversion. Kraff-Ebing 
blamed degeneracy for sexual perversion. Ellis argued that both heredity and psychology play a 
                                                       
10 Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis with Special References to the Antipathic Sexual Instinct: A 
Medico-Forensic Study, trans. F.J. Rebman (New York: Rebman Company, 1900). 285-6.  
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role in causing perversion, that inversion was not a sign of deterioration of the genes, but rather a 
birth defect or a latent predisposition that manifested because of environmental factors in early 
childhood. Ellis did not connect sexual perversion and heredity, but his constructions of 
perversion was still linked to pathology. These debates about causes, as well as potential “cures,” 
would continue for years to come. However, regardless of the “cause” of perversion, one thing 
remained consistent: the connections sexologists made among biology, perversion, and moral 
character.  
Feminist theorist and historian Jennifer Terry contextualizes the concepts of “biological 
deficiencies” in relation to physiology and psychology, and argues that today we often think of 
the biological domain of the body as somewhat distinct from the psyche.11 However, she argues 
that throughout the much of the twentieth century, “sexologists did not understand these to be 
clearly differentiated domains.” Instead, she argues: 
an individual’s constitution encompassed biological attributes as well as moral, intellectual, 
and psychical qualities, all of which were seen to be deeply reflective of each other and 
embedded in an individual’s body. In the case of homosexuality, an individual’s tendency 
toward perverse acts was seen as evidence of innate moral inferiority as well as biological 
deficiency. Conversely, those who were robust and free of perverse temptations were seen 
to be biologically sound and morally upright.12 
 
Clarifying how sexologists grappled with a body’s “constitution” is crucial for understanding 
how deviance was constructed, particularly when a body’s “constitution” indicated not only 
one’s physical and psychiatric well-being, but also one’s moral standing. Their etiological 
explanation of these perversions as congenital abnormalities rather then degenerate ones 
complicated the narratives and discourses of causation, but failed to disconnect morality from 
perversion and what they considered to be degeneracy.  
                                                       
11 Jennifer Terry and Jacqueline Urla, Deviant Bodies: Critical Perspectives on Difference in Science and Popular 
Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). 131. 
12 Ibid. 131. 
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 Sexologists like Havelock Ellis and Magnus Hirschfeld cast themselves as advocates for 
those diagnosed or labeled as “sexual degenerates.” Their etiological explanation of these 
perversions as congenital abnormalities rather then degenerate ones complicated the narratives 
and discourses of causation, but failed to disconnect morality from perversion. While they 
attempted to separate what they claimed were “congenital sexual pathologies” from the “realms 
of morality and religion and move them to the purview of science and medicine,” these 
sexologists, influenced by eugenic discourse, simultaneously reinforced what feminist scholar 
Siobhan Somerville argues were “concepts of immutable difference which were the backbone of 
racial hierarchies and justifications for segregation and imperialism.”13 In other words, 
sexologists reified the connections among what they “considered sexual pathologies” to morality, 
degeneracy, and racism. 
Other scholars have focused on some of these intersections, particularly regarding 
homosexuality. Somerville argues that race and sexuality discourses intertwined because of their 
relationships to the concept of degeneracy. Instead of evolving towards civilization, 
respectability, and bourgeois ethics, degenerates were those who regressed, “resulting in a 
weakened nervous system and the emergence of ‘primitive’ physical and mental traits,” notions 
that would influence the medical field throughout the twentieth century.14 The belief that U.S. 
society was becoming more dysgenic was also common. Non-white bodies were often among 
those understood as degenerate.  
Sexologists often cast the bodies of those considered to be not white as more primitive 
and less developed, particularly in regard to sexual differentiation. Somerville notes that as a 
result of this “sexual characteristics became a key site for establishing ‘normal’ and ‘generate’ 
                                                       
13 Siobhan B. Somerville, Queering the Color Line: Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in American Culture 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000). 202-3. 
14 Ibid. 202. 
 
 27 
anatomy.” In particular, inversion, which again at the time was understood as a “man’s soul in a 
woman’s body, or vice versa,” was believed to be caused by degeneracy. This belief emerged 
from within a discourse that, in Somerville’s word, “saw homosexuality as a reversion to a 
sexually undifferentiated past… [where] the bodies of sexual degenerates… are analogous to 
criminals and ‘primitive’ races.”15 We know that these narratives and ideologies did not produce 
“truths” about homosexuality or people of color, but they did produce bodily norms against 
which notions of abnormality would be constructed.16 Similarly, eugenic ideologies and 
narratives of degeneracy did not produce the “truth” about transvestism, but they did produce the 
gender norms against which notions of gender deviance would be constructed. 
 
From Inversion to Intermediaries and Eonism  
 In the first several decades of the 1900s, distinctions between gender, sex, and sexuality 
were beginning to take shape. It was in this context that in 1910, German physician Magnus 
Hirschfeld published Transvestites: The Erotic Drive to Cross-Dress. Hirschfeld’s treatise 
provides insight into how transvestites, particularly those seeking medical intervention, were 
caught in a web of politics around the evolving norms of sexuality, race, and disability. It also 
marked an important shift in discourses about abnormal sexuality and gender. Hirschfeld’s 
understanding of “normal” gender, his explanations of heredity and mental illness, his anxiety 
concerning marriage and reproduction, and his praise of eugenicists’ assessment of transvestism 
all demonstrated the influence of eugenics in his writing.  
 Hirschfeld was among the first to suggest that transvestism was related to but distinct 
from homosexuality. In fact, he argued that most transvestites were heterosexual. Other 





sexologists, and many psychoanalysts, believed that cross-dressing was a severe manifestation of 
homosexuality. This framed transvestism as gender inversion rather than sexual inversion. 
Hirschfeld disagreed. Rather than transvestism falling under the rubric of sexual inversion 
(homosexuality), his use of four categories of “intermediaries” provided a different lens through 
which to understand gender as distinct from sexuality. Hirschfeld argued that his demarcation 
was “not a matter of theory… but rather only a principle of division.”17 However, just as with 
sexual inversion, he incorporated heredity and degeneracy into the diagnosis of transvestite. 
After providing “evidence” of the fundamental femininity of the “feminine core cell” [the egg] 
and the masculinity of the “male core cell” [sperm], Hirschfeld argued that children contain germ 
cells from both parents. The “egg cells and the semen cells have a manly or womanly 
predilection,” and these “predilections” affected the inclinations of the child.18 In addition to 
discussing the hereditary aspects of biology, in eleven of the seventeen cases discussed, 
Hirschfeld commented on degeneracy within the transvestite’s families. He argued that in each 
case “a neurotic disposition… could be suggestive of a present degenerative constitution.”19 
Commenting on degeneracy and heredity was not only a common eugenic practice of the time, 
but was expected when discussing deviance. Hirschfeld’s reliance on eugenic strategies reified 
the co-constitutive nature of transvestism and other “degenerate” conditions. 
 He proposed four types of intermediaries, defined as individuals who failed to embody 
male masculinity or female femininity and deviated from the norm in at least one of these ways: 
1) sexual organs, individuals known as hermaphrodites; 2) other physical characteristics, 
individuals with secondary sex characteristics of the opposite sex, i.e., men with gynecomastia or 
                                                       
17 Magnus Hirschfeld, Transvestites: The Erotic Drive to Cross Dress, trans. M.A. Lombardi (Buffalo: Prometheus 
Books, 1991). 215. 
18 Ibid. 219. 
19 Ibid. 144. 
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women with facial hair; 3) sex drive, those engaging in homosexual or non-normative 
heterosexual sex acts; or 4) other emotional characteristics, individuals labeled as transvestites.20 
That transvestism was placed under a rubric of emotion reflects an evolving approach to what 
many sexologists struggled to define. Particularly because their work focused mostly on men 
who were effeminate and whose dress reflected this effeminacy, Hirschfeld’s use of emotion is 
perhaps not surprising, as women were thought to be more “emotional” than men. A diagnosis of 
emotion here also indicates the belief that the emotions were wrong or were manifesting 
improperly. Sexologists and eugenicists often attributed emotionality to those labeled unfit (for 
example, those diagnosed with hysteria are as some other diagnosis due to sporadic emotional 
outbursts). That transvestism, here, is aligned with an emotional “characteristic” places the 
diagnosis among other “unfit” emotional diagnoses. 
This theory of intermediaries relied on a clear division between femininity and 
masculinity, both rooted in a white, middle-class, and able-minded norm. Hirschfeld never 
directly mentioned race but his explication of women’s sexuality, that women should be “the 
receiver, responder… the more passive partner” to a man, mirrors cultural expectations based on 
understandings of white sexuality.21 Black women were constructed as “beyond the moral 
constraints of white sexuality codes” that included “purity, piety, domesticity, and 
submissiveness…the four ideals towards which (white) women should strive.”22 Instead, black 
women were often portrayed as lascivious and hypersexual.23 Throughout his writings, 
Hirschfeld’s understanding of “normal” femininity, therefore, mirrored that of white femininity. 
                                                       
20 Ibid. 220. 
21  ibid. 216. 
22 (Maurer 39 
23  (Skidmore 292). 
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 Hirschfeld’s distinctions within “intermediary” categories are important to note. He 
categorized males who cross-dressed intermittently together with those whose sole desire was to 
be women.24 However, he distinguished transvestism from metamorphosis sexualis paranoica, a 
congenital “mental illness.” He argued that most transvestites knew that they were not really 
women, even if they sometimes felt like one. Those who truly believed they were women, 
Hirschfeld believed, suffered from insanity or delusions. Hirschfeld’s association of gender 
abnormality and “congenital mental illness” was not uncommon. The terms describing “mental 
illness” varied, but they almost always included the “unfit” and sexual “perverts” and were more 
often applied to poor people and people of color. In line with eugenic goals of bettering the race, 
these individuals were either sterilized or strongly encouraged to not reproduce.  
 Hirschfeld’s discussion of marriage and reproduction also revealed his reliance on 
eugenics. He asserted that heterosexual love was normal, even if one individual cross-dressed. 
He even provided cases of individuals cross-dressing in order to accompany their heterosexual 
partner to work or in travel. Hirschfeld believed that this demonstrated an increased level of 
heterosexual, and therefore normal, devotion and commitment. However, Hirschfeld questioned 
the “suitability” of marriages between transvestites and their opposite-sex partners, despite his 
indication that many transvestites were in happy, heterosexual marriages. He was particularly 
doubtful about reproduction within these marriages. He believed that the children of transvestites 
might “be endangered by a heredity burden,” or that the deviation of transvestism might “lead to 
offspring who are psychologically disunified… [and] unstable, degenerated individuals.”25 He 
                                                       
24 Hirschfeld did briefly discuss individuals assigned female at birth, but the majority of his text and his research 
focused on those assigned male at birth. Do you have any thoughts/research about why he did that? / why that was a 
general trend in this kind of work? Maybe that isn’t important it just strikes me as a reader. 
25 Hirschfeld, Transvestites: The Erotic Drive to Cross Dress. 235. 
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believed that transvestites were not “fit[] to enter into marriage” or to reproduce.26 Hirschfeld 
aligned himself with eugenics when he expressed anxieties concerning transvestites marrying 
and reproducing, two actions that eugenicists sought to control.  
 At times, Hirschfeld demonstrated what might be considered sympathy towards 
transvestites. While he was reproachful in his writing about transvestites marrying, he advocated 
for the protection of transvestism as a legitimate, albeit abnormal, way of existing in the world. 
He felt that the laws condemning cross-dressing for transvestites were unjust. This sympathy, 
however, failed to affect his writings about larger connections between criminality and cross-
dressing. One entire chapter of Transvestites focused on a discussion of how criminals utilize 
cross-dressing to evade the law and to escape arrest for crimes committed, reflecting a larger 
discursive tendency within both sexology and eugenics to align transvestism with criminality. He 
at no point directly differentiated between those who cross-dress because of an inborn desire and 
those that cross-dress as an “intentional deception.”27 Hirschfeld here did not succeed in 
differentiating transvestites from criminals and cross-dressing, despite his profession that 
transvestites should not be condemned for it.  
 Lastly, Hirschfeld praised well-known eugenicist and psychiatrist August Forel’s etiology 
of transvestism. Hirschfeld quoted Forel description of one “case” at length. Forel describes an 
individual, born male, who “maintain[ed] he [was] a girl.”28 After describing the normal 
appearance of his genitals, Forel asserted that this person was “sexually anesthetic,” or asexual. 
This was enough evidence for Forel to assert that his psychosexual condition—his inversion and 
“emotional hermaphroditism”—was “predetermined by heredity.”29 Hirschfeld cited Forel as an 
                                                       
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 297. 
28 Ibid. 321. 
29 Ibid.  
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expert source, supporting his hereditary explanation for transvestism as a degenerate condition, 
an explanation that was explicitly informed by eugenic logic. Aligning himself with Forel and 
this particular etiology of transvestism indicates Hirschfeld’s belief in the accuracy of eugenic 
explanations for degenerative “conditions.”  
 In the decades following the publication of The Transvestites, it was impossible to 
discuss transvestism without also discussing eugenics, due in part to the wide influence of 
Hirschfeld’s book, but also because most writings by eugenicists and sexologists engaged the 
same discourses as Hirschfeld. Eugenicist thinking remained central to the solidification of 
“transvestite” and eventually “transsexual” as diagnoses over the next forty years. Reading 
Hirschfeld’s text with this in mind, while also recognizing the discursive and historical context in 
which he wrote and his lasting influence in the field of sexology, makes visible how 
understandings of gender and eugenics were not only mutually productive, but inseparable.  
 In 1920, ten years after Hirschfeld published Die Transvestiten, Havelock Ellis, a well-
known sexologist and a contemporary of Hirschfeld, published a short article in a journal called 
The Medical Review of Reviews entitled “Eonism.” This piece, following Hirschfeld, worked to 
differentiate sexual perversion from cross-dressing. In fact, Ellis preferred not to use the term 
“sexo-esthetic inversion” because it recalled too easily the idea of homosexuality. Ellis instead 
used the term eonism, as it was less apt “to arouse suggestions of homosexuality, which may be 
quite absent.”30 The necessity for this distinction reflects a shift in the discourse away from 
placing transvestism under the larger umbrella of sexual deviance.31  
                                                       
30 Havelock Ellis, "Eonism," Medical Review of Reviews 26, no. 1 (1920). 4. 
31 As historian Joanne Meyerowitz asserts, sexologists often “subsumed crossgender identification under the broader 
rubric of ‘inversion’ and associated it primarily with homosexuality.” Even the popular press made little attempt to 
parse out the difference between those labeled as transvestites and “inverts,” or men who desired same-sex sexual 
behavior. As Meyerowitz notes, “popular stories rarely distinguished sex, gender, and sexuality… they usually 
melded a number of phenomena that today we might consider distinct.” While we cannot expect the journalists of 
the time to have a 21st century lens through which to examine behaviors deemed deviant, it is important to recognize 
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 According to Ellis, many of the eonists he conversed with were different from 
homosexuals; he claimed to be impressed by their morals as well as their refinement, sensitivity, 
and high intelligence.32 As such, he expressed disagreement with the classification of 
transvestism as a fetish but also dissatisfaction with his own understanding about why these men 
dressed in clothes of the opposite sex. He was one of the first proponents of the notion that 
dressing was not about disguise, but that instead transvestites felt a sense of relief when dressed, 
that “he has thereby become emancipated from a disguise, and is at last really himself.”33 Ellis 
explained that this longing was rooted in heredity and that the environment one was raised in 
assisted in the manifestation of these desires. However, the “cause” was ultimately physiological 
like other “aberration[s] of the sexual impulse.”34 He never explicitly classified transvestism as a 
disease, but instead as an abnormal pathology.  
While Ellis did not wholly agree with Hirschfeld’s assertion that inversion and 
transvestism were various iterations of “intermediaries,” and despite the fact that Ellis 
understood homosexuality and eonism as distinct phenomena, his beliefs did reflect the idea that 
common threads existed between sexual abnormality (homosexuality) and transvestism. The 
difficulties of parsing out sexual deviance from gender deviance, though, were caused in part by 
discursive histories that found commonalities  among “perversions” and racist understandings of 
humanity.  
 
Ellis, Sterilization, and Abnormality 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the overlapping discourses that included both notions of sexuality and of gender expression, particularly because 
many individuals who cross-dressed did not consider themselves homosexuals. In fact, many “eonists” worked 
diligently to establish firm distinctions between themselves and homosexuality. Joanne J. Meyerowitz, How Sex 
Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 15, 32. 
32 Ellis, "Eonism." 11. 
33 Ibid. 3, emphasis mine. 
34 Ibid. 11. 
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 Ellis, an ardent supporter of eugenics, was particularly interested in the relationship 
between eugenics and sexology.35 He linked sexual abnormalities to degeneracy and 
reproduction, and distinguished more “superior” human races from “savages.” He believed that 
the eugenic ideal would manifest through natural, instinctive, and unconscious impulses and that 
this ideal would, for example, “lead men and women to reject as partners only the men and 
women who are naturally unfit—the diseased, the abnormal, the weaklings.”36 This instinct 
would help to limit the reproduction of “savages,” but would also help to control sexual instincts. 
It would help those who were “fit” to only reproduce with others deemed “fit.” 
 As early as 1896 Ellis explicitly linked degeneracy with sexual perversion in a piece he 
co-wrote with Dr. E. S. Talbot.37 Ellis and Talbot described the case of Guy T. Olmstead. 
Olmstead, burdened by a history of “insanity,” paranoia, and stints in asylums, attempted a 
murder-suicide with a former male lover. Despite an imperfect historical record available for 
Olmstead’s case, Ellis was confident in regarding this man as “the subject of ill-defined 
hereditary degeneration.”38 Ellis understood the cause of his “homosexual perversion” to be 
congenital, as evidenced by his “physical conformation,” citing that the “parasitic growth of 
sexual inversion” was nourished by the “favorable soil” in Olmstead’s background and history.39 
The conformation Ellis and Talbot referred to here concerned Olmstead’s physical structure – 
Olmstead is described as having a “normal and fair” physical condition overall, but with small 
genitals described as a “rudimentary penis.”40  
                                                       
35 Ellis, a discipline of Galton, served a term as president of the Galton Institute as well as vice-president of the 
Eugenics Education Society. 
36 Havelock Ellis, The Task of Social Hygiene, Project Gutenberg Ebook Edition ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1916). 207-8, emphasis mine. 
37 Talbot was a dentist, but was also well-known for his writing on degeneracy and criminal anthropology.  
38 E.S. Talbot and Havelock Ellis, "A Case of Degenerative Insanity with Sexual Inversion, Melancholia, Following 
Removal of Testicles, Attempted Murder and Suicide," The Journal of Mental Science 42, no. 177 (1896). 345. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 341. 
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 By the 1910s, Ellis had also firmly established himself as a supporter of sterilization for 
those deemed “unfit.” In his 1911 work The Problem of Race Regeneration, Ellis outlined his 
understanding of eugenics. He argued that the success of eugenics rested largely on personal 
responsibility, that “the finer breeding of the race is a matter that is primarily settled in the 
individual conscience.”41 As such, Ellis claimed to disagree with compulsory or forced 
sterilization. Rather, he affirmed the idea that, “It is the more reasonable, as well as the more 
Christian plan, to allow the unfit to make themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of Heaven’s 
sake… [and] should not even be applied to irresponsible lunatics who are under restraint.”42 
Through governing oneself and making “responsible” decisions in the interest of the race would 
render forced sterilization unnecessary. Ellis reiterated his rejection of forced sterilization in The 
Task of Social Hygiene (1912), stating that: 
the only compulsion we can apply in eugenics is the compulsion that comes from within. 
All those in whom any fine sense of social and racial responsibility is developed will 
desire, before marriage, to give, and to receive, the fullest information on all the matters 
that concern ancestral inheritance.43  
 
He was not alone in this view and it cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to his sexological writings.  
 Despite his reluctance to require sterilization for the ‘unfit’, Ellis expressed concern with 
the “kind of people” who were born into families with histories of degeneracy, namely “tramps, 
prostitutes, paupers, criminals, inebriates, all tending to be born a little defective.”44 While he did 
not explicitly name “sexual perverts” here, sexual perversion is linked to these subject positions 
                                                       
41 Havelock Ellis, The Problem of Race-Regeneration, New Tracts for the Times (New York: Moffat, Yard & 
Company, 1911). 60. 
42 Ibid. 63. This belief falls directly in line Julian Carter’s assertion that “self-governance was the core value at the 
heart of whiteness,” a notion he attributes to African American Atudies scholar Matthew Frye Jacobsen. Julian B. 
Carter, The Heart of Whiteness: Normal Sexuality and Race in America, 1880-1940 (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2007). 35. 
43 Ellis, The Task of Social Hygiene. 45. 
44 The Problem of Race-Regeneration. 39. 
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through the common denominator of congenital abnormality and through constructions of 
degeneracy.45  
 
Legislating Criminality and Inversion  
 While sexual perversion was often linked to feeble-mindedness and general unfitness, it 
was also linked with criminality. Ellis drew a direct link between criminality and sexual behavior 
when he argued that:  
Criminality, again, is associated with feeble-mindedness in the most intimate way. Not 
only do criminals tend to belong to large families, but the families that produce feeble-
minded offspring also produce criminals, while a certain degree of feeble-mindedness is 
extremely common among criminals, and the most hopeless and typical, though 
fortunately rare, kind of criminal, frequently termed a ‘moral imbecile,’ is nothing more 
than a feeble-minded person whose defect is shown not so much in his intelligence as in 
his feelings and his conduct.46  
 
Conduct here is not explicitly defined, but as homosexual behavior was considered a criminal 
act, there is a direct link between inversion as a behavior and what is being referred to here as 
“criminal conduct.” The recognition that inversion, criminality, and “feeble-mindedness” were 
linked is particularly important considering that Ellis and other sexologists believed that sex 
“penetrated the whole of life,” and that “the impulse of sex is just as fundamental as the impulse 
of nutrition.”47 As such, sex required acknowledgement and consideration: it required 
investigation because it was so central to life and indicative of ones moral character.  
                                                       
45 This opinion would continue to carry significant weight in sexological circles, despite Freud’s difference of 
opinion - that sexuality was not the result of heredity, but rather an emotional and developmental aspect of a 
person’s identity. It follows that gender as we understand it today would also be implicated to some degree in these 
assertions because their co-constitutive nature. Concerning acquired abnormal sexual (and gender) perversion, Ellis 
mentions that parents must be trained to raise children well so that mothers, in particular, do not provide false ideas 
of sex. This anxiety over parenting, as well as the influence of schools, in relation to sexual hygiene, and fitness 
more generally, had been seen already in Hirschfeld’s work but would become a common theme in eugenically and 
sexological literature over the following decades. 
46 Ellis, The Task of Social Hygiene. 39. 
47 Ibid. 255-6. 
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The discursive links between sexuality and degeneracy also informed sexologists’ views 
on the role of the legal system in relation to regulating and controlling sexual abnormalities. An 
entire chapter of Ellis’ The Task of Social Hygiene concerns “Immorality and the Law.” In this 
chapter, Ellis discussed the legal implications of inversion and other sexual and gender 
“abnormalities.” He discussed the need to distinguish between immorality and criminality here, 
but found it difficult to parse out what was considered immoral from what was considered 
illegal, asserting that disgust for a behavior or action should not necessitate its illegality. Simply 
because individuals might be offended by particular behaviors, like homosexuality or cross-
dressing, he argued, did not provide reason to punish those behaviors “with extreme severity.”48  
Ellis recognized the subjectivity of what constituted an “immoral” or anti-social act.49 He 
even provided a brief recognition of hierarchies of privilege, naming the fact that laws, once 
instituted, influence common constructions of morality and no longer represented the whole 
community but rather tended to “merely [reflect] an expression of the feelings of a small upper-
class social circle.”50 However, Ellis contradicted himself in these assertions when arguing that if 
an anti-social act was met “with a reaction of social indignation which is fairly universal and 
permanent, it may be regarded as a crime coming under the jurisdiction of the law.” If opinion 
varied, however, it should not be considered a “crime.” He repeated this type of argument several 
times within his work, reflecting a powerful morality discourse operating in relation to notions of 
criminality, normalcy, and perversion.51 The logic of his arguments concerning crime and morals 
was predicated on an understanding that morality was not legislated and that criminal law did not 
reflect the dominant, and dominating, morality of his particular context. Furthermore, any 
                                                       
48 Ibid. 255. 
49 Ibid. 263. 
50 Ibid. 262. 
51 While he did not support criminalizing homosexuality, he did place the conversation concerning homosexuality in 
among a discussion concerning the sale of alcohol, prostitution, the “age of consent” for girls, and molestation – all 
of which were issues falling under the purview of legislation. 
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intention Ellis had regarding the decriminalization of sexual and gender deviance falls short, as 
his rhetoric continually links criminality, abnormality, and eugenics.  
Responses to sexual “abnormalities” reveal the overlapping nature of discourses 
regarding sexology and eugenic, but also legal discourses. As early as 1882, laws were in place 
that criminalized inversion and its various manifestations. Between 1848 and 1952, thirty-nine 
cities across the U.S. passed anti-cross-dressing laws.52 As these laws multiplied, so too did 
arrests of those soliciting or engaging in “lewd acts,” “sodomy,” “crimes against nature,” and 
also cross-dressing. Though these anti-cross-dressing laws were not synonymous with sodomy 
and “lewd acts,” they were closely associated. Legal scholar William Eskridge, writing of the 
growing surveillance concerning gender and sexual deviance, provides one particularly striking 
example from 1919 involving an investigator who “uncovered a subculture of fairies among the 
Newport sailors.”53 These men had formal charges brought against them and were labeled “moral 
degenerates.” This was, in part, because of their homosexual behavior, but also because these 
men dressed as women. 
 
The Burden of a Nation 
 Both eugenicists and sexologists associated homosexuality and gender deviance with the 
“lower races” and “savages,” and with stunted development in relation to physical or 
psychological growth. This language and these connections emerged from racist scientific 
discourse and practice dating back years before “transvestism” became a subject position. For 
example, Ellis wrote that “On the whole, evidence shows that among lower races homosexual 
practices are regarded with considerable indifference, and the real invert… generally passes 
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unperceived… [thus] the uncultured man of civilization is linked to the savage.”54 In her work 
about homosexuality and surveillance, feminist scholar Jennifer Terry provides evidence that 
Krafft-Ebing held many of the same views. Sexual perversion was evidence of a “sign of a 
lagging evolutionary process,” and was closely associated with ambiguous sex characteristics or 
gender ambiguity. Thus, these abnormal manifestations of sex were “interpreted to be primitive 
and, most likely, degenerate… unfinished specimens of stunted evolutionary growth, a status 
they shared with ‘savages’ and certain types of criminals.”55 Regardless of the condition caused 
by this “degeneracy,” each condition causing one to be unfit was seen as a burden not only for 
the race, but also for the nation.56 
Disability scholar Kim Nielson further highlights the intersections between race, 
disability, and sexuality, discussing the numerous actions that led one to be labeled “a burden.” 
In the 1910s, Alice Smith, a white woman, was deemed defective and then sterilized by 
authorities because after leaving her abusive father, she lived with a black man and became 
pregnant. Authorities justified the sterilization citing the fear that without it she would “be the 
cause of a new generation of epileptics and imbeciles.”57 Nielsen argues that the “disability 
                                                       
54 Havelock Ellis, "Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Vol. Vii: Eonism," in Sexology Uncensored: The Documents of 
Sexual Science (1928), ed. Lucy Bland and Laura Doan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998). 210, 
emphasis mine. 
55 Terry and Urla, Deviant Bodies: Critical Perspectives on Difference in Science and Popular Culture. 135. 
56 Historical anxieties about degeneracy, disease, and defectiveness affected access to citizenship, both for those 
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57 Harry H. Laughlin, Eugenical Sterilization in the United States (Chicago: Psychopathic Laboratory of the 
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transgressions” for Smith were “racial, sexual, and class based.”58 “Disability transgressions” 
references the ways in which Smith, but also others, transgressed normative expectations in ways 
that “caused” disability – medically or socially. When an individual performed or embodied 
these transgressions, they could be, and often were, labeled as “disabled” – particularly as having 
a psychiatric disability. Smith—because she was sexually active, involved with an African 
American man, and poor—was constructed as disabled, which in turn made her subject to legal 
and medical surveillance and control. She had become a “burden.”  
The particularities of Smith’s case hold meaning for considerations of transvestism 
during this time. Transgressions of gender expression during the 1920s were never wholly 
separate from race, sexuality, and disability. If one “transgressed” whiteness, able-mindedness, 
and sex within intra-racial heterosexual marriage, they were subject to medical and legal 
surveillance. As gender deviance was linked to degeneracy and defectiveness, it fell under the 
purview of discourses of disability and medical intervention, particularly at the behest of 
eugenicists and a discourse that was invested in keeping the (white) race pure and free of 
“defectives.”59 
Support for sterilization increased in the 1910s and 1920s as a solution to this issue. 
Eugenicist Harry H. Laughlin, in his 1922 publication Eugenical Sterilization in the United 
States, defined the “unfit” as those who were “socially inadequate,” a term vague enough to 
include almost anyone who either lived with an identifiable disability, stepped outside of the 
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59 Race and disability discourses were central to the “dehumanizing practices of eugenics” and disability scholar 
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social, sexual, or legal order even slightly, or suffered from an infectious disease.60 Referencing 
socially inadequate persons, rather than classes, Laughlin argued that, “the whole purpose of 
eugenical sterilization is to prevent the reproduction of persons who, because of their hereditary 
make-up, would be destined to become social menaces or wards of the state.”61 Laughlin 
constructed a definition so broad as to include any person or class subject to changing and 
malleable definitions of weakness, disability, and degeneracy.62 
 This belief that “the unfit” caused a burden on the nation included concerns that extended 
beyond sexuality and sexual preference. Laughlin and other eugenicists discussed the “cost of the 
socially inadequate,” arguing that these individuals were a financial burden for the state. 
Laughlin wrote in 1928 that:  
the inability of the inadequates to support themselves, their lack of participation in the 
production of wealth and their hindrance to progress, welfare and sanitation generally, 
greatly outweigh their direct money charge to the state.63  
 
He cited the appropriations for the state of New York for the 1928 fiscal year, showing that 
fifteen percent of those appropriations (totaling over thirty-two million dollars) was spent on 
                                                       
60 Laughlin provides this list: “The socially inadequate classes, regardess of etiology or prognosis, are the following: 
(1) Feebleminded; (2) Insane, (including the psychopathic); (3) Criminalistic (including the delinquent and 
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classification of social handicap and degeneracy,” he would have found that the 10 classes of individuals mentioned 
about “include the whole range of social inadequacy… [and] is therefore proper by statutory definition to draw a 
definite line of demarcation between the socially effective and the socially ineffective members of the community.” 
As seemingly disparate communities were listed together, they all were reduced to one simplified category: the 
unfit. Ibid.   




institutions and aides “chargeable to… [the] feeble-minded, insane, criminalistic, epileptic, blind, 
deaf, paupers, and other institutionalized and socially aided classes.”64 This understanding of 
abnormality as a burden, both social and financial, was consistent with the eugenic ideology held 
by Galton and his predecessor Karl Pearson. Degeneracy and abnormality, regardless of how 
they manifested, resulted in individuals being not “worth” the cost of their care. While gender 
deviance was not named here, the links between gender deviance, criminality, 
institutionalization, and disability firmly places it within this list.65  
 The goals for eugenicists to “better the race” remained consistent, regardless of how they 
achieved those goals or how eugenicists defined the cause of the “unfit.” Rubin, a eugenicist who 
believed that both heredity and environment could influence an individual’s character, argued 
that “the fertilized egg… contains within itself all that ultimately develops… [but] environment 
may modify these characteristics…”66 However, his political investments leaned heavily toward 
supporting sterilization laws. He even called these laws “splendid.”67 His understanding of 
heredity and genetics aligned with the most popular understandings of eugenics at the time, 
including the notion that characteristics can be inherited from distant relatives going back 
“scores of generations” and that “those who are unfit for parenthood — the feeble-minded, 
insane, the epileptic, the syphilitic — should be prevented from producing children, if we are to 
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and morality, constructions linked to concepts of heredity used to justify the withdrawal of resources for black 
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raise the physical and mental standard of the race.”68 Institutions scrutinizing potential parents 
with increasing intensity were particularly important for eugenicists, as sterilization not only 
eliminated “genetic defects,” it also restricted parenthood. Their justification for this was two 
fold: 1) the “feebleminded” should not raise children, especially children who were “normals,” 
and 2) sterilization would not only better the race, it would be cost effective as well.69  
 Along with a concern about the “future of the race,” the “empire” of the U.S. and its 
success as a nation was an ever-present concern. Pearson believed that good stock produced 
good and responsible citizens, that without “fit” citizens “a nation can neither be built up nor an 
empire preserved.”70 Embedding eugenic ideology into his definition of patriotism, Pearson 
argued that individuals must commit to their “national duties” to better the race, rather than 
indulge in their “individual interests.”71 Pearson criticized “the nation” for allowing anybody to 
reproduce, arguing that commitments must be made to support fit parents and their reproduction, 
and that individuals must judge legislation and social habit by 1) preservation of economic value 
of child and 2) emphasis on economic value of child of fit parentage.72 Of course not everyone 
agreed. As I mentioned above, Ellis did not advocate legislating sterilization but instead urged 
that “the finer breeding of the race is a matter that is primarily settled in the individual 
conscience… [o]rder, self-control… intelligent regulation, are necessary in all the matters that 
concern society and the race.”73 Pearson and Ellis most often utilized terms like “feeble-minded” 
or “unfit,” but these broad terms always implicitly included sex and gender “perverts.” If an 
individual was a homosexual, a transvestite, or was labeled as any other type of sexual or gender 
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pervert, by virtue of their perversion or deficiency they should choose to not reproduce, for sake 
of the nation.  
   
The Rebranding of Eugenics 
 The terms used for individuals considered “unfit” was somewhat consistent throughout 
the early half of the 20th century: degenerate, feeble-minded, moron, pervert, idiot, and deviant, 
among others. However, the definitional malleability of those terms, and of eugenics in general, 
also remained constant. Definitions for terms like “unfit,” or “moron,” or “pervert” were 
reshaped time and again to include any number of behaviors, characteristics, or abnormalities. In 
a 1935 issue of The Eugenics Review, the editors sought to clarify the “Aims and Objectives of 
Eugenics” by identifying those whom they believed constituted a “Social Problems Group.” This 
list, created by the “Mental Deficiency Committee” in 1930, identified those who belonged: 
those with characteristics such as “insanity, mental defects, epilepsy, occupational instability, 
recidivism, inebriety and social dependency.”74 If one were identified as having one or more of 
these “characteristics,” the committee would then determine if the cause was hereditary in 
nature. The group claimed that they were relying on objective, scientific evidence for their 
determinations of who was a “social problem.” However, the definitions reflected evolving 
social norms and discourses. Despite the consistency of the terminology used, those deemed 
“unfit” always reflected current social anxieties. Even if “unfit” was defined differently in 1915 
and 1935, the same individuals always seemed to occupy that subject position.    
Eugenicist Ellsworth Huntington played a significant role in helping to keep eugenic 
discourse relevant in the midst of a changing political landscape. In 1935, when serving as 
president of the American Eugenics Society, Huntington wrote and published Tomorrow’s 
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Children.75 In this text, Huntington’s language reflected the flexibility of eugenics in 
incorporating evolving social anxieties, while remaining consistent in its ideologies. He 
navigated among eugenics, economics, family, science, education, and even public relations in a 
way that was accessible to a general readership, but with an approach that differed from his 
predecessors. Eugenics scholar and digital archivist Nancy L. Gallagher, referencing this text, 
argued that while many eugenic organizations continued to use terms like “race hygiene” and  
openly supported “race hygiene measures in Nazi Germany,” the American Eugenics society:  
recognized the political liabilities of framing eugenics in racial terms. In 1934, AES 
president Ellsworth Huntington rewrote the eugenics catechism to appeal to democratic 
sentiments, the desire for the health and happiness of children, and the need to improve 
economic opportunities. Denoting their program the “new eugenics,” the American 
Eugenics Society preserved the core philosophy of the “old” eugenics and the goal of a 
eugenic society through reproductive selection, while avoiding the explicitly racist 
rhetoric of the Nazi regime and its sympathizers.76 
 
Adapting to the shifting political landscape, particularly within the post-depression economic 
context of the U.S., was crucial for the perpetuation of eugenic ideals both in politics and in 
education. Eugenics, regardless of its label, needed to be understood as financially beneficial and 
democratic. Huntington utilized appeals to the “nation,” arguing that the “defectives… may be 
compared to an insidious disease affecting the body politic.”77 He continued, urging for the 
immediate and far-reaching response of eugenicists and the public more broadly to rid 
themselves of this burden, one he compared to cancer. Part of his strategy was to equate eugenic 
policies and social policies as, for the most part, one in the same and equally desirable.78  
 Concurrent to an effort to democratize eugenics, those active in the movement worked to 
expanded their influence. Lewis M. Terman, along with Catharine Cox Miles, published an 
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influential sexological text concerning masculinity and femininity in 1936.79 While this may, at 
first glance, be seemingly unrelated to eugenics, it is important to note that Terman served on the 
advisory council of the American Eugenics Society, the society where Huntington served as 
president from 1934-1938. It is also evidence of eugenicists continuing to further their influence 
on sexology, specifically sexological understandings of gender “conditions.” In the interest of 
further codifying what constituted a “normal man” and a “normal woman,” Terman and Miles 
created what they called the “M-F Test,” but what was officially known as the “Attitude-Interest 
Analysis Test.” The text assessed the relative amount of masculinity and femininity present in 
individuals as well as “other variables” that included aspects of their personality, occupational 
choices, as well as “delinquency, and homosexuality.”80 The purpose, according to the authors, 
was to “enable the clinician or other investigator to obtain a more exact and meaningful, as well 
as more objective, rating of those aspects of personality in which the sexes tend to differ.”81 This 
text was influential. At its most basic, it helped to reflect and establish normative expectations of 
masculine behaviors and feminine behaviors during the time. However, the test was also used, 
for example, in helping to classify “degree of custody and the type of housing” for inmates in 
prisons.82  
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 Beyond being able to identify masculinity, femininity, and homosexuality, identifying 
those who were “fit” was a broad concern for all eugenicists. In 1937, eugenicist Julian Huxley 
expressed the desire to more clearly define “fitness.” He argued that not only would the “inferior 
stocks” need to be picked out with “more certainty,” but that the reproduction of those deemed 
“superior” would need to happen more quickly in order to offset the negative affects of the 
unfit.83 This job also became the responsibility for the “medicine of perversion,” as Foucault 
called it, and sexology was among the disciplines charged with this task. The sexologists, with 
their varied interests and specialties, became the producers of various taxonomies and diagnoses 
concerning sex and gender deviance. Not only were they concerned with naming these 
abnormalities, they also expressed interested in what “caused” them so they could prevent other 
“normal” people from falling prey to these perversions.  
 As eugenic discourse was beginning to incorporate environmental explanations alongside 
genetic ones for “degeneracy,” in the late 1930s a more pressing issue arose. Eugenicists worked 
diligently to rebrand the movement in order to distinguish itself from what they called the “racial 
hygiene of the 3rd Reich.”84 Felix Tietze, for example, attempted to differentiate German and 
U.S. approaches to eugenics by explaining the fundamental differences in their understandings of 
the word “race.” He referenced Galton’s original definition of eugenics as “the science which 
deals with all influences which improve the inborn qualities of a race, altho [sic] those that 
develop them to the utmost advantage.”85 He argued that the English used “race” as a category 
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but not in the “anthropological sense.” Race for the German’s referred to a Nordic or Germanic 
race, which, he argued, was “a thing that does not exist.”86 Tietze also, though, discussed a 
German law that provided the foundation for “racial hygiene” that seem to mimic what 
eugenicists were advocating in the U.S. These laws concerned 1) the prevention of hereditary 
diseases, 2) laws that forbid marriages between Jews and Germans (similar to those preventing 
interracial marriage in the U.S.), 3) laws promoting particularly ‘fit’ marriages, and 4) the 
protection of “hereditary health.” While the German approach to eugenics was admittedly more 
aggressive, the differences between “racial hygiene” and eugenics only manifested in their 
method and unapologetic commitment to racial hygiene, as their ultimate goals remained very 
similar.87  
This rebranding of eugenics also involved sexologists and their numerous publications. 
With the task of differentiating the eugenics of the U.S. from other, more “unsavory” 
approaches, Sexology: Sex Science Magazine was one of several publications that ran articles in 
the 1940s supporting eugenicists and their aims. Sexology, a magazine written for the general 
public, published an article in the March 1941 issue entitled “Must we Raise Our Birth Rate?” 
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3 (September 2010). 240. 
 
 49 
The author argued that “there is much silly anti-eugenic criticism abroad nowadays much of 
which will not stand logical examination.”88 Five years later, after the end of WWII, Sexology 
continued their support. The 1946 November issue included a short paragraph discussing the 
“Aims of Eugenics.” The author wrote: 
One of the aims of eugenics is to secure the largest number of births from the intelligent 
families in every social and economic class. The least intelligent families have about 
three times as many children as the most intelligent. This trend should be reversed… 
Race suicide will not be brought about by a universalized knowledge of how to prevent 
pregnancy. It is the love of children that has resulted in a restriction of their number, good 
prospects for a few being preferred to poverty for many.89  
 
Nancy Ordover argues that these instances of support for eugenics demonstrated that the 
movement in the U.S. was actually encouraged by Nazism, rather than diminished. The existence 
and influence of the movement continued to exert influence, and those involved in the movement 
remained committed to its goals of improving the “race” through their various political and 
professional commitments. While many sexologists remained bold in their eugenic ties, indirect 
reference to the eugenic politics of the previous decades continued to have devastating 
consequences for individuals labeled dysgenic or “unfit.” This manifested in many different 
ways, and conversations about transvestism expanded to include more frequent references to 
criminality, race, disability, class, and other categories that helped sexologists advocate for 
eugenics without directly naming their commitment to its ideology.  
 
World War II: Non-Effectives, Misfits, & Social Responsibility  
Rhetoric and discourses about disability, sexuality, and race evolved during and after 
World War II, particularly in relation to transvestism and gender deviance. Military personnel, 
particularly psychiatric experts enlisted by the military to assess the “fitness” of those enlisting, 
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played a significant role in these discursive evolutions and shifts. Military officials expressed 
ongoing concern about enlisting men with psychiatric or physical disabilities, but also men who 
deviated from normal gender expression or heterosexuality. Oftentimes, femininity and 
presumed homosexuality were directly connected to assumptions about psychiatric disability. 
Feminine men were targeted by draft boards and underwent immense scrutinization because of 
concerns about psychiatric disabilities that would inhibit the effectiveness of a soldier.  
When men were drafted, they underwent an examination comprised of both physical and 
psychological components. While histories of men being rejected for presumptions or knowledge 
of homosexuality are somewhat familiar to those engaged in histories of homosexuality, the 
histories of individuals being rejected for transvestism are more obscured and scattered.90 
Sexologist David Cauldwell, who served as a psychiatrist in an induction station in Lafayette, 
Louisiana, briefly discussed this topic. Cauldwell wrote of his time in Lafayette and shared 
stories of men rejected on the basis of their transvestism. One man told the draft board that he 
felt like a woman and wore feminine attire. In this case, he was deemed ineligible for service 
because of a “psychopathic personality,” and because it was possible he was a “malignerer.”91 
Another man identified himself as a homosexual. When Cauldwell pushed him to discuss this 
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 51 
further, the individual said “‘I’m a homosexual… I assure you, because these organs down here 
mean nothing. I am a woman and all the doctors in these United States and Europe can’t 
convince me otherwise.”92 Despite this man’s confession as a homosexual, the disclosure of his 
identification as a woman earned him the diagnoses of “Inadequate personality. Paraphernalia. 
(Cunnilinguist - imagines he is a female).”93 Cauldwell asserted that “The Armed Forces did not 
want a man like that.”94 
 The cooperation between military leaders, medical professionals, government officials, 
sexologists, psychiatrists, and psychologists is indicative of the growing number of institutions 
involved and invested in naming and identifying psychiatric disability, and specifically gender 
“deviance.” The need for capable and “fit” soldiers, in particular, motivated a more well-defined 
and thorough articulation of what “counted” as a disability and what did not.  
The identification and rejection of individuals understood to have a psychiatric disability 
(which included homosexuality and transvestism) reflected an anxiety about disability more 
broadly, but particularly the deleterious economic effect for the military and the U.S. 
Government. At a symposium about the “Selection of Military Might” in 1951 sponsored by the 
National Academy of Sciences, Dr. John C. Whitehorn reflected upon this anxiety: 
 Looking back upon the screen practices of World War II, it would be difficult to 
appreciate the attitudes which prevailed in rejecting so large a proportion for 
neuropsychiatric reasons unless one gave consideration to a special factor — the 
costliness of the care of veterans who had developed neuropsychiatric disabilities. Faced 
with a figure of approximately $30,000 as the ultimate probable cost to the 
Government… many examiners… were strongly motivated thereby to save the national 
treasury from heavy prospective costs by rejecting questionable candidates.95  
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Captain Robert A. Bell of the U.S. Navy who also presented at this symposium referenced those 
with psychiatric disabilities as “non-effectives,” with a physician, Dr. Raymond Franzen, arguing 
that the military should have a department dedicated solely to psychological assessment, in part 
because the “detection of disorders and measurement of function are quite different tasks.”96 Dr. 
Lawrence S. Kubie cited the incredibly high percentage of individuals with neuropsychiatric 
disabilities as a rationale for this special department, citing that “between 50 and 60 per cent of 
all patients [in military hospitals] have neuropsychiatric disabilities with a psychosomatic 
component.”97 While there were differing opinions about the potential success and acclimation 
possible for those diagnosed with these disabilities, there was little to no interrogation into the 
subjective assessment of these diagnoses, the conflation of various conditions understood as 
disabilities, or the cultural framing that constituted disability in the first place. The major concern 
about psychiatric disability for the military was an economic one. 
 Ultimately, these conversations were all rooted in who was “fit” or “unfit” for service. 
Dr. Clements C. Fry conducted a study of men admitted to service who had previously been seen 
for psychiatric disorders at Yale or Harvard. He was concerned that these men were approved for 
service despite the otherwise consistent rejection of men with their same diagnosis. This 
rejection was based on regulations followed by the evaluation boards and he argued that 
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“prevailing psychiatric thought concurred in the judgment that people with histories of some 
emotional disturbance should have been excluded from the armed forces — for their own good 
and for the good of the services.”98 He continued, referencing the concept of fitness, a term 
steeped in eugenic histories of degeneracy:  
Above all, the psychopathic personality, the homosexual, the man who had had a history 
of psychosis or psychotic episode should not have been considered fit to serve. The 
popular word in use was ‘misfit,’ and there was much talk of ‘eliminating the misfits.’ 
We all thought that we know those who would be unfit — even if we didn’t happen to 
call them ‘misfits.’99  
 
While transvestism is not mentioned in this list, it is important to note that transvestism was 
often referred to as both psychosis and psychopathology. Fry is very transparent about the 
discursive slippage between “misfit” and “unfit.” It is difficult to miss the parallels between 
conversations eugenicists had about the “unfit” and the “feeble-minded” and this statement by 
Fry concerning the “misfits” of the draft.100  
 The military, supported by other institutions, were so committed to defining normality, 
and they led the charge in codifying and outlining all psychiatric conditions. Leading up to 
World War II, several texts classifying diseases existed. The military utilized three texts: 1) the 
Standard Classified Nomenclature of Diseases revised in 1942, 2) the War Department 
Technical Bulletin 203 outlining military-specific nomenclature – a guide provided by the 
Veterans Administration, and 3) the International Statistical Classifications of Diseases, Injuries 
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and Causes of Death (ICD) originally published in 1939. However, these multiple classifications 
systems created confusion and inconsistency regarding diagnoses. The military responded to this 
inconsistency. In 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal dictated that the Armed Services 
prepare a uniform classification and nomenclature of diseases, injuries, and conditions for joint 
use.”101 This resulted in the writing and publication of the Joint Armed Forces Nomenclature and 
Method of Recording Psychiatric Conditions. Four years later, the American Psychiatric 
Association would draft the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM I) 
patterned directly from the military’s classification manual, solidifying the military’s influence 
on all psychiatric “disorders,” including transvestism and transsexualism, for years to come. 
 
Drawing Connections between Genitals, Race, and Deception 
  In the late 1940s, publications by and about transvestite individuals continued to grow in 
number. Sexology began publishing more autobiographical writings as well as commentary from 
various sexologists and medical professionals concerning transvestism. These writings focused 
on topics ranging from the “causes” and “cures” of transvestism, to its connection to 
hermaphroditism, degeneracy, and criminality. Despite the horrors perpetrated by Hitler’s Nazi 
regime and the U.S. disavowal of his practices, eugenics continued to influence constructions of 
transvestism and gender abnormality.  
David O. Cauldwell, mentioned above, was well-known for his “popular sexology” 
writing and wrote extensively about transvestism, among other topics related to sex.102 
Beginning in April of 1946, he became the editor of Sexology’s “Question and Answers 
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Department.” Many of these replies concerned issues of cross-dressing or transvestism. He also 
published dozens of individual works as well, both in Sexology, and in the form of Big Blue 
Books, small books published in Gerard, Kansas with Haldeman-Julius Publishing Company.103 
While he was not the only sexologist writing about transvestism, he was one of the most prolific.  
Cauldwell’s writings about sex and sexual disorders relied heavily on eugenic ideology, 
as well as euthenics. He spoke highly of the goals behind both, where “eugenics means to be 
well born. Euthenics means to be well bred.”104 Cauldwell explained that males wore female 
attire because of “unfortunate heredity on the one hand, the unfortunate heritage of a psychotic 
mother (rarely father) on the other, and an unfavorable and unhealthy environment resulting from 
a combination of these factors.”105 He continued: “Education, preventative medicine, treatment, 
and above all frank publicity, now promise… to eradicate” not only “general disease,” but also 
what Cauldwell referred to as “sexual ignorance.”106  
For many sexologists, their work focused on connecting transvestism to genetics and 
heredity. Proving this “cause,” would lead to potential “cures” or justification for other eugenic 
methods of reproductive control in order to stop the transmission of this defect. If transvestism 
was caused by heredity, there was no cure and therefore transvestites should not reproduce. If it 
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was caused by environment rather than heredity, poor parenting was to blame. Cauldwell and 
other authors in Sexology told stories of mothers who corrupted their sons, causing them to be 
transvestites. Cauldwell accused one mother of this, arguing that she was “trying hard to make an 
eonist of her son” by dressing him in girls cloths and forcing him to keep his hair long.107 
However, he claimed that there was no cure for transvestites as this affliction was made manifest 
by events in early childhood; the effects were irreversible. He also blamed schools and churches: 
“schools practicing corporal punishment help to create [transvestites]. Churches requiring 
penance do a first class job.”108 Despite the blame he placed on parents, schools, and churches, 
he ultimately did not claim that anything was “right or wrong” about transvestism, and saw 
“nothing further than inconvenience and possible chagrin.”109 He continued: “What’s wrong with 
transvestites? We may as well ask what’s wrong with anyone,” echoing his earlier assertion that 
“transvestism, within itself, is neither an aberration nor a perversion.”110 While potentially a 
liberal take on transvestism, he expressed this view alongside statements that drew out 
connections among transvestites, their personality or mental defects, and neurosis.111  
Despite his claim that transvestism was neither “an aberration nor a perversion,” 
Cauldwell’s assessment of hermaphroditism differed greatly. Cauldwell did not describe 
hermaphroditism as a benign variation. He aligned himself with those who attributed 
hermaphroditism to “developmental defectiveness” and also claimed that it was “more or less 
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correct” to think of the hermaphrodite as a “monster or freak.”112 Concepts of monsters, freaks, 
and psychopaths were categories that had very particular non-white, racial implications. 
Elizabeth Reis, in her study of the history of hermaphroditism in the U.S, discusses two 
preoccupations that fueled notions of freakishness, one of which concerned race. She argues that 
“two related cultural preoccupations colored the anxiety about hermaphrodites in the period of 
the new republic; worries about racial instability and concerns about deception and fraud.”113 
Linkages were being made between degeneracy and “defectiveness,” freakishness and 
abnormality, and race. These linkages are evidence of the ways in which Cauldwell’s description 
of both transvestites and hermaphrodites, and later transsexuals, left each of these groups subject 
to eugenic label of “unfit.” 
The anxieties around race, degeneracy, and deception have a long history in the U.S., 
linked specifically to a desire to have a visible and stable category of whiteness. Reis argues that 
“the unnerving possibility that individuals could suddenly change sex paralleled the early 
national preoccupation with race, racial categories, and the possibility of changing racial 
identity.”114 “Questions about race, skin color, and heredity,” she argues, were discussed in 
reference to those who purportedly “changed race;” i.e., their skin color either darkened or 
lightened at some point in their life.115 If individuals could change skin color, their bodies 
threatened clear and definable racial categories.116 If individuals were to change sex, it would 
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undermine the clear and definitive categories of immutable sex, an anxiety evidenced in 
Cauldwell’s writing. While “mental hermaphrodites”—a term sometimes used synonymously 
with transvestism—were cause for less immediate concern because of their clearly defined 
genitalia, they still posed a threat in relation to undermining clear boundaries between sexes, and 
thus disrupting understandings of sexuality. In response to fears of “chaos,” sexologists like 
Cauldwell pushed for what Reis characterizes as more “stringent classification of such categories 
as race and sex, based on the conviction that such divisions were embodied and essential.”117 
This also provided an opportunity for doctors to racialize bodily anomalies, and in particular 
genital anomalies. Biologists and “race scientists” of the early 1900s believed that African 
Americans were “disproportionately affected by genital anomalies, especially elongated penises 
and enlarged clitorises and labia.”118 While most of the transvestites discussed in Cauldwell’s 
writing were white, the historical connections between race and sex shaped understandings of 
who was degenerate and who was not, placing both people of color and transvestites among 
those who failed to adhere to “non-degenerate” whiteness. 
 While connections among race and transvestism demonstrated a persistent eugenic 
influence, so too did connections between transvestism and criminality. Many authors writing 
about transvestism in the 1940s continued to link transvestism and criminality, links evident 
already in conceptions of the “unfit” and in earlier sexological writings. Even if, and when, these 
authors mention that the number of criminals who cross-dress to commit crimes are few, mention 
of them appears too frequently in texts discussing transvestites for it to be ignored – a legacy that 
emerged as early as 1910 with Hirschfeld’s text Transvestites. In the January 1947 issue of 
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Sexology, for example, the author mentions an individual named William Heirens, who the 
author refers to as a “young sex criminal.”119 Heirens was a “garment fetishist.” He stole clothes 
when he was young but eventually killed a woman and a young girl. The way this case is 
discussed reveals anxieties about the consequences of poor upbringing:  
When you talk to the average parents on this subject they listen incredulously and resent 
the implications. They just cannot believe that they are playing with dynamite. These 
good, but misled people, have never learned the truth that twisting a child’s personality 
endangers the whole future life of the child. Often such experiments have terrible 
consequences.120  
 
The author blames the parents, but specifically the mother who let Heirens grow his hair out 
when he was young. She is also charged with dressing him in women’s clothes. The author 
believed that this led not only to homosexuality, but also caused individuals to “become perverts 
of many different types, and who sooner or later run afoul of the law.”121 The writer then argues 
that if Sexology were in charge, they would make it a “criminal offense to masquerade children 
in clothing of the opposite sex.”122  
 Others echoed these anxieties. In the March 1948 issue of Sexology, eugenicist and 
sexologists Winfield Scott Pugh in “The Transvestite – (A Timely Warning)” recommended that 
transvestites dress at home rather than masquerade in public “because their chief danger lies in 
seduction.” He continued:  
When this happens, certain latent sexual centers are then brought into prominence and 
slight gratification is experienced. Then, having a desire to repeat the performance, he 
may become an acquired homosexual. As a rule I have found the transvestite to be a very 
good citizen and patron of the arts and the drama — highly cultured persons in every 
way. This is, of course, quite natural.”123  
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Pugh also blamed the parents for causing these perversions, and encouraged them to dress their 
sons in masculine cloths and give them a masculine haircut as early as possible. Pugh, 
Cauldwell, and other sexologists were not shy in connecting criminals who dressed in “the attire 
of the opposite sex” to transvestism, aligning these two subject positions.124 
 
Psychopathia Transexualis 
 Among the many articles written by Cauldwell in the 1940s, “Psychopathia Transexualis” 
is one if his most well-known. Caudwell, who previously discussed transvestism almost 
exclusively, began to include discussions of transsexuality in his work. The two terms had not yet 
been clearly differentiated but transsexualism was used to indicate a more extreme version of 
transvestism, and Cauldwell’s writing reflects a distinct opinion about the cause and long-term 
implications for each. Originally published in Sexology in 1949, Cauldwell pointed to “poor 
hereditary background” as a cause of transsexualism.125 This differs slightly from his original 
emphasis on parenting, corporal punishment, schools, and churches as the cause of transvestism, 
mentioned above. While he does not dismiss the importance of childhood environment, he is 
quick to link the discussion and rhetoric of his writings to eugenic logics of degeneracy. He also 
diagnosed those “affected” by psychopathia transexualis as “mentally unhealthy.” He continued 
by arguing that there were “varying degrees of psychopathic transsexuality,” and links 
psychopathology and poor heredity to those identifying or trending towards what was becoming 
recognized as transsexualism.126 Cauldwell painted himself as sympathetic to his transsexual 
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patients, referencing his “broad and tolerant consideration of people and of the sexual nature of 
the human being,” while simultaneously describing them as having “psychopathic traits.”  
 Cauldwell’s understanding of his patient’s sexuality also greatly influenced his 
assessment of their mental state. Discussing one transsexual patent who was a physician, 
Cauldwell acknowledged his own experience with “numerous case histories of males… who 
have become well integrated transsexuals [sic] living useful lives and helping, rather than 
hindering society.”127 However, he found it relevant to mention their sexual leanings; they were 
“transexuals [sic] by affectation only… they are all, in their sexual activities, purely 
autosexual.”128 While transsexual sexuality is a more complicated topic, one that will be explored 
more in the next chapter, what is important to note here is Cauldwell’s superficial distinction 
between homosexuality and transsexualism. Transsexuals, because they were engaging in 
somewhat normative sex, or no sex at all, could be understood as good citizens.129 Labeling them 
as autosexual – as individuals who were either asexual or only interested in masturbation – or as 
heterosexual allowed him to dismiss their “eccentricity” as harmless. 
 Towards the end of this short article, Cauldwell, again, referenced psychopathology. This 
time, however, he argued that the “psychopathic characteristic is manifested not… in actual 
homosexuality or transvestism… but in such practices as seduction, parasitism, violation of the 
social codes in numerous ways, frequently kleptomania and actual thievery, pathological lying, 
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and other criminal and unsocial tendencies.”130 It is unclear from this work if he believed that 
there were transsexuals free from psychopathology. However, the rhetoric of how this 
psychopathology manifests reflected the language emerging from discourses of criminality, 
disability, and homosexuality. Cauldwell’s statement emerged in a context in which each of these 
discourses worked to link transsexuality with more general notions of pathology.  
 Cauldwell would continue to write over the next decade, often returning to discussions of 
causes and cures for sexual perversion. Over time, his emphasis on heredity lessened as his 
emphasis on environment increased. He blamed transvestism on parents and “other near 
relatives” for their overindulgence. This shift mirrored the shifts in eugenic ideologies that began 
to evolve and incorporate environmental explanations for degeneracy. Cauldwell’s writings were 
rooted in eugenic notions of normality, as were the evolving diagnosis of “transvestite” and the 
newly emerging “transsexual.” 
 
A Shift Occurs 
 Moving into the 1950s, definitions about transvestism and transsexualism varied greatly. 
This was due, in part, to the growing distinction between the two terms. Transvestism generally 
functioned as an umbrella term during this time. Labels such as “genuine” or “true” transvestite, 
eonist, and transsexual were all terms that implied a more specific and extreme manifestations of 
transvestism. While the desire for medical intervention was not new, a growing interest in 
transsexualism, paired with advancements in the medical field over the previous four decades, 
the possibilities of “sex changes” seemed more attainable. The desire for this type of medical 
intervention—and what seemed to many “extreme beyond measure”—accounted for some of the 
differing responses.  
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 Transsexualism, because it involved permanent bodily changes, was understood as 
extreme, making transvestism seem less radical to some sexologists. The editors of Sexology 
believed that transvestism was “of all the sexual deviations… the most innocuous.”131 While 
many medical professionals still reviled transvestism, growing responses to transsexualism 
garnered negative responses from those who even felt nonplussed by transvestism, David 
Cauldwell included.  
In relation to his attitudes concerning transvestism, Cauldwell reacted with an 
uncharacteristic severity to transsexuals. Unlike his view that transvestism was a harmless 
eccentricity, he believed that transsexuals not only had and created sexual problems, “they 
[were] themselves sexual problems.”132 In this same publication, he explained why doctors 
would not perform these “sex change” surgeries, stating his view that there was: 
no necessity for an individual who is a member of one sex to cultivate a persistent 
attitude that he or she is sexological… of the wrong sex… The psyche and sanity are 
never at stake as was contended by the sick-minded individual. The psychic is already ill 
and sanity is seriously involved when an individual develops a compulsion to be rid of 
his natural organs and places his insane desires ahead of the rights of others. Mutilating 
surgery can not preserve such a psyche and it cannot restore sanity to the insane.133  
 
Cauldwell was inconsistent in his assessment of transsexuals. While referencing the concern 
about transsexuals being crazy, he said “one may as well ask whether heterosexuals are crazy. 
Some are and some are not.”134 One year later though, Cauldwell articulated a stance on 
transsexuality, using the term “sex-transmutationist,” very concisely:  
The sex-transmutationist is a sick person. The transvestist may be a thoroughly delightful 
individual, charming, entertaining — even daring. The transvestist is an individual who is 
willing to indulge a harmless eccentricity…. were sex transmutation possible I would 
have no more objection to helping an individual through transmuation then I have to 
writing a friendly letter. Any other attitude is not that of the scientist…I regard the 
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destruction of any healthy organ of the body an act which either borders on criminality or 
is criminal.135  
 
Here, Cauldwell brings together discourses of criminality, psychiatric disability, and sexual 
deviation. Each of these discursive categories informs and reifies one another, adding bite to his 
admonishment of transsexual desires. 
This description of the patients clothing as “eccentric” is rife with classed, particularly 
upper-class undertones. Mismatched or odd clothing for poor people, people of color, or people 
who are understood to have psychiatric disabilities would rarely be described as “eccentric,” a 
term that according to George E. Marcus in his essay “On Eccentricity” is a term with explicit 
class implications. He argues that eccentricity is “often associated…with the bearing of great 
wealth,” regardless of the person’s actual wealth. In fact, he argues, this is “always an aspect of 
class resentment or desire associated with eccentricity,” even when the person labeled as 
eccentric is working- or middle-class. While he does not spend a significant amount of time 
discussing it, he does offer several examples of behaviors that have been labeled eccentric, and 
“inversions of commonsense habits, gender identifications, and dress.”136 Beyond the myriad 
assumptions behind the reference to “commonsense habits,” these assertions help link 
eccentricity, transvestism, wealth, and normality, links that help to uncover the indirect meaning 
of Cauldwell’s description. Cauldwell’s classification of transvestite’s eccentricity as “harmless” 
and his belief that they were interesting and ingenious was saturated with not only with class 
meanings, but the gendered, raced, and psychiatric notions of wellness that attended them.137  
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A growing focus on transsexualism, paired with the increased influence of psychiatry and 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders I (DSM-I), shifted opinions about 
causes and cures towards the notion that it was a psychological problem rather than a genetic or 
physiological one. Janet Thompson, a self-identified transvestite writing in 1951 for the 
International Journal of Sexology, suggested to her readers (both professionals and lay people) 
that transvestism was the “outward and obvious manifestation of symptom of other deeply rooted 
emotional problems.”138 She linked transvestism to other pathologized identities, and argued that 
groups of transvestites included heterosexuals but also “fetishists, sadist, masochists, voyeurs, 
homosexuals, etc.”139 She also classified some as “psychotic,” specifically those who “actually 
believe he is of the opposite sex or that he is ‘a female soul in a male body.”140 Thompson did 
not relegate the problem of transvestism to families of lower social class, arguing that 
“transvestism knows no special group or strata of society. It appears to develop in families 
dancing from the apparently well-balanced emotionally and financially secure to the incise, 
impoverished or broken families.”141 This explanation is possible in part because of her reliance 
on a psychological explanation - that transvestism, and its more extreme manifestation 
transsexualism, occurred because of deep-seated emotional problems rather than from poor 
genetic make up. In fact, she argued that the “only way to obtain any sort of ‘cure’ in these cases 
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is to get at the basic emotional problems and resolve them.”142 While she departed from the some 
of the more traditional theories of eugenicists, where psychosis or degeneracy was a result of 
heredity, her use of the word “psychotic,” paired with her reference to “fetishists, sadists, 
masochists…,” bespeaks her proximity to the ways in which eugenics collapsed psychiatric 
disability, criminality, and non-normative sexual behavior regardless of their fundamental 
causes. 143 
 
1952 – The Year Things Changed 
 As opinions and declarations increased about transsexualism from eugenicists, 
sexologists, and even self-identified transsexuals, transvestism as an umbrella term remained 
consistent, and continued to dominate most conversations about gender deviance. Notions of 
“fitness,” psychiatric disability and wellness, sexual deviance, criminality, race, and class had all 
become foundational to constructions of transvestism by the early 1950s. Transsexualism caused 
some alarm and concern among medical professionals, in large part due to accusations of 








                                                       





Bodies and Mayhem: Transsexualism After Jorgensen 
 
“From a eugenic point of view it would do no harm if a number of sexually abnormal  
men [transsexuals] were castrated and thus deprived of their sexual libido.” 
-Christian Hamburger, 1953 
 
 
Both transvestism and transsexualism as diagnostic categories were the focus of many 
sexological writings, starting with Hirschfeld in 1910 and continuing through the 1950s. 
Transvestism, serving as an umbrella category for moderate to “severe” manifestations of cross-
dressing, generally received more attention. Transsexualism, the most “extreme” version of the 
diagnoses being used at the time, was part of the discourse but did not demand the same attention 
as transvestism. This would change significantly in 1952, the year in which Christine Jorgensen, 
the first widely known transsexual woman, became a media sensation. This chapter, while 
including transvestism, focuses on discourses of transsexualism following Christine Jorgensen’s 
global debut. The growing influence of psychoanalysis and advances in medical technology, 
paired with the 1952 global media sensation of Jorgensen, created an environment in which 
debates about transsexualism, medical and surgical intervention, definitions of sex and gender, 
and mental well-being increased exponentially. Transsexual individuals, much like transvestites, 
had to navigate the shifting definitions of pathology, criminality, and degeneracy, a task made 
more difficult for those without the means to access the medical intervention they might desire.  
 The growing attention to transsexualism [referred to by different terms: “genuine 
transvestism,” “true transvestism”] was reflected in the medical literature of the time following 
Jorgensen’s visibility in the larger culture. Increasingly transsexualism was included in titles of 
medical articles alongside transvestism. Concurrently, discussions of transvestism as fetishism 
increased, as did medical and popular articles specifically discussing “change of sex.” While 
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discussing transvestism as a fetish was not new, a shift in focus towards transsexualism displaced 
sexologists’ focus on transvestites and other “sex perverts” as degenerates or those with 
psychiatric disabilities. While transsexualism during this time always fell under the rubric of 
transvestism, evidenced by Benjamin’s assertion that the “transsexualist is always a transvestite 
but not vice-versa,” it also assumed a life of its own as the specificity of the diagnosis evolved.1  
While Jorgensen was the center of much sexological debate, so too were the issues of 
intersexuality, respectability, and relationships between sexuality and gender.2 One sexologist’s 
voice and writings dominated the discourse: Harry Benjamin. His foundational writings continue 
to affect transsexual discourses, as well as diagnosis, treatment, and constructions of 
transsexualism today. Benjamin never directly referenced eugenic ideology, but its affects are 
present in his writing. Despite the negative press eugenics received during and after World War 
II, eugenic ideology continued to play a role in transsexual discourses, of which Benjamin, 
Jorgensen, and the other subjects were a part.  
 
All About Christine 
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 Christine Jorgensen, the first widely-know transsexual woman, made headlines in 1952 in 
the New York Daily News as the “Ex-GI” who became a “Blonde Beauty.”3 With the advent of 
new medical technology, growing focus on and anxieties about gender and in particular women’s 
place in the home following WWII, as well as the evolution of sexological focus on gender 
deviance, the discursive landscape produced a moment in which someone like Jorgensen would 
catch global attention. Her story is well-known among individuals and communities interested in 
transgender history. What has not been explored, though, is how the trajectory of eugenic and 
sexological discourses affected not only her own articulation of her identity, but the ways in 
which she and other transsexuals afterwards were assessed, diagnosed, and constructed. 
Jorgensen’s debut onto the world stage would mark a significant shift in the focus of sexologists, 
from transvestism to transsexualism. While both were still central to the discourse, Jorgensen’s 
“sex change” surgery became a hotbed of controversy.  
Jorgensen’s claim and access to some semblance of white, able-minded, heterosexual 
womanhood played a significant role in the amount of attention she received. Feminist scholar 
Emily Skidmore argues that Jorgensen and other white transwomen, “articulated their 
acceptability through their performance of the scripts of white womanhood and by implication, 
normative investments in heterosexuality, consumerism, and white supremacy.”4 Furthermore, 
Jorgensen and others created and relied on narratives of the “good transsexual,” a narrative that 
Skidmore argues “helped to support the continued dominance of the bi-gender system and 
gender norms forged in white heteronormativity.”5 Their complicity in these narratives aided in 
their access to visibility. Jorgensen made headlines for years after the original New York Daily 
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News article. While not always positive news coverage, part of her appeal was her simulacrum of 
normative, white, able-bodied, middle-class, heterosexual womanhood. Cultural historian 
George Mosse argues that during this time:  
the distinction between normality and abnormality, between bourgeois respectability and 
sexual deviance, and between moral degeneracy and eugenic cleansing were the elements 
of a discourse that made unconventional sex a national threat and thus put a premium on 
managed sexuality for the health of the state.6  
 
Despite her attempts to present herself as a proper and productive woman, she always stood just 
outside the realm of the acceptability, normativity, and those who were considered good 
citizens.7 Newspapers and magazine tracking her “management” by her team of sexologists 
became a spectacle for the nation. 
While it is fair to critique the ways in which she negotiated her positionality over and 
against other subject positions (homosexuality most notably), it is important to recognize how 
she was limited by the ways in which she was being produced by the multiple discourses at play. 
She did access the “scripts of white womanhood” and the normative aspects of that position, but 
her willingness to perform in the spotlight was not without benefits for others. It provided an 
example for how one might navigate the discourses producing trans subject positions; it is also 
possible that her performance allowed marginalized people to imagine possibilities for new 
subject positions, positions that they glimpsed in her public personae, even if her particular 
example was not possible to access, or even particularly desirable. 
                                                       
6 George Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). Quoted in: Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's 
History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). 34. 
7 Aren Aizura’s words can be used to describe Jorgensen and what might have been a desire t: “fad[e] into the 
population… to be ‘proper’ in the eyes of the state: to reproduce, to find proper employment; to reorient one’s 
‘different’ body into the flow of the nationalized aspiration for possessions, property, [and] wealth.” Aren Z. Aizura, 
"Of Borders and Homes: The Imaginary Community of (Trans)Sexual Citizenship," Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 7, 
no. 2 (2006). 295. 
  
 71 
 The middle class, white, heterosexual expectations and references are found throughout 
popular press articles about Jorgensen. In one, “Parents Praise Bravery,” Christine’s mom shares 
that when Christine was boy, “he dated girls, was with girls at parties. He had a normal boyhood. 
He liked tennis and belonged to the ski club at Bear Mountain.”8 Affirming her heterosexuality 
before transitioning, as well as appealing to normality through very raced and classed activities 
like tennis and skiing, Jorgensen’s mom aligned Jorgensen with normal, middle-class values.9 In 
the same article, a doctor also attempted to distance Jorgensen from sexual and gender deviance, 
arguing that “persons who change their sexes usually are pseudo-hermaphrodites,” even though 
by this time there were many doctors who did not believe this to be true.10 Regardless, though, 
this explanation offered a physiological “cause” of Jorgensen’s transsexualism, rather than a 
psychological or “mentally disordered” one.  
Affirming her heterosexuality post-transition, the Chicago Daily Tribune published a 
piece from the Associated Press that interviewed one of Jorgensen’s love interests. He affirmed 
her femininity, even discussing the way she exceeded expectations of clothing, figure, and 
aesthetic. He repeatedly referenced her as a girl or woman, saying that “when I met her she was a 
girl and, as far as I am concerned, she’s a girl now. She’s got a personality that’s hard to beat, the 
best looks, best clothes, best features, and best figure of any girl I ever met.”11 This interview 
served several functions: the man quoted in the article represents a heterosexual man interested 
in a heterosexual woman, and he indirectly references her surgical transition when he stated that 
she’s a girl now” and that she had the “best figure of any girl I ever met.” Not only was he 
comparing Jorgensen to other women whose femininity was not up for debate, Jorgensen outdid 
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these women in her performance and embodiment of femininity and womanhood. The man 
normalized attraction and desire for this “blonde beauty,” and this portrayal of heterosexual 
desire for a transwoman set a precedent for one of the ways in which Jorgensen, and those that 
followed, would legitimate their claim to womanhood. 
 Continuing to rely on her class status as integral to and indicative of her femininity, many 
reporters commented on her looks, jewelry, and clothing. Several articles, referencing her mink 
coat and comportment, discussed her portrayal of femininity. In one article, “Christine Arrives 
Back Home a New Woman and with Mink,” published in the Chicago Daily Tribune, reporters 
debated her identity and wardrobe and seemed to suggest through their title that wearing a mink 
coat was a part of her successful embodiment as a “new woman,” and in particular a white, 
middle-class woman. The article also included a conversation between Jorgensen and a “woman 
reporter”: On her [Jorgensen] arm hung a cape and a woman reporter asked what it was. ‘Don’t 
you know mink when you see it?’ demanded Christine, as tho [sic] she had worn it all her life.”12 
The Tribune positioned Jorgensen’s femininity and womanhood as natural, as something that 
was so familiar as to give the impression that she “really had been a woman” her entire life. 
Later in this same article, the reporter even championed her success in portraying confusion as a 
woman: she at one point “Raised her hands to her pearl earrings in a gesture of womanly 
confusion.”13 Minks and pearls were, and are, feminine symbols of class status, and Jorgensen 
drew attention to her pearls by performing this stereotypical feminine gesture, and this particular 
reporter’s tone conveys their conviction of Jorgensen’s womanhood.  
In another article, Jorgensen utilized the media’s attention to draw connections between 
her femininity and her role as a useful and productive citizen. Jorgensen even referenced herself 
                                                       




as an “American woman.” This appeal to American-ness was an attempt to distance herself from 
narratives of perversion, psychopathology, homosexuality, and disability more broadly. 
Citizenship in America was defined over and against these labels, and her claim to American-
ness—if successful—would function to discursively separate Jorgensen from these negative 
pathologies so often associated with transsexualism at the time.  
 
What Makes a Woman a Woman? 
 Throughout the early 1950s, definitions concerning what made a woman a “woman” and 
what made a man a “man” were hotly debated. While Jorgensen’s personal story will be explored 
in depth in chapter three, it is important to note her role in the shifting discourses of 
transsexuality and determination of sex, particularly in media narratives and discourse. Almost 
overnight, national media attention to transvestism, transsexualism, and medical intervention 
grew exponentially. Sexologists, surgeons, endocrinologists, and psychiatrists offered expert 
opinions for newspapers and magazines as the topic of and interest in transsexuals expanded. As 
Joanne Meyerowitz argues in How Sex Changed, “In the history of sex change in the United 
States, the reporting on Jorgensen served as both a culminating episode and a starting point.”14 
Jorgensen’s notoriety gave voice and provided (some) legitimacy to transvestites and 
transsexuals who had been asking for various medical interventions for years. It also inaugurated 
these more public conversations about “what makes a woman a woman and a man a man?”15  
 Despite her beauty, charm, race, class, and affect, Jorgensen was vulnerable to charges 
that she was not a woman, only a male whose sexual organs had been removed. She strategically 
used normative discourses of white womanhood in attempts to gain mainstream legitimacy as a 
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subject. However, her precarious position left her open to accusations of deviance and 
perversion. People wondered if she really was a woman post-surgery. The original New York 
Daily News article mentioned above proclaimed that Jorgensen was a woman: “Now George is 
no more. After six operations, Jorgenson’s sex has been changed and today she is a striking 
woman, working as a photographer in Denmark.”16 They even declare that her Army records 
were officially changed to “Christine.”17 While the bulk of the article references Jorgensen as 
“he” and even as George, they switched to female pronouns by the end of the piece. In another 
article, “Bronx ‘boy’ is now a girl: Danish treatments change sex of former army clerk,” 
Jorgensen’s doctor Christian Hamburger was more vague, and said that her “treatment was about 
complete.”18 Hamburger here seems to suggest that making Christine a “real woman,” though 
incompletely achieved, was an attainable goal. 
 Within months of the first news article, however, the press became less sure about 
Jorgensen’s status as a woman. As early as February of 1953, two months after her debut, the 
success of her “sex change” was up for debate.19 In 1954, a reporter for the Indianapolis Times 
went so far as to refer to Jorgensen as “it” rather than “he” or “she” in an attempt to be “neuter” 
on the situation, and pokes fun at what he called her “sex-cess story.”20 This article, and many 
more like it, would be common in the years to come, and reflected debates about what 
Jorgensen’s doctors actually accomplished in 1952, as well as what constituted biological sex 
more broadly. In April, Hamburger, providing more specificity than his previous statements, was 
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quoted in an article entitled “Christine discounted as 100 Pct. Woman by Her Copenhagen 
Doctor.” He asserted that “no doctor can change the sex of an individual 100 percent.”21 He 
claimed that this was not the purpose of surgery. Instead, surgical intervention was intended “to 
make life… easier for the person who strongly feels that she belongs to the opposite sex.”22 
When asked for a definitive answer concerning Jorgensen’s sex post-surgery, he said, “it was 
beyond his authority as a doctor to tell.”23 Determining sex had become so difficult, sex was so 
ambiguously defined, that even one of the leading doctors on the Jorgensen case abdicated the 
responsibility of clearly defining Jorgensen’s status as a woman.  
 Within the year, though, Hamburger would again shift his response in the media. One 
reporter relayed that the doctors, Hamburger included, “make it clear that their patient… is not 
now a woman, despite surgery and hormone treatments.”24 Her treatment was for psychiatric 
relief only, where “the treatment - plus legal permission to wear women’s clothing – achieved 
mental balance and thus was logical and ethical.”25 The doctors defined all patients with 
transvestism as “under sway of a mental sexual deviation,” and believed that a change in 
physiology would relieve psychological anguish.26 The media narrative focused on physical 
transformation, but this was almost always paired with discussions of psychiatric wellness.  
 The focus on Jorgensen’s outward physical appearance as mirroring that of a woman 
gestures towards reasons why Jorgensen was understood to not be 100% woman. TIME 
Magazine called Jorgensen an “altered male” and a “male castrate,” and assured readers that her 
case was “not one of hermaphroditism or pseudohermaphroditism” because if it had been, the 
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“operations would have left Jorgensen a girl, or a reasonable facsimile thereof.”27 Jennifer Terry 
links this doubt to scientific scopophilia, what she defines as “the pleasures of viewing [that] 
were deeply tied to… a positivist quest for the truth in physical evidence.”28 Jorgensen, 
following the logic of physical evidence, was not “100%” woman; she did not posses ovaries and 
a uterus and thus she could not reproduce. If, as a woman, she could not reproduce, she fell 
outside the standards of white, heterosexual womanhood, a womanhood infused with eugenic 
notions of reproduction and the advancement of the race.  
 Some doctors rejected transsexuals’ claim to womanhood based on their understandings 
of the connections among womanhood, heterosexuality, and reproduction. In 1953, sexologist 
Mortimer Ostow critiqued Hamburger (Jorgensen’s doctor) and his colleagues for suggesting 
that plastic surgery could be used to “resolve such a discrepancy” that Jorgensen and others 
experienced. Ostow argued that Hamburger and his team were mistaken in their understanding 
that Jorgensen and others wanted to live as women because “the patient has no desire for sexual 
relations with men. There is no evidence of any maternal interests… it seems that the patient’s 
only concern is to look like a woman.”29 Ostow believed that transvestism, and by default 
transsexualism, was only a symptom of neurosis and was not something that required or justified 
surgical intervention. According to Meyerowitz, Ostow “compared the desire for genital surgery 
with the desire for death.”30 Sexologists like Ostow claimed a position that aligned those who 
desired “genital surgery” with those who were suicidal—or in other words, those with depression 
or some other serious psychiatric disability.  
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An Expert Witness 
 One of the most well-known sexologists who worked with transvestites and transsexuals 
came to notoriety in the 1950s: Harry Benjamin. He began seeing patients in the late 1940s and 
spearheaded the effort to provide specificity to the “transvestite” diagnosis. Benjamin 
encouraged and supported those who reached out to him. He also had a major impact in the work 
differentiating between transvestism and transsexualism. Publishing in the 1950s and more 
prolifically in the 1960s, his most notable text is The Transsexual Phenomenon (1966). Part of 
his rise to fame within the transsexual community had to do with his involvement with 
Jorgensen, someone he mentioned as a quintessential example of transsexualism in his book. 
Through his work with Jorgensen, and his many publications pertaining to transvestism and 
transsexualism, his influence on the ultimate outcome on constructions of these two diagnoses is 
undeniable. 
 In his 1954 article “Transsexualism and Transvestism as Psycho-Somatic and Somato-
Psychic Syndromes,” he laid out most clearly his early distinctions between transvestism and 
transsexualism. He believed transvestism to be a fetish and a desire to be “accepted in society as 
a member of the opposite sex.”31 “Transvestites,” he argued, “enact the role of a woman.” 
Transsexualism, though, was what he categorized as a “different problem and a much greater 
one.”32 Rather than enacting the role of woman, the “transsexualist” wanted both to be and to 
function as a woman. He summarized his view: 
To put it differently: In transvestism the sex organs are sources of pleasure; in 
transsexualism they are sources of disgust. That seems to me a cardinal distinction and 
perhaps the principal differential diagnostic sign. Otherwise there is no sharp separation 
between the two, one merging into the other.33 
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He also believed that for transsexualists, there were always inclinations towards homosexuality. 
He originally conceived of three types of transvestites. First, the principally psychogenic 
transvestite who had no desire to physically transition but felt more comfortable in women’s 
clothing. Second, the intermediate type, who was similar to the psychogenic transvestite but their 
desire was more pronounced. Benjamin described this person as “very disturbed” and noted that 
“masturbation fantasies are narcissistic and he visualizes himself functioning as a woman.”34 
This intermediate type of transvestite also lacked a desire to be “cured,” and that, because of 
Jorgensen’s publicity, they might “turn toward transsexualism.”35 Lastly, the somatopsychic 
transsexualist; Christine Jorgensen was emblematic of this type of transvestite. Their “sex life is 
largely cerebral and non-genital,” and according to Benjamin they tended to believe that they 
were “really females with faulty sex organs.”36 This distinction among three types would become 
more nuanced, reaching its most popular iteration in Benjamin’s landmark publication The 
Transsexual Phenomenon thirteen years later in 1966.  
 The cause of transvestism and its various manifestations was multifaceted for Benjamin. 
He dismissed etiologies that relied 100% on either psychological or biological factors. While 
Benjamin emphasized the importance of “environment and psychological conditioning,” he also 
discussed the genetic etiological factors: 
The endocrine aspect of the problem is intimately related to the genetic. If we find in a 
transvestite underdeveloped gonads and other signs of a congenital hypogonadism or if 
there are undescended testicles or hypospadia, we may be justified to suspect the sexual 
deviation to be due to a primary genetic disturbance also. But on the other hand all 
physical abnormalities can secondarily have far- reaching psychological repercussions.37  
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As is evidenced in his writing from the time, Benjamin assumed that because “crossgender 
identification” had a “somatic cause,” it justified medical intervention. This continuation of 
drawing linkages, however subtly, to genetic malformation or poor development reified a 
reliance on genetics and heredity. These connections emerged in a context in which the lasting 
influence of eugenics was pervasive. Benjamin never self-identified as a eugenicist, nor was he 
identified as a eugenicist by the media or other physicians. However, any reliance on an 
etiological explanation for transvestism or transsexualism continued to rely heavily upon eugenic 
understandings of genes and heredity because of the ways eugenic thinking dominated the field 
for so many years prior to the 1950s. Benjamin’s writing, regardless of his intentions, reflected 
this influence.  
 In addition, part of the conflict about etiology was rooted in differing notions of what 
constituted sex in the first place. Many sexologists, including Benjamin, believed that 
“organically, sex is always a mixture of male and female components.”38 He later mentioned 
chromosomes, arguing that “the effeminate male may look and behave as he does on a purely 
psychosomatic or psychological basis… but he may also be the product of a somato-psychic 
mechanism originating in his chromosomes.”39 The reference to chromosomes, genetics, and 
organic aspects of being cannot be wholly disconnected from the histories of eugenics that 
influenced understandings of these biological concepts. What is so impactful about Benjamin’s 
indirect connection to eugenic ideology is that Benjamin would become the expert on 
transsexualism.  
 As Benjamin’s expertise grew and he became more recognizable as a spokesperson for 
transsexualism and transvestism, his advocacy increased, but with limitations. His writing 
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reflected recognition of the social and legal difficulties facing individuals who dress in public: 
“one can only wonder that their neurotic symptoms are often not more pronounced.”40 In another 
article published in 1953, he pondered a different approach to treatment: “Instead of treating the 
patient, might it not be wiser and more sensible to treat society educationally so that logic, 
understanding and compassion might prevail?”41 However, despite these empathetic 
declarations, he still advocated that “the psychiatrist must have the last word” regarding 
surgery.42 Benjamin, along with most other sexologists and psychiatrists, continued to place 
power with the medical establishment rather than with the subjects seeking treatment, 
particularly when it came to surgical intervention. 
 
Inflicting Mayhem  
 Renewed attention on this “extreme version” of transvestism reinvigorated debates about 
what “caused” transvestism and transsexualism, as well as what “cures” might exist. Because 
medical professionals were now discussing direct medical intervention via hormones and 
surgery, however, these debates were saturated with new concerns about medical ethics, the 
irreversibility of the types of medical intervention some people were requesting, as well as the 
legality of surgically altering a body, particularly male genitalia.  
“Sex Change Surgery” 
 Genital surgery, particularly castration, was illegal in the 1950s due to the mayhem laws, 
laws that were in place to prevent the “willful destruction of healthy tissue.” Mayhem has its 
etymology in “maim,” a word that evolved into a legal term meaning “an injury to the body 
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which causes the loss of a limb, or of the use of it; a mutilation, a mutilating wound.”43 Mayhem 
became the more common term in reference to the law by the mid-1700s and more specifically 
referenced “the infliction of physical injury on a person, so as to impair or destroy that person’s 
capacity for self-defense.”44 At the time, because individuals who we might now refer to as 
female born women or ciswomen were not expected to fight in combat for their country, these 
laws generally did not apply to them. However, in the twentieth century when those assigned 
male requested castration, they were denied their request because it fell under conditions of 
mayhem — of destroying or “mutilating” healthy tissue. Those deemed unfit by eugenical 
standards were not considered integral to social body and therefore were subject to castration, 
sterilization, among other medical procedures and experiments. Mayhem laws, preventing many 
surgeons from granting requests for castration, were inconsistently applied in relation to who fell 
under purview the laws and who did not. 
 Many sexologists were generally in agreement with the law and surgeons consistently 
refused requests for castrations for men seeking the procedure. In 1951, before Jorgensen’s case 
was widely known, physicians William Perloff and Morris Brody made a plea for “somatic 
normality,” a normality based on clearly delineated expectations of maleness and femaleness. 
Beyond advocating for this “somatic normality,” they also dismissed the desires of their patients. 
Perloff and Brody wrote about a case study of a “male pseudo herm” who was, according to 
them, the equivalent of a castrated male. However, she had been reared as a female and 
professed a commitment to being a woman. The doctors only supported this commitment 
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because, according to them, the patient was particularly difficult and because the testicles were 
atrophied. The physicians were not happy with this outcome, and forcefully argued that:  
Obviously, the final decision cannot be up to the patient… if this procedure were carried 
out ad absurdum, genetic males, normal physical, who were homosexual, might present 
themselves for such treatment. Manifestly, no reputable physician would be a party to such 
manipulation, and yet, in effect, the present authors were guilty of just such behavior.45  
 
These words supported the belief that operating on otherwise healthy genital tissue was a 
“manipulation” and was a disreputable act. Furthermore, they expressed doubts as to the long-
term outcome for the patient mentioned above, saying that despite the patient’s consistent urge to 
be a woman, her “ultimate psychologic prognosis for this patient is in doubt… It is considered 
that the prognosis for eventual adjustment to femaleness is likely to be poor.”46 The reasons they 
provided for this skepticism was because the case had been “poorly managed.” Their failure to 
consider the patient’s professed desires, as well as the fact that the patient had been reared as a 
female (despite their belief that “early training of the child” was more important than any 
congenital factors) led them to discourage any surgical intervention in favor of the individuals 
who are trained to correct “psychologic difficulties”: psychiatrists.47  
 David O. Cauldwell also dismissed the desires of transsexuals, calling them “whims and 
fancies,” and asked “Is it right, reasonable or sensible to pit the whims and fancies of one 
individual against an entire well-established and honored social structure?”48 His professed 
beliefs supported the mayhem statutes and he argued that surgeries for transsexuals went against 
the Hippocratic oath and medical ethics. Surgeons who “indulged” transsexuals were 
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committing, according to Cauldwell, “deleterious and mischievous” acts because no one could 
actually “change sex,” save for pseudo-hermaphrodites—and even then surgery simply “restored 
an individual of mistaken sex to his or her proper sex.”49 Between 1958 and 1959, other Sexology 
authors reaffirmed surgical intervention as “self-mutilation,” with one author in 1959 claiming 
that it was representative of a “suicidal impulse [that] is concentrated on a part of the body as a 
substitute for or symbol of the whole.”50  
 There were some sexologists who supported surgical intervention in spite of the general 
support of the mayhem laws. While references to class, race, and gender can be very indirect 
ways of indicating a eugenic underpinning, anxieties about surgically altering genitals (castration 
and removal of the penis specifically) pushed some doctors to make direct and unapologetic 
reference to eugenics.51 Christian Hamburger, Christine Jorgensen’s Danish doctor, argued for 
the justification of castrating transsexuals. He argued that “destroying healthy tissue” was worth 
providing a more complete and integrated sense of self. He was one of few sexologists explicitly 
aligned themselves with eugenic principles, and his eugenic leanings provided ideological room 
for him to support sterilizing these individuals. He stated this explicitly: “from a eugenic point of 
view it would do no harm if a number of sexually abnormal men were castrated and thus 
deprived of their sexual libido.”52 Many surgeons, particularly in the U.S., refused to perform the 
procedure for years to come because of many ethical and legal complexities, but the mayhem 
statute was often cited as the main reason. 
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 Even while Hamburger claimed that to destroy “healthy tissue” was worth it if one could 
be more “integrated,” these statements belie his ableist tendencies and how he framed what 
constituted a “healthy” or “integrated” person. More than this, much of the controversy regarding 
the mayhem laws can be traced back to anxieties about disability and disabled bodies. That the 
original laws were based on the notion that the loss of a limb was one form of “mutilation,” and 
that the loss limited one’s “capacity for self defense” is evidence of ablest notions of the 
capabilities of people with physical disabilities.  
 While the mayhem statutes played a role in debates about justification for or against 
surgical intervention, sterilization was also a concern, particularly for those who understood 
transvestism as being caused by heredity. In June of 1959, Sexology published an article by 
physician Nicola Brunori that discussed the “pros and cons of sterilization,” demonstrating the 
continuing influence of eugenic ideology. While he did not discuss transsexualism or 
transvestism directly, that his works was published in the midst of numerous articles about 
transvestism and transsexualism is revealing. His conversations focused not only on eugenic 
notions of birth control, but criminality as well. Brunori did not recommend sterilization as an 
answer to eugenic or criminal problems, and stated that “neither voluntary nor forced 
sterilization should be done either for contraceptive or eugenic reasons.”53 However, this 
conclusion came after he clearly tied heredity to degeneration and crime within a cultural context 
in which transvestism was related to both. He acknowledged that sterilization was used to 
prevent the transmission of disease and that it was also used as a way to punish criminals, in 
particular sexual criminals. Beyond punishment, he cited the use of sterilization as “a means of 
preventing the transmission of heredity tendencies to crime, if connected to special forms of 
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organic degeneration.”54 While he wholly dismissed using race as a justification for sterilization, 
he failed to acknowledge the connections between the ways in which mental and physical 
“defects” were racialized. While Brunori is not a name that carries significant weight in ongoing 
discourses of transsexualism, the presence of an article like this in Sexology illuminates the 
context in which discourses of transvestite and transsexual subject positions were evolving.55  
 
Sexological Attitudes Regarding SRS 
Throughout the 1960s, attitudes towards surgical intervention varied greatly among 
psychologists, general practitioners, surgeons, those who identified as either homosexual, and 
even among self-identified transvestites and transsexuals. In 1966, sexologists Richard Green, 
Robert Stoller, and Craig MacAndrew surveyed 196 individuals from both the medical and 
transvestite community. Their questionnaire and subsequent publication reflecting the results 
provide an overview of the “attitudes toward sex transformation procedures” and transsexualism 
more broadly. They categorized their results by demographics: psychiatrists, urologists and 
gynecologists who they referred to more generally as “surgeons,” general practitioners, 
transvestites, male homosexuals, and female homosexuals. They surveyed these groups 
regarding their views on how neurotic they believed transsexuals to be, how psychotic, and asked 
if they were a “threat to society.” Regarding surgical intervention, over seventy percent of 
transvestite respondents were recorded as favoring “sex transformation procedures for a male 
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transsexual.”56 When asked if surgical intervention for males with “a pseudo-hermaphroditic 
anomaly” was appropriate, the approval rating from physicians rose dramatically, moving from 
around three to eight percent to twenty-eight to forty percent.57 Green et. al, argued that doctors, 
and surgeons in particular, would have been more “sympathetic” if they had not been concerned 
about malpractice suits, a concern informed by the rhetoric and threat of the outdated “mayhem 
statutes.”58  
 Sexologist Robert Stoller was very vocal about his views, publishing several articles in 
1966 discussing the issue. He was not fully on board with surgical intervention. Part of his and 
other sexologists’ hesitancy had to do with “issues of morality.” They questioned the moral 
implications of these surgical procedures both for the transsexual and themselves, with Stoller 
claiming that it was “impossible to discuss the treatment of transsexuals without becoming 
involved in moral issues.”59 A number of sexologists and even self- identified transvestites 
believed that transsexuals were “by definition, morally depraved.”60 Stoller also expressed 
concern that homosexuals and others would request surgery, thinking that surgery would help 
them to become heterosexual. He argued that individuals who were not “actually transsexual” 
would experience “severe depression or paranoid psychosis” as a result of castration or other 
surgical procedure.61  
 Stoller was wary not only about surgery, but the long term success were the procedure to 
occur. Referencing Benjamin’s recommendation that people live for one year as a woman before 
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undergoing surgery, Stoller expressed doubts about this approach. Even if a male were to live 
one year as a woman, he felt that the “rigors of living as a woman are either too frightening or 
the person is too masculine.”62 This echoed Harry Benjamin’s admonishment from a 1963 
Sexology article where he wrote a general letter to transwomen telling them “You have to learn 
how to behave like a woman, how to walk, how to use your hands, how to talk, how to apply 
make-up, and how to dress… you may have had your experience with dressing… but was then 
more or less a game.”63 Ultimately, Stoller did no wholly dismiss surgical intervention. He 
advocated for surgery only in terms of research and only for people who had undergone 
extensive study for at least six months “by a team of psychiatrists, psychologists, 
endocrinologists, and urologists.”64 Sexologists struggled over these approaches for years, and 
continue to do so today. Because of the seriousness and irrevocability of the surgical procedures 
at hand, transsexualism and surgical intervention posed new ethical, moral, and philosophical 
questions for sexologists.  
 In this controversial context, Johns Hopkins opened their Gender Identity Clinic in 1965. 
The clinic was only open for fourteen years, it was the first academic institution to not only 
condone but also perform “sex reassignment surgery.” The clinic was started by John Money and 
Claude Migeon. Both had worked with intersex children and had a growing interest concerning 
the formation of gender identities. In a recent Johns Hopkins Newsletter, editor-in-chief Rachel 
Witkin described Money’s approach: “He thought that performing surgery to match one’s sex to 
one’s gender identity could produce better results than just providing these patients with 
therapy.”65 He was not alone in this assumption.  
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Characterized as “investigational” work, the clinic largely focused on transsexualism, and 
the sexologists involved were interested in what caused transsexualism as well as what the best 
treatment plan might be. Witkin quoted a Beyer, a woman who considered surgery and sought 
information from the clinic. Beyer decided not to pursue surgery at the clinic for many reasons, 
but a central reason had to do with the highly sexualized environment: 
It was so highly sexualized, which was not at all my experience, certainly not the 
reason I was going to Hopkins to consider transition, that I just got up and left, I 
didn’t want anything to do with it… No one said this explicitly, but they certainly 
implied it, that the whole purpose of this was to get a vagina so you could be 
penetrated by a penis.66  
 
This individual’s experience reflects the emphasis on the sexologists’ goals for performing any 
transsexual related surgery: heterosexual womanhood. The preliminary criteria set by the 
committee at the Clinic reflected this emphasis. Among the seven specific criteria covering 
criminal history, mental health, and other concerns was a requirement that the “patient had to 
have legally dissolved an existing marriage bond.”67 The committee had no interest in 
constructing lesbians. 
 The “success” of the clinic is debated, but its role in changing the tide of opinion 
regarding SRS for physicians is not. When they closed their doors in 1979, Jon Meyer, chair of 
the Sexual Behaviors Consultation Unit and member of the Gender Identity Clinic, argued that 
“My personal feeling is that surgery is not proper treatment for a psychiatric disorder, and it’s 
clear to me that these patients have severe psychological problems that don’t go away following 
surgery.”68 During the fourteen years it was open, only thirty people underwent surgical 
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treatment. However, by the time they closed their doors in 1979 twenty other medical institutions 
had changed their policies and were allowing trans-related surgeries.  
Mayhem and Eugenics 
 Mayhem worked in the interest of eugenic notions of worth and in service of eugenics as 
a strategy to improve the race. Susan Stryker and Nikki Sullivan apply a Foucauldian analysis to 
these mayhem laws and their application in response to requests for castration. They wonder who 
draws the arbitrary line between which enhancements are “normal” and which are understood as 
enhancing the body. Furthermore, they argue that answers to this question shed light onto an 
expanded concept of bodily integration — not one that is “predicated… on the organic integrity 
of the human organism,” the integrity of flesh as defined by medical norms, but instead on “the 
body’s suitability for integration, its ability to be integrated as a biopolitical resource into a 
larger sociotechnical field, or into an apparatus such as the state.”69 They are referencing the 
ability of legal, political, and social institutions to integrate the body as something of use and of 
value.  
In addition, their language reflects the ongoing links between mayhem and disability and 
concerns about “bodily integration” and the body’s ability to function as a biopolitical resource. 
Feminist philosopher Rosalyn Diprose puts it differently: “The regimes of social regulation… 
seek to preserve the integrity of every body such that we are compatible with the social body.”70 
Bodies that cannot be integrated into the social body are seen as less valuable, and in turn less 
“socially viable.”71 Many have written about the circularity and absurdity of what medical 
procedures count as “enhancement” and which are understood to “disable” bodies, and these 
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arguments will not be explored in depth here.72 However, what is relevant is that what “counts” 
as bettering the body and what does not aligns with eugenic ideals concerning bodily aesthetic, 
reproductive capabilities, as well as raced and classed gender norms.73 
 As transsexual existence came under the surveillance of medical and surgical teams, body 
parts became more of a focus – particularly which ones to keep and which ones to add. There 
was always a discursive attachment, however, to body parts that “facilitate[d] specific uses of the 
biopower of the bodily remainder.”74 Biopower here references a type of power articulated by 
Foucault, whereby nation states regulate their subjects through “an explosion of numerous and 
diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations.”75 
The U.S. since the turn of the century had increased its regulation of its subjects at the level of 
the population through the regulation of citizenship, health, economics, marriage, and 
reproduction. Eugenics informed each site of regulation. Eugenics was, and remains, a 
biopolitical movement in which only certain bodies are useful or valued for their potential 
biopower. The potential (re)productive possibilities of each individual was always a focus, but 
their ability to achieve a particular aesthetic was also important to the goals of normativity.  
For transsexuals able to achieve a normative (white and upper-class) feminine 
appearance, they put themselves in a position to be regularlized, to become more socially 
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integrated than the transvestites around them—the men who dressed as women for a sexual 
fetish. Stryker and Sullivan argue that the:  
transsexual body… becomes a more socially integrated body, no longer confined to an 
underground economy. It becomes a body that reproduces, through its atypical 
technologisation, the visual norms of gendered embodiment that form part of the routine 
functioning of the social body; it becomes a body suited for taxable work, for labour 
more readily harnessed to purposes of state… [and] strikes a deal with sovereignty to 
access the power of certain normativities as an avenue for its own peculiar life.76  
 
Christine Jorgensen typifies attempts at achieving a “more socially integrated body,” as she 
worked to present herself and her body as achieving the “visual norms of gendered 
embodiment.” This achievement and reification of these norms necessarily include the eugenic 
ideologies embedded in those norms.  
 These conversations about surgery, body parts, and biopower are also linked to concepts 
of productivity and human value. Historian Dan Irving ties together anxieties about surgical 
intervention and constructions of productive citizenship. When transsexual patients met with 
medical professionals, they were assessed by various means - size of genitals, overall health, 
intelligence, heredity and family, but they were also assessed “in terms of their aptitudes, earning 
potentials, education, and class backgrounds.”77 Their success or failure in these categories 
mirrored norms of citizenship and productivity during the middle of the century, norms based on 
white middle-class, heterosexual workers. Class also played a role in either advocating for or 
refusing medical intervention. Irving argues that some doctors “opposed any medical 
intervention… in part because they believed [it] would thwart the industrious potential of the 
middle class, able-bodied (presumed) male and (re)productive potential of the (presumed) 
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female.”78 These doctors, he argues, saw the potential economic value their patients represented 
and did not want to compromise that value.  
 As I mentioned above, some sexologists vehemently disagreed with transsexual surgical 
intervention. Cauldwell himself argued that “it would be criminal of a doctor to remove healthy 
organs.”79 Some were sympathetic—Benjamin and Hamburger, for example. However, doctors 
in favor of allowing patients to undergo these procedures were also invested in productive 
subjects, albeit with a different logic. Hamburger and Benjamin’s support was based in the belief 
that because there was no psychological “cure,” surgery would make transsexuals feel better 
about themselves, which in turn would make them more productive.80 The valorization, Irving 
argues, of “the maleness or femaleness of post-transition transsexuals hinged in part on 
understandings of their productive capacity.”81 However, the gendered-ness also hinged on the 
specific norms and ideals of what constituted maleness and masculinity, and femaleness and 
femininity—concepts steeped in discourses and expectations of whiteness, wealth, and 
ablebodymindedness.  
 Discourses of disability, and the portrayal of those with psychiatric disabilities as a 
burden, also coincide with this conversation. Any person understood to have a psychiatric 
disability was often understood to be “threatening and dangerous.” Irving argued that “medical 
professionals identified transsexuals as a… disability — a preoccupation with sex/gender 
identities and expressions that tempered the ability of transsexuals to contribute to society.”82 
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Cauldwell and other medical professionals understood transvestites, transsexuals, and others 
labeled as having psychiatric disabilities to be burdens on society; they were “parasitic.” This 
rhetoric reflects the long-standing eugenic concerns about social welfare, and of those who were 
wasting funds and costing the state. Logics of productivity, worth, and dependence on the state 
used by Cauldwell and military personnel in the 1940s and well into the 1950s mirrored the 
logics used by eugenicists in the 1920s and 30s. The legacies of defining worth and productivity 
had foundations in eugenic ideologies that evolved over the first half of the twentieth century.  
 
Shifting Alignments and Etiologies 
 Psychoanalysis and psychiatry played a significant role in the development of and 
approach to both transvestism and transsexualism as diagnostic categories. While psychoanalysis 
had been growing in influence since WWI, after 1946 it experienced what some call a “golden 
era” in the U.S. At that time, psychoanalysis had a sweeping influence on a number of fields 
ranging from criminology, education, and child welfare. This increase in popularity occurred in 
part because of the growing influence of Freudian psychology. As one historian notes, Freud’s 
ideas and theories offered a new way of understanding the mind and articulated, “the pathogenic 
power of repressed thoughts and feelings... the importance of sexuality to neurosis.”83 This 
theoretical orientation provided many psychiatrists with what they thought to be more effective 
methods to treat pathologies and neurosis, particularly of the sexual sort. Throughout the 1950s, 
American psychiatry was moving more towards psychological explanations and treatments for 
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neurosis rather than somatic ones—a contentious move in the face of desires for surgical 
intervention by transsexuals.84  
 The war played a significant role in the acceptance and implementation of psychoanalysis 
in the U.S.85 With the growing influence of psychoanalysis, many physicians relied on a 
psychological explanation for transvestism and this would apply to newer cases of 
transsexualism. While many sexologists were moving away from understanding transvestism to 
be caused only by physiology, the psychological explanation was not antithetical to an 
understanding of hereditary or genetic influence. Hereditary explanations for general 
characteristics and diseases were used for both physiological and psychological variations. 
However, psychoanalytic explanations came to dominate the discourse, with many sexologists 
arguing that transsexualism demonstrated these overlaps among psychoanalysis, transvestite 
etiology, and hereditary explanations rooted in eugenics.86 Despite the waning public popularity 
of eugenics, explanations of heredity grounded in eugenic ideology persisted, even in their 
psychoanalytic iterations.87 References to “fitness” had all but disappeared in medical writing 
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about transvestism and transsexualism, but it was clear that transvestites, and in particular 
transsexuals, were anything but medically or genetically “fit,” and anxieties about hereditary 
involvement abounded.  
Some sexologists and physicians sought out hereditary answers to what “caused” 
transvestism. Walter C. Alvarez was a physician and eugenicist who wrote extensively about 
transvestism in the popular press. In an article in the Los Angeles Times on January of 1957, 
Alvarez posited that transvestism was caused by a malfunction in the brain specifically, instead 
of by sexual glands. The article, entitled “Transvestites Called Harmless to Society,” called 
attention to the difference between transvestism and homosexuality, but also their different 
causes.88 Alvarez here provided his own evidence for the physiological cause of transvestism and 
argued that “the main difficulty in homosexual persons lies not in defective male…glands, but in 
the brain.”89 In an earlier article published in July of 1956, he drew connections between 
homosexuality, transvestism, and heredity. One patient asked if there were any medicines he 
might take to make him “normal sexually,” and in response Alvarez recalled a case of another 
patient who was “stuffed” with male hormones to no avail. He stated that: 
During the last several years I have been asking homosexual persons about their ancestry, 
and so far I have always got a story of one more near relatives who were a bit psychotic 
or alcoholic or epileptic… [H]omosexualism… is commonly inherited as a variant of 
psychosis.90  
 
He notes that the biggest barrier to tracing hereditary links was the difficulty of interviewing 
people because most “prefer not to discuss the subject.” Despite his sympathetic approach to 
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transvestism, often arguing in support of surgical intervention, in this conversation he links an 
understanding of homosexuality caused by hereditary to a similar explanation for transvestism. 
 The editors of Sexology Magazine continued this line of inquiry regarding heredity. 
Despite the public rejection of eugenics post-WWII, an editorial in the January 1959 issue 
mirrored commentary from the 1930s. Entitled “Future of the Human Race,” the editors deplored 
the advancement of modern medicine. This medicine, they argued, allowed for infants with 
defects to be kept alive who would have otherwise died either at birth or shortly thereafter. The 
medicine which provided them life also provided them the opportunity to “pass on inherited 
defects to future generations.”91 The editors urged parents to recognize and act upon their 
responsibility to “bring into the world human beings as well equipped as possible.”92 
Other sexologists also continued to focus on heredity, arguing that it led not only to 
physiological but also psychiatric causes for transvestism. George Peabody, Arthur Rowe, and 
James Wall discussed several cases of transvestism in their article “Fetishism and Transvestism.” 
Discussing one case of transvestism, Peabody et.al. stated that “hereditary factors may be 
inferred from the several cases of personality disorder and mental illness among the patient’s 
immediate relatives. A constitutional element is also suggested by his early physical retardation, 
severe myopia, left-handedness, and undersized genitalia.”93 These doctors identified heredity as 
a cause of many “disorders” and malformations, including transvestism. 
Harry Benjamin acknowledged biological factors but advocated for a view that 
recognized how environment also played a significant role in development and eventual outcome 
for individuals. Any etiological explanation for transvestism and transsexualism that relied 
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heavily upon eugenic notions of genes reified the influence of eugenic ideology on concepts of 
normative femininity (on female bodies) and masculinity (on male bodies). Benjamin made 
direct comparisons to normality, and argued that it would not be likely that transvestism would 
develop in an individual whose “soma” was healthy and “normal.”94 Benjamin never directly 
indicated any support for eugenic solutions to transvestism and transsexualism. In fact, he 
advocated that society should better accommodate transvestites and transsexuals. However, 
eugenics and eugenicists were present in his writings and professed opinions.  
 
Psychiatric Diagnoses and Gender Deviance 
In the 1950s and particularly in the 1960s, sexologists and psychiatrists continued a 
eugenic trend from the early 20th century of broadly categorizing various individuals as 
“mentally ill.” Transvestites and transsexuals were diagnosed as psychologically “disordered,” 
most notably with psychopathology and more frequently with psychosis.95 The terms indicated 
different mental states, and were used freely by sexologists including Harry Benjamin and 
Robert Stoller. Psychopathology characterized an individual who exhibited “antisocial, violent… 
aggressive” or irresponsible behavior.96 Psychosis indicated a “disordered mental state” and was 
characterized by “a loss of contact with reality… and deterioration of intellectual and social 
functioning.”97 Both diagnoses were used to draw connections among transvestism and 
transsexualism to criminality, delusional states, and degeneracy.  
Psychopathology and Psychosis 
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Labeling transvestites (and by definition, transsexuals) as psychopathic cast them as 
“mentally ill,” but it also served to draw connections between them and understandings of 
criminality. Sexologist and psychiatrist Karl Bowman argued that transvestites were not often a 
“serious menace” but explicitly mentions one case of murder “in which transvestism was a part 
of [a] prisoner’s psychopathology.”98 Despite his assertion that most transvestites were not 
criminals or “menaces,” his assertion that transvestism and murder were connected through an 
individuals “psychopathology” is telling. The intersection among discourses of transvestism, 
criminality, and psychology provided an environment in which sexologists like Bowman were 
able to connect these seemingly disparate “conditions” and reflects larger associations between 
transvestism and criminality.  
Psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Naham Greenberg, along with his colleagues Alan 
Rosenwald and Paul Nielson, linked transvestism to criminal behavior and murder more directly. 
In 1958 at a conference hosted by the American Psychiatric Association, they provided accounts 
of three cases of transvestites and transsexuals committing at least one murder. The first case was 
the story of a transvestite from Wisconsin who was characterized as a “homicidal farmer.” The 
second was a transvestite from Chicago who “stabbed a young pregnant woman to death.” 
Lastly, to drive the point home, Greenberg et al., provided the details concerning a case where a 
“young man who admitted to multiple female murders and who practiced transvestitism for a 
period.”99 Besides their dismissal of “surgical transformation” playing into the “patient’s 
illusions” the authors clearly associated transvestism with serious psychosis. They were not 
alone in this association, although not every sexologist and transvestite made such extreme 
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comparisons. Many transvestites and other sex “deviates” were subject to the connections being 
made among criminality, transvestism, and psychiatric disability. A number of sexologists and 
psychiatrists, however, believed that transsexuals were “delusional” or simply wanted to indulge 
“whims,” often calling them psychotic.100  
In 1966, J.C. Barker argued transvestites and transsexuals reflected psychopathology in 
his article for a major mainstream medical journal: The Journal of the American Medical 
Association. He claimed that in his experience, “transsexualism and transvestitism are 
completely separate clinical and possibly psychopathological entities.”101 He opined that the only 
approach to “cure” transvestites of their psychopathology was aversion therapy, and in particular 
an approach where patients underwent treatment that often caused severe nausea. Drs. Hertz, 
Tillinger, and Westman expressed agreement with Barker’s diagnosis, and stated firmly that 
“heterosexual individuals with transvestites are generally psychopaths who want to attract 
attention.”102  
Some sexologists, rather than seeing their patients as psychopaths, argued that their 
patients suffered from psychosis. In 1966, Green summarized his observations of twenty-five 
transsexuals and noted that while there was an “absence of gross psychosis in the great majority” 
of the patients, transsexuals were, in general, delusional.103 He did not dismiss delusion all 
together, however, as he wrote about several of his patients who “demonstrated cross-gender 
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identities with varying degrees of circumscribed delusional thinking about their gender.”104 
Robert Stoller agreed with Green and characterized transvestites and transsexuals as psychotic. 
However, he did provide nuance to his diagnosis, arguing that transsexuals were not clinically 
psychotic, as “their ‘delusion’… is placed in a setting of intact reality testing. Almost all of these 
patients know their request is strange.”105 Stoller here fails to clearly state a diagnosis yet sill 
aligns transsexualism with psychosis, reaffirming the association, and often conflation, of the 
two.  
As the number of transvestites and transsexuals working with sexologists and 
psychiatrists increased, discussions of psychosis in relation to this “condition” also grew. 
Sexologists G. Northrup argued that transvestism functioned in two ways: “as a mode of social 
advancement and as a defense against psychosis by projecting sexual delusional material into the 
group.”106 Transvestites, and in particular those who were becoming more associated with the 
term transsexual, were time and again characterized as those who would “self-mutilate” via 
castration and who could easily be diagnosed as psychotic or neurotic.  
 Virginia Prince, a PhD in pharmacology and a self-identified transvestist, wrote about her 
experience of and views on transvestism. She was a prolific writer on the topic of transvestism, 
but also was a contradictory and enigmatic figure and spokesperson for transvestites during this 
time.107 She argued that for some transvestites, the cause was based “on several factors” 
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including “psychological conditions with social factors of an environmental nature.”108 She 
differed in her approach to transsexualism specifically, however, as she categorized 
transsexualism and an entirely different category of deviation rather than as an extreme form of 
transvestism. Prince argued that transvestites, unlike transsexuals, were “under no illusion as to 
his actual masculinity.” Transvestites knew they were men. Transsexuals, on the other hand, 
were convinced they “really” were women: “his desire for… wifehood are… motivated by… the 
conviction that he really ‘is’ a woman.”109 This distinction reveals a rhetorical suspicion of 
transsexualism, and her language is strikingly similar to that used by sexologists when 
diagnosing transsexuals as psychotic.  
 Prince’s characterization of transsexuals as delusional echoed the views of many 
sexologists. Sexologists Worden and Marsh, for example, framed any surgical intervention as 
“mutilation” while simultaneously characterizing transsexuals as delusional: “Their 
[transsexuals’] feeling is that the difficulties in getting the surgery stem from the stupidity and 
prejudice of society rather than from any questions as to the appropriateness of their wish for a 
mutilating operation”110 They also described transsexuals as “extremely deviated.” They 
continued, stating “we have not yet found one subject who has a realistic idea of what a woman 
is like. They all show an extremely shallow, immature, and grossly distorted concept of what 
woman is like socially, sexually, anatomically, and emotionally.”111 They cite the contradictory 
nature of a desire to have their own vagina while simultaneously abhorring it on other people 
(those born with vaginas and vulvas) as evidence of their “distorted concept.”  
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 Sexologists and psychiatrists used the diagnosis of “psychosis” to draw links between 
transvestites and criminality, much like those who argued that their patients were psychopaths. In 
1963, A.J.W. Taylor and D.G. McLachlan conducted a psychological study of six transvestites. 
They aligned transvestism closely with criminality in part because of the results of their 
psychological study. These two doctors believed that this type of psychological disturbance 
(transvestism) was connected to inherent proclivities for criminal activity. For the six cases 
discussed, they provided a brief description of each individual but also included their criminal 
records, which is demonstrative of their view that criminality was of central importance to 
discussions of transvestism as well as to its causes and possible cures. 
 The convergence of discourses of criminality, psychosis, psychopathology, and diagnoses 
of gender “deviance” was indicative of the growing influence of psychoanalysis, and the 
continuing influence of eugenics, during the 1950s and 1960s. Because psychoanalysis often 
came to bear on conversations about criminality, it is not surprising that conversations about 
transvestism and criminality would sometimes merge, especially considering previous 
association of the two “conditions.” Some doctors, like Nicola Brunori mentioned above, 
discussed sterilization in relation to these conditions, particularly because they claimed it 
prevented the transmission of disease and could be used to punish criminals. Other physicians, 
psychoanalyst William Menninger included, believed that criminals should receive psychiatric 
rather than physical treatment. Menninger believed the punishment criminals received were 
inefficient in relation to rehabilitation. Those who had previously been understood as criminals 
in need of punishment were now more commonly understood as patients, or at least as criminals 
who needed psychological intervention.112 Writers for Sexology in 1956 drew direct connections 
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between sex criminals in particular and the subject position of “patient.” One author argued that 
“Legal action is taken against sexual deviates, and many of the cases we are discussing are 
considered emotionally unstable… the prevailing opinion today is to use the word patient and not 
the term criminal.”113 The way to deal with social ills, criminality, and deviance was moving 
from the realm of criminality and the carceral system into the realm of physicians and 
psychiatrists; rather than punishment, these individuals needed “treatment” to cure them of their 
abnormality.114  
Connections to Eugenics 
A growing understanding of DNA, chromosomes, and genetic heredity was influencing 
sexologists and their explanations for psychiatric “disorders” which included transvestism. Harry 
Benjamin had been linking chromosomes to the causes of transvestism as early as 1954, arguing 
that “the effeminate male may look and behave as he does on a purely psychosomatic or 
psychological basis… but he may also be the product of a somato-psychic mechanism 
originating in his chromosomes.”115 By the 1960s, however, references to chromosomes and 
genetics had grown significantly. While physiological explanations for deviance—gender or 
otherwise—were present in the discourse, newer psychogenic explanations for deviance were 
growing in popularity alongside the growing influence of psychology and psychiatry, 
explanations that relied on psychological, rather than physiological, origins for any number of 
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physical or psychiatric “illnesses.” These psychogenic explanations often referenced heredity 
and degeneracy in relation to psychiatric and physical disability.116 
Despite the growth of psychogenic explanations, physiological explanations for 
transvestism or intersex conditions continued to play a role in etiological conversations. A June 
1960 Sexology article focused wholly on genetics and chromosomes in relation to intersex 
conditions. The author was excited about “the new genetic knowledge” about both physiological 
and psychological abnormalities. He believed that this knowledge “may well lead to the ultimate 
unraveling of many of the mysteries surrounding constitutional predisposition to illness and the 
development of sexual aberrations and other abnormalities, such as mental deficiency.”117 
Reliance on new medical technology did not function to eliminate discussions and debates rooted 
in eugenic philosophy. Instead, this new technology changed the specifics of the conversations.  
Eugenics had long since fallen out of favor in public discourse as a result of the Nazi 
utilization of negative eugenic methods in the 1940s. However, twenty years later sexologists 
were still discussing eugenic approaches to health and well-being. In the March 1965 issue of 
Sexology, sexologists discussed “forced sterilization” and admitted that the Nazi approach was 
problematic. However, they argued, forced sterilization could be justified in part because, “There 
was the probability that any offspring would be mentally deficient and become a public 
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charge.”118 While not speaking specifically of transvestism and transsexualism, the concepts of 
“mental deficiency” and “sexual deviance” were inextricable even if their manifestation differed. 
Race was also implicated in these conversations because of the ways in which these categories 
were co-constitutive.  
In her book Chang and Eng Reconnected, Cynthia Wu explores the connections between 
race and disability. More specifically, she critiques the ways in which constructions of disability 
rely on “facile conflations between race and ability status.”119 Wu discusses how references to 
race when thinking about disability have “tended to rely on an assumption of unmarked middle-
class whiteness.”120 She continues:  
“It is telling that racial difference—more specifically, blackness—served as an all- too-
available trope through which early scholars have articulated an otherwise important 
argument about physical variation. Correspondingly, one can easily imagine that 
discourses of race may also have been inflected with a concern about disability. The 
question of “fitness” has historically attended discussions about racial difference in many 
ways.”121 
 
Nowhere in this 1965 article do the authors discuss “fitness,” but there is no need. Discussions of 
forced sterilization as an approach to preventing unwanted hereditary deficiencies—
psychological or physical—always already incorporated discussions of “fitness” and eugenic 
notions of superior genetics. One rather outspoken eugenicist, Frederick Osborn, was very frank 
about the continuation of eugenics. In his 1968 book The Future of Human Heredity: An 
Introduction to Eugenics in Modern Society, Osborn argued, “Eugenic goals are most likely to be 
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attained under a name other than eugenics.”122 Both this quote and Wu’s insights illuminate how 
eugenic ideologies continued under the guise of racial, disability, and medical discourses. 
Regardless of the diagnosis, most published sexologists at some point identified 
transvestites, and later transsexuals, as either psychotic or psychopathological. In light of this 
common practice, it is not difficult to recognize the underlying ties between transvestism, 
disability, and criminality, all of which have raced and classed implications. If one was 
diagnosed as a psychopath, it was a simple task to align that individual with criminal acts as a 
result of their “antisocial” or “aggressive behavior.” Casting transvestites and transsexuals as 
“delusional” recalls the ease with which early eugenicists applied the label of “feebleminded” to 
anyone that they understood to be abnormal. The application of “psychosis” and 
“psychopathology” reflected and reified normative understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality.  
 
Mixing Up Sex  
 Debates about causes for transvestism and transsexualism often led to questions about 
how to ascertain one’s “true” sex. Establishing an individual’s “true sex” proved crucial because 
if an individual was a transsexual and desired surgery to alter their physical birth sex, surgery 
could not be “justified.” However, if there was any chance of a sex “mix-up” or misidentification 
that occurred at birth, surgery was justified to correct the “mistake” of falsely identifying that 
individual as the “wrong sex.” Physical hermaphroditism necessitated surgical intervention; 
psychic hermaphroditism, a term sometimes used synonymously with transsexualism, could not 
justify surgery, and was instead seen as a neurosis or pathology in need of a psychiatric cure or 
treatment rather than surgical intervention. As these debates played out, physicians, reporters, 
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and even individuals now labeled as “transsexual” struggled to differentiate intersex conditions 
(hermaphroditism) from transvestism, and in particular from transsexualism.  
After news of Jorgensen’s “sex change” surgery was circulated in the media, transvestites 
and transsexuals who had been identified male at birth sought medical intervention for their 
desire to become more feminine, or to become women. As publications, both academic and 
popular, began discussing transsexualism and specifically surgeries related to this “condition” 
more frequently, stories of patients’ “mistaken sex” increased as well. Shortly after Jorgensen’s 
debut in the New York Daily News, sexologists and journalists were quick to assert the 
impossibility of actual sex change surgeries. However, they argued, they could “correct” one’s 
sex, but only if they had been misidentified at birth. They also rushed to defend the surgeries that 
had been completed in the U.S., and asserted that these individuals were not transsexuals, but 
instead intersex individuals.  
Sex Mixups 
 Walter C. Alvarez attempted to make these conversations accessible to a wider audience. 
In a May 1955 column, “How Surgery Helps Clear Up Sex Mixups,” he referenced Roberta 
Cowell’s story, a woman who is often now referred to as a transsexual, as a case study 
supporting his thesis about sex “mixups.” He believed that the surgeries Cowell received were 
appropriate since Cowell’s sex was “mixed up” at her birth; her surgeries were simply aligning 
her body with her “true sex.” Despite his references to “sex mixups,” he made no reference to 
hermaphroditism or intersex conditions. Rather, he spoke of the “unfortunate persons… [who] in 
their psychic makeup… are decidedly feminine,” of individuals with psychic, rather than 
physical, “problems.”123  
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The March 1960 issue of Sexology speaks to this anxiety about “mistaken sex,” as Dr. 
Salvatore Vittorio Musumeci discussed definitions of both “true” and “false” hermaphroditism, 
where “true hermaphrodites” possess both “the male and female sex glands” but was extremely 
rare.124 A majority of the article focuses on “false” hermaphrodites: individuals who, for 
example, were “genetic males,” but who “at birth show a certain number of external female 
anatomical characteristics, but possess male sex glands.”125 The remainder of the article focused 
on surgical measures necessary to correct the mistaken sex identification. Musumeci at no point 
equivocated about his recommendations; if one was misidentified at birth, hormonal and surgical 
intervention early on in life will “have the greatest chances of full success.”126  
Both the popular press and academic works reflected this growing attention to intersex 
conditions as more legitimate and requiring medical intervention, as opposed to transsexualism. 
In one newspaper article, journalist Alton Blakeslee proclaimed that according to doctors, 
“Thousands have Intersex.”127 Citing these doctors, Blakeslee also noted that “sex abnormalities” 
were far more common than was previously believed. Sexology went so far as to celebrate sex 
changes which were “successful,” a term used only in reference to cases of “mistaken sex.” Sex 
change surgeries for transsexuals could not be successful; as Benjamin noted in an issue of 
Sexology the next year, the “so-called ‘change’ by surgery concerns only those organs that make 
you physically and legally a man (or a woman),” and asserted that a person (after castration) 
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would “be neither male nor female, but instead a ‘neuter.’”128 Some authors even characterized 
transvestism as a mistaken diagnosis; that instead these individuals could have intersex 
conditions, justifying doctors “fixing” the sex of “misdiagnosed” children.129  
As a result of this focus on “mistaken” sex, by 1964 sex at birth was being discussed as a 
diagnosis in and of itself. Authors in the July 1964 issue of Sexology reiterated the common 
explanation of surgical intervention for intersex individuals, “emphasizing that this was not a 
‘surgical sex change’ but merely the correction of defects which had kept the child’s maleness 
incomplete, the doctors referred to the case as one of ‘mistaken transvestism.’”130 However, 
beyond discussing surgical intervention, they claimed that their motivation for writing the article 
was that the “report may stimulate more accurate diagnoses” of sex at birth.131 In light of this 
discussion of sex being diagnosed at birth, the ability to ascertain the “correct” diagnoses proved 
to be of the utmost importance. Doctors, if able to establish their patients clearly as either 
hermaphroditic (intersex) or as a transsexual, would then be able to justify or deny surgical 
intervention without fear of legal prosecution via the mayhem statutes – as well as leverage the 
diagnoses in relation to their own moral positions in relation to gender deviance. 
The “Truth” of Sex 
Instead of relying on “sex mixups,” or a questionable claim to intersexuality, many 
physicians leading up to the 1950s believed in a theory of bisexuality (one that differs from 
current notions of bisexuality concerning sexuality). Developed in the early twentieth century, 
the theory of bisexuality recognized overlapping characteristics of males and females. Gregorio 
Mariñon, a Spanish physician, argued that sex was not “two antagonistic and profoundly 
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differentiated entities” but rather “a scale of infinite gradations.”132 Other notable sexologists 
agreed with this concept or concepts similar to it, including Hirschfeld, Krafft-Ebing, Havelock 
Ellis. Christine Jorgensen also claimed to believe in this view of sex. As Meyerowitz notes, this 
concept of human bisexuality took hold in Europe in the first few decades of the twentieth 
century, but appeared to a lesser degree in the U.S. in the 1920s and 1930s.133 Sexology was 
sympathetic to this view and published articles reflecting that stance in the 1930s and 1940s 
stating “All human beings are bi-sexual in their makeup.”134  
However, the growing dominance of psychoanalysis shifted sexological discourse away 
from this theory. Psychoanalysts, according to Meyerowitz, “maintained a vision of separate 
biological sexes,” and dismissed transvestism and other cross-gender behavior as a psychological 
condition rather than a physical one. For psychoanalysts, psychoanalysis was the answer to 
aligning ones “true sex” with their behavior, not surgical intervention.135  
For decades, sexologists had confidently argued that biological sex was determined by 
gonads. Moving into the 1960s, however, sexologists came to rely more heavily on chromosomal 
definitions. This was due, in part, to evolving medical understandings of genetics and DNA. 
However, this move was also influenced by the expanding conversations and anxieties about 
transsexualism, intersex bodies, and an urgent need by physicians for clear, definable boundaries 
between male and female in light of those anxieties. W.W. Bauer, then the director of health 
education for the American Medical Association, believed that a “true sex” existed, but that it 
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was just a matter of making the proper determination. He referenced new innovations in sex 
chromatin research, something that would help determine an individual’s “true sex.” He believed 
that no one was bisexual, and that everyone was either female or male. He argued that 
“Physicians in general believe that there is no such thing as a bisexual individual and that an 
adult person of one sex cannot be converted into the other.”136 He dismissed popular 
understandings of “sex transformation” as a sex change, stating that “What actually happens is 
that the true sex of the individual concerned is ascertained and the necessary procedures initiated 
to make this sex apparent externally as well as internally.”137 The theory of a “true” sex that 
could be identified was growing in dominance over the theory of bisexuality.  
The discursive overlap between transvestism, transsexualism, notions of “true sex” and 
intersex conditions manifested in other ways as well. At times, intersex terminology fully 
dominated conversations about transvestism and transsexualism. In a 1965 issue of Confidential, 
journalist Bert Eltinge defined intersex as “persons with the physical characteristics of one sex 
and the mental makeup of the other.”138 Following this broad definition, he discussed several 
transvestites and self-identified transsexuals, including Christine Jorgensen. However, instead of 
labeling her as a transsexual, he implied that she was intersex, arguing that the term included 
“persons with the physical characteristics of one sex and the mental makeup of the other,” and 
called her “America’s most famous sex-switcher.”139 His characterization of Jorgensen as 
intersex shifted her story away from one of a sex “change” from male to female into a story of 
medical intervention that “remove[d] the dominant sex organs and replace[d] them with the 
hidden or latent set.”140 In another Confidential article that year, Eltinge even suggested that the 
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entertainment industry had covered all the sex scandal stuff so they might be seeking out intersex 
people to spice things up. Eltinge quipped, “don’t be surprised when Hollywood switches from 
Sex Symbols to Intersex Symbols.”141 
While very few, if any, references were made to genetics, heredity, or eugenics in 
conversations about “true,” “mistaken,” or “mixed up” sex, the existence of anxieties around 
these distinctions speaks to larger concerns about what it meant to be “normal.” In 1960, 
sexologist Robert Stoller, along with Harold Garfinkel and Alexander Rosen, discussed what 
they claimed were the distinctions between intersex individuals and transsexuals. Sharing a case 
study of an intersex individual, they claimed that the intersex person, unlike transsexuals, had an 
earnest desire to be a woman: “The patient does not appear to be imitating the female role but 
seems clearly to have identified with it. Essential in this identification is the lack of caricature, of 
hostility seen in transvestites and transsexualists.”142 As such, they claimed that if a transsexual 
were to receive a “reconstructive castrating operation… her vagina would be man-made rather 
than gene-made, and so worthless,” but if a patient was intersex, then the operation was 
justified.143 In addition, there were strong racial implications in the language of the article. They 
described their intersex patient as a “cultural stranger,” one who “must bring a great deal of 
awareness, skills, aptitudes, rehearsals…. in order to master his daily circumstances…the 
stranger is… able to teach the ‘normals’ about the strange features of the normals’ ordinary 
affairs of life.”144 
                                                       
141 Ibid. 70. 
142 Robert J. Stoller, Harold Garfinkel, and Alexander Rosen, "Passing and the Maintenance of Sexual Identification 
in an Intersexed Patient," Archives of General Psychiatry 2, no. 4 (1960). 44. 
143 Ibid. 47. 
144 Ibid. 43. Stoller again referenced “normals” in his 1964 article Gender-Role Change in Intersex Patients.” He 
discussed his belief that those who felt uncertain in their gender would more readily adjust to changing gender later 
on. However, changing from one sex to another for those who have developed a very fixed identity would prove 
difficult if not impossible. Referencing a potential patient, he argued that “his capacity to shift gender role is a s 
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This reference to “normal” can be examined through the lens of Julian Carter’s 
understanding of normality: that normality discourse emerges as politically neutral but houses 
ideologies of white racial dominance. While they make no reference to race here, they are 
creating a distinction between normal and abnormal, concepts embedded in racial distinctions. 
Their understanding of the authenticity of the intersex patient’s femininity was firmly rooted in 
raced and classed understandings of “normal” (read: white) femininity. They made several 
references to her “typical” femininity, as she was not “garish, outstanding, or abnormally 
exhibitionistic in her attire, nor was there any hint of poor taste,” mirroring the standards of 
middle-class, white femininity.145 Stoller’s “normals” were never explicitly defined, but 
considering the discursive contexts in which he wrote, “normal” indicated white, heterosexual, 
and ablebodyminded, as well as those whose gender normatively aligned with their sex.146  
 
Benjamin’s Intervention 
 Serving as a culmination of decades of research as well as a milestone in transsexual, 
transvestite, and sexological history, Harry Benjamin published The Transsexual Phenomenon 
(TP) in 1966. At the time, TP was the most comprehensive text about transvestism and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
much an unalterable part of the patient’s identity as is the inability to shift in normal.” Robert Stoller, "Gender-Role 
Change in Intersexed Patients," Journal of the American Medical Association 188, no. 7 (1964). 165. 
145 Directly referencing race, they discussed later in the article issues of legitimate and illegitimate passing. They 
referenced the difficulty of their intersex patient “passing” as a woman, and then list “sanctionable” and “legitimate” 
passing, what they also referred to as “transfers of persons from one status to another.” Changing from “single to 
married, from student to graduate, from unemployed to employed,” are legitimate and “publicly and ceremonially 
recognized.” However, illegitimate change for them was evidenced by more white people being counted in the 
census each year, due to “Negroes who have switched group affiliations, i.e., who have ‘passed.’” Stoller, Garfinkel, 
and Rosen, "Passing and the Maintenance of Sexual Identification in an Intersexed Patient." 44, 46.  
146 Stoller used the concept of “gender identity” by 1964, and argued that gender identity is often fixed by the age of 
two. Despite his research and exposure to intersex individuals, he argued in another 1964 article, Hermaphroditic 
identity of Hermaphrodites, that “it is rarely questioned that there are only two biology sexes, male and female, with 
two resultant genders, masculine and feminine. The evidence for biologic or psychologic bisexuality does not 
contradict this division.” His commitment to “normals” and the normality of binary sex divisions is evident, and 
speaks to his commitment to the two-sex system. Robert J. Stoller, "The Hermaphroditic Identiy of 
Hermaphrodites," The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 139 (1964). 453, emphasis mine. 
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transsexualism and discussed etiology, definitions, symptoms, treatments, motivations, 
distinctions, approaches to diagnoses, legal aspects of transsexualism, results of operations, as 
well as photos of transsexuals both pre- and post- surgery.147 Benjamin, advocating for proper 
treatment, criticized doctors for being too self-serving rather than having the interest of their 
transvestite and transsexual patients at heart. After appealing to the reader to be sympathetic, 
arguing that “we are all intersexes” in some ways, his medical definition was clear.148 Where 
transvestites “‘feel’ as men and know that they are men,” transsexuals (both male and female) 
are “deeply unhappy as a member of the sex (or gender) to which he or she was assigned by the 
anatomical structure of the body, particularly the genitals. … This has nothing to do with 
hermaphroditism.”149 This assertion, however, did not preclude surgical intervention for 
transsexuals. Benjamin was an advocate for surgical intervention, repeating what others had 
noted for several years: psychotherapy was unsuccessful at “curing” transsexualism.  
 Despite his claim that psychotherapy was unsuccessful, Benjamin framed transsexualism 
as a psychological illness, a neurosis, and as narcissism. He even questioned if some of his 
patients’ schizophrenic or psychotic issues were caused by “thwarted sex life and the gender 
discomfort of the transsexual state.”150 When discussing psychological illnesses, he referenced 
Ira B. Pauly’s work that showed that many transsexuals, because they failed to develop adequate 
interpersonal skills, often “present the picture of a schizoid or inadequate personality.”151 He 
highlighted various difficulties transsexuals face, from living full-time as women and keeping it 
secret, to legal troubles, to physical changes they must make, but also their “character and 
                                                       
147 In addition, a supplement to TP was available to “doctors of the medical and psychological professions only,” 
and consisted of ten pages of photographs, all of which depict male-to-female transsexuals, and the majority of those 
focused on castration and surgically-constructed vaginas. 
148 Harry Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon (New York: Julian Press, Inc., 1966). 8. 
149 Ibid. 13. 
150 Ibid. 51-52. 
151 Pauly, "Male Psychosexual Inversion: Transsexualism: A Review of 100 Cases." 172. 
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behavior. From a so-called ‘character neurosis’ to outspoken hostile, paranoiac demands for help 
from the doctor, all kinds of objectionable traits may exist.”152 He continued, casting transsexuals 
as unreliable, deceitful, ungracious, and impatient, immature, and adding that “many transsexuals 
are utterly self-centered.”153 
Benjamin also mirrored other writers of the time, and paired conversations of criminality 
and transsexualism. He urged readers to recognize the difference between “legal criminality” and 
“criminality before science and common sense.”154 He then mentioned transvestites and 
transsexuals in a list with “drug addiction, alcoholism, and prostitution” as examples of legal 
crimes that are “not crimes” in terms of “science and common sense.”155 While dismissing 
claims that transvestism and transsexualism were connected to criminality, the presence of the 
conversation reflects the dominance of discourses that linked the two. Ultimately though, he 
argued that if society and the law were more permissive, allowing transsexuals to complete legal 
name changes and allowing both transvestites and transsexuals to wear female attire, this 
approach would promote a patient’s “peace of mind” and “his ability to work and maintain 
himself better economically and psychologically, to the benefit of the community.”156  
Despite his advocacy for transsexuals, his understandings of gender, sex, and sexuality 
reflected larger discourses of normality. He defined “the normal male (normal by his genetic 
inheritance)” and the “genetically normal” female as heterosexual.157 When discussing Virginia 
Prince and her attempt to separate sex from transvestism, he dismissed this move as reflective of 
Prince and other transvestites “frequent lack of realism among… and their ever-present capacity 
                                                       
152 Benjamin, The Transsexual Phenomenon. 67. 
153 Ibid. 67-8. 
154 Ibid. 136. 
155 Ibid. 136. 
156 Ibid. 140. 
157 Ibid. 10. 
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for illusion and self-deception”158 He also continually reinforced the notion that surgery could 
not change anyone’s sex, that it would only change the “external appearance from male to 
female,” effectively making that person a “neuter.” He consistently reminded the reader that 
there would be many obstacles in the path towards becoming a woman, namely masculine 
features, height, an Adam’s Apple, among other physical characteristics of male-bodied 
individuals. He mentioned the legal difficulties, but then also asked that the transsexual consider 
their family and how they might feel.159 He continued:  
when you have recovered from the pain and the aftereffects of the operation, after a few 
weeks or months, your real work begins — to change into a ‘woman.’ You have to learn 
how to behave like a woman, how to walk, how to use your hands, how to talk, how to 
apply make-up, and how to dress… if you may have had your experience with dressing… 
but was then more or less a game.160 
 
Benjamin relied on the “normal” feminine comportment of the time, and his reminder about 
learning to behave like a woman implies that transvestites were to act like heterosexual and 
normatively feminine (white) women.  
 Refusing to expand conceptions of sex beyond male and female, despite his knowledge of 
intersex conditions, Benjamin continually reaffirmed the belief that “medically, or rather 
endocrinologically, we are reminded that no ‘female’ can ever result from the operation but 
merely a castrated (or mutilated) male, with artificially created sex organs resuming those of a 
female and, if successfully created, allowing normal peno-vaginal sex relations.”161 Benjamin’s 
ability to reference post-surgical sex as “normal,” as heterosexual, speaks volumes about his idea 
that transsexual males who would then live full time as women could assimilate into “normal” 
life, pending their success as feminine heterosexual women. Ultimately, Benjamin was an 
                                                       
158 Ibid. 36-37. 
159 Ibid. 108. 
160 Ibid. 109. 
161 Ibid. 113. 
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advocate for surgical intervention based on the notion that the operations left people happier than 
they were before. He claimed that transsexual males could “attain a happier future” as women, 
and he stated that “in this way, the individual as well as society can be served.”162 
 His insistence that these interventions ultimately served society speak to a larger concerns 
informed by decades of eugenic ideology. He was not alone in his concern for “the greater 
good,” and his optimism responded, if indirectly, to concerns from other sexologists such as 
Pauly, who was concerned about transsexual delusions being “projected” onto society, and Green 
et. al.’s concern that transsexuals might be a “threat to society.” Benjamin’s argument that 
medical interventions were of benefit to both the transsexual and to society relate to larger 
concerns about public health that were bolstered during the eugenics movement. Both surgical 
intervention and the eugenics movement attempted to modify and control various aspects of life 
and reproduction.  
 Sexuality played a significant role in Benjamin’s views regarding surgery. Foucault 
discussed sexuality in relation to eugenics and biopolitics, and argued that “sexuality exists at the 
point where the body and population meet,” and because of this is subject to both disciplinary 
power and regularization, particularly in relation to heredity.163 Foucault argued that those who 
have been cast as having perverted sexuality were “assumed to have a heredity,” a degeneracy. 
Direct conversations about degeneracy are absent from Benjamin’s text, but vestiges of the 
anxieties that informed theories of degeneracy remain. He claimed to be concerned about the 
                                                       
162 He reflected on his experience with patients and the outcomes of the interactions between transwomen and 
physicians. In relation to the success of surgical intervention, he believed that “patients who want to please the 
doctor with their statements” regarding the success of operation. However, he reiterates his mistrust of what 
transwomen said, both before and after interaction with physicians. He was somewhat skeptical of their story of their 
lives leading up to surgery, and somewhat skeptical about their feedback regarding the successes of medical 
intervention. When discussing these issues, he again cited Pauly who called transsexuals “‘unreliable historians.’” 
ibid. 135. 
163 Michel Foucault et al., Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76, 1st ed. (New 
York: Picador, 2003). 251-252. 
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greater good, about what could make transsexuals not only the most harmless, but also the most 
useful to society. He professed a hope to intervene with medical technology to correct or change 
what did not happen at birth, to correct the constitutional aspects of the transsexual’s body. 
Eugenics was explicitly interested in purifying the body, particularly the bodies belonging to 
white, “eugenically valuable,” individuals. Benjamin, and many other sexologists, physicians, 
and psychologists, were ultimately interested in assimilating and fixing those who did not fit.  
Benjamin fell in step with the goals of many sexologists and medical professionals: 
rehabilitation via the medical industrial complex for transvestites and transsexuals. For example, 
he was willing to create “neuters,” albeit heterosexual “neuters,” in the interest of helping 
transsexuals lessen their potential for stress, neurosis, as well as their potential to commit 
criminal acts. In the interest of homeostasis, he advocated for the creation of women that were as 
similar to and consistent with the expectations of white, middle-class, heterosexual femininity – 
Christine Jorgensen served as the epitome of this goal. The preferred method of “rehabilitation” 
differed for some of these physicians and involved various degrees of either medical or 
psychological intervention. What was consistent, though, was the need to “fix” and rehabilitate 
transwomen in order to incorporate them back into society as productive citizens – and if those 
citizens could be white, middle-class, and heterosexual, all the better. 
 
In Their Own Words 
 Sexologists writing about transvestites and transsexuals often explicitly dismissed the 
validity and legitimacy of the narratives that their patients shared with them. This dismissal was 
made even easier with the association of delusions, psychiatric disability, and the desire of some 
of these patients to be women. However, these “patients” began to write and publish their own 
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narratives. Their narratives both diverge from and reflect the one emerging from within 
sexological discourse. In their own words, yet influenced by discourse, publishers, editors, and 
strategic approaches to constructing themselves as sympathetic characters, they began to lay 






















CHAPTER 3  
Disciplining Narratives 
 
“Sex change is not a new ‘fad’’… It is a serious medical answer to a serious  
medical problem… He cannot be rightfully blamed for these conditions  
anymore than if he had been born with cerebral palsy.”  
-Charlotte McLeod, 1956  
 
Claiming Respectability 
 Sexological literature focused on transvestism, transsexualism, and hermaphroditism 
grew exponentially during the first six decades of the twentieth century. Autobiographical 
writing provided the authors with a discursive space for constructing alternative understandings 
of their subjectivity and identities, and to communicate particular messages to the readers. 
Autobiographical writing occupies a space that is neither history nor fiction, but a liminal space 
where truths and subject positions emerge and stake their claim. In Autobiography & 
Postmodernism, English scholar Leigh Gilmore argues that, “autobiography and other forms of 
self-representation [are] a site of identity production; as texts that both resist and produce cultural 
identities.”1 Gilmore also argues that the genre of autobiography participates “in the cultural 
production of a politics of identity… that maintains identity hierarchies through its reproduction 
of class, sexuality, race, and gender as terms of ‘difference’ in a social field of power.”2 The 
autobiographies I analyze below both reify and challenge this process of cultural production. The 
narratives, published between the years 1918 to 1968, were written by those deemed abnormal in 
relation to manhood and womanhood by psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, sexologists, lawmakers, 
and the popular press. In attempts to access legitimacy, the authors do use discourses of white 
and heterosexual superiority to frame themselves as deserving of empathy and understanding.3 
                                                       
1 Leigh Gilmore, "The Mark of Autobiography: Postmodernism, Autobiography, and Genre," in Autobiography & 
Postmodernism, ed. Kathleen M. Ashley, Leigh Gilmore, and Gerald Peters (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1994). 4. 
2 Ibid. 5. 
3 Ibid. 6. 
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Moreover, the authors also appeal to discourses of respectability, situating themselves as 
empathetic figures deserving of legitimacy and respect through claiming the authority to tell their 
own narratives of becoming properly feminine. This demand to be understood as true and 
feminine women existed in stark contrast to the approach sexologists often took when 
approaching transvestite and transsexual narratives. Time and again, sexologists expressed a 
belief that transvestites and transsexuals were either incapable of narrating their history or that 
they were prone to exaggerate and manipulate their histories for their own benefit. In her work 
concerning scientific racism and homosexuality, Siobhan Somerville dates this dismissal back to 
the late 1800s. For medical professionals of the era, the “speaking pervert” was “a challenge to 
the ‘truth’ of medical examination and threatened to contradict tradition source of medical 
evidence, the patient’s mute physical body as interpreted by the physician.”4 Despite the 
pervasiveness of this dismissal, many publishers included introductions and forewords written by 
sexologists and doctors, as well as assessments and interpretations by doctors that often 
supported and congratulated the authors and their narratives of transition. Perhaps these were 
included with the hope that these additions provided legitimacy to narratives that had otherwise 
been deemed suspect as best, and outright lies at worst. Regardless, publishing their own stories 
provided transwomen with some semblance of authority and control over their own narratives 
that existed in contradiction to the sexologists’ dismissal of their authorial voices.  
 These narratives, while published outside of medical journals and texts, were still 
embedded in medical discourse. The diagnoses of transvestism and transsexualism helped to 
produce evolving and sometimes contradictory “truths” that emerged from both the writings of 
                                                       
4 Siobhan B. Somerville, Queering the Color Line: Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in American Culture 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000). 263. Trans studies scholar Talia Mae Bettcher references this 
dismissal, in part, as “Basic Denial of Authenticity.” See: Talia Mae Bettcher, "Trans Identities and First Person 
Authority," in "You've Changed": Sex Reassignment and Personal Identity, ed. Laurie J. Shrage (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 99. 
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sexologists and the writings of those being diagnosed. The truths produced in and through these 
autobiographies informed and were informed by the “norms of scientific regularity” and could 
not be separated from these norms. In her work on biomedical ethics and the frequency with 
which the private matters of vulnerable populations are forced into public discourse, Karla 
Holloway focuses on the instances where this occurs at the intersection of medical and legal 
contacts. Arguing that the privacy of marginalized groups, particularly black women, is 
sacrificed in service of public morality, her work underscores the “ways in which culture is a 
vigorously constructed interplay of identities.”5 The sexologists and authors were co-producing 
this interplay. These identities, for Holloway’s work and mine, are often “vigorously embedded 
in medicine” and medical discourse.6 These autobiographies provide insight into the work some 
transwomen did as they navigated the dominating and regulatory effects of medical discourse, 
norms of womanhood and femininity, as well as the disciplining effects of the diagnosis.  
 
Confessions of Respectability 
These autobiographical writings often take the form of a confessional. Many authors 
explicitly used the term “confession” when narrating their various medical examinations and 
what the examinations “revealed” or what “truths” emerged at the site of the examinations. 
Christine Jorgensen explicitly referred to her moment of “revelation” in dialogue with the 
medical fields, particularly an endocrinologist, as a “revealing confession;” Hedy Jo Star writes 
“I have a confession to make.”7 Using these various formulations of confession, the reader is 
constructed as a confidante, as a subject to whom a “secret” is being revealed, but also someone 
                                                       
5 Karla Holloway, Private Bodies/Public Texts: Race, Gender, and a Cultural Bioethics (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2011). xix. 
6 Ibid. xviii. 
7 Hedy Jo Star, My Unique Change (Chicago: Novel Books, Inc, 1965). 1. 
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who is trustworthy and who will believe the narrative the author constructs. Through these 
confessional narratives, the authors presented themselves as legitimate, heterosexual women, 
most often white, as well as someone whom the reader will listen to. They also utilized 
confessional narratives as an appeal for access to various medical interventions to produce a “sex 
change.”8  
In readings these texts, one finds similar narratives, consisting of explanations and 
confessions of unhappiness as children, feelings of failure as men, dressing in women’s clothing 
as young children then working to avoid it, marrying for love – even having children, discussions 
of how cross-dressing got in the way, an eventual self-acceptance of their “condition,” with 
climactic endings describing how wonderful and fulfilling their lives were now that they were 
being “true” to themselves. Many times this “self-acceptance” was narrated as a confession. 
Always, though, the authors cast themselves as liberated from perversion or pathology, thus 
deserving of respect. These narratives were examples of transvestism enacting itself, of those 
inhabiting subject positions of gender deviance speaking on their own behalf, a move Michel 
Foucault characterized as demanding “that its [transvestism’s] legitimacy, ‘naturality’ be 
acknowledged.”9  
                                                       
8 These narratives mirror earlier confessions of homosexuality—both popular and personal—to families, therapists, 
and journalists, confessions that Foucault argued utilized “the same vocabulary…the same categories by which” 
these individuals had been deemed abnormal, perverse, and “epistemically suspect,” as unable to know or articulate 
the ‘truth’ of their own narrative. However, these autobiographical narratives also did more than mirror the 
discursive products of sexology and other medical fields. The narratives invited readers to witness the production 
and habitation of subject positions deemed abnormal by legal and medical professionals, but subject positions 
transpeople themselves worked to normalize and make acceptable through their narratives. Michel Foucault, The 




 Presenting the published books to readers as “authentic” provided what Ashley et al., call 
an environment where readers, writers, and publishers were “enjoined in a mutually productive 
performance of truth-telling.”10 As Foucault explained: 
The confession is… a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not 
confess without the presence… of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the 
authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in 
order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile… it exonerates, redeems, and 
purifies him; it… liberates him.11 
  
The readers, sexologists, and transpeople are all produced and interpellated by these narratives: 
the narratives plead for sympathy from doctors, empathy from the reader, and cast the authors as 
worthy of both.12 As such, the discursive production of the “truths” of transsexuality were 
relational – sexologists, transsexuals, the popular press, and all those reading the texts produced 
from these various sites were all involved in shaping the discourses of transsexuality. The 
authorities, those requiring the confession, were the readers, which included medical 
professionals and those to whom the authors appealed to for understanding and respect.  
 More than just the emergence of subject positions occurred. The authors crafted their 
stories and represented their positions in relation to race, class, gender, sexuality, and disability.13 
They also helped to construct who they understood as “other.” In her essay about Christine 
Jorgensen and constructions of transsexuality, Emily Skidmore argues that many of the 
transwomen had an opportunity to “put forth an inclusive display of gender variance,” but 
instead they “sought to claim an identity ‘just like’ other women, and in calling upon the notion 
                                                       
10 Kathleen Ashley, Leigh Gilmore, and Gerald Peters, eds., Autobiography and Postmodernism (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1994). 57. 
11 Foucault, The History of Sexuality. 61-62. 
12 Some books such as Elbe’s were, in fact, only available to the medical community when they were first published. 
13 Meyerowitz discusses the phenomenon in detail in How Sex Changed. She argues that, “after Jorgensen made the 
news, American doctors and scientists took up the taxonomic process of sorting out a tangled thicket of varied 
conditions of sex, gender, and sexuality. On the ground, those who identified as transsexuals, transvestites, lesbians, 
and gay men sorted themselves out in parallel social process. Amidst a multiplicity of variations, some of them came 
to define their conditions not only in contradistinction to the mainstream norm… but also with regard to others on 
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of a universal sisterhood, they conflated transsexuality with whiteness, heterosexuality, and 
middle-classness.”14 She believes that this was not a failure of the women writing but instead 
was indicative of the “strong disciplinary mechanisms within the cultural ideology of race, 
gender, and sexuality.”15 The disciplinary mechanisms are fueled by decades of white supremacy 
at the intersection of eugenics and scientific racism. Through appeals to their whiteness, 
heterosexuality, and femininity, transwomen cast transsexuality as “an acceptable subject 
position.” To access these norms, however, they were required to subjugate those who were not 
white, heterosexual, and feminine.  
 The texts discussed that are the subject of this chapter emerged from a variety of 
publishers and each one engaged the discourses involved in the emergence of male-to-female 
transvestite and transsexual subject positions in the mid-twentieth century.16 Furthermore, some 
of the autobiographies narrated characters who outright rejected the terms associated with 
transvestism at the time in which they wrote.17 While a discussion of what terms they do and do 
not claim is provided below, it is important to note that I will refer to the writers as “authors” 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the margins.” Joanne J. Meyerowitz, How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 7. 
14 Emily Skidmore, "Constructing the "Good Transsexual": Christine Jorgensen, Whiteness, and Heteronormativity 
in the Mid-Twentieth-Century Press," Feminist Studies 37, no. 2 (2011). 294. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Throughout this chapter, I utilize theoretical insights from oral historians like Alessandro Portelli. As argued, 
“oral history has made us uncomfortably aware of the elusive quality of historical truth itself.” While the 
autobiographies discussed below are not technically oral histories, they are narrative sources. Portelli makes this 
comparison when he argued that “oral historical sources are narrative sources.” Just as with oral histories, these 
autobiographies are not “purely ‘objective’ realities” but instead are only “constructed as such by the network of 
relationships in which they are inserted.” Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, and Other Stories: Form 
and Meaning in Oral History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). 48. 
17 Transmasculine individuals were and remain important to this history. However, their voices and narratives were 
not considered as important by sexologists and publishers. I focus only on transfeminine voices here because it was 
their voices, particularly those of white transwomen, whose narratives dominated larger discourses of transvestism 
and transsexuality at the time; it was their narratives that sexologists, psychiatrists, and lawmakers were primarily 
concerned with and it was their self-representations, both in person and in writing, that shaped the trajectory of the 
“official” diagnoses that continue to be accessed today. There were, however, some transmasculine narratives 
written during this time period: But For the Grace, an autobiography of transmasculine individual Robert Allen, was 
published in 1954. Thousands more brief autobiographical narratives were published in Sexology, in Harry 
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rather than as transwomen, intersex women, or hermaphroditic women. Despite the fact that 
present day intersex and trans* communities claim some of these women as their own, the 
authors did not often use this same terminology. Considering that each author worked to 
construct a narrative and to position themselves as legitimate subjects, I want to respect their 
self-identification. As such, because I am writing exclusively about individuals who desired to be 
or identified as women, I will use that term.  
 
Circulation of Cultural Production 
I explore and analyze ten different autobiographical narratives in this chapter. The 
publication and circulation, or lack thereof, for each is important to note. Those that were 
published were circulated to specific audiences. Many were published as pulp or as “sensational 
stories” of “sex change,” revealing much about a culture that regarded these women as a 
spectacle. However, others were published by more prestigious presses, or were only written for 
medical audiences. These differences inform how each author constructed both their narrative 
and their own subjectivities. They also help to think about questions posed by feminist scholar 
Sandy Stone in relation to these very autobiographies: “Who is telling the story for whom, and 
how do the storytellers differentiate between the story they tell and the story they hear?”18  
Earl Lind’s Autobiography of an Androgyne was published in 1918. This text, as with his 
next two autobiographies, was published by New York physician Alfred W. Herzog in the midst 
of WWI. Ralph Werther, using “Earl Lind” and “Jennie June” as pseudonyms, narrated his story 
as a self-proclaimed “androgyne.” Herzog wrote a lengthy introduction to Autobiography of an 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Benjamin’s The Transsexual Phenomenon, in David O. Cauldwell’s Big Blue Books, and in other popular 
publications. 




Androgyne and professed that the book was “published in an endeavor to obtain justice and 
humane treatment of the Androgynes.”19 According to Herzog, Lind wrote his autobiography in 
an “endeavor to bring his misfortune vividly before the medical and legal fraternities, for the 
purpose of lightening the heavy load which rested so unjustly, he [Lind] said, upon the 
unfortunates of his class.”20 After first reading the text, Herzog claimed that he saw no “literary 
nor scientific value” but after seeing a “light,” Herzog decided to offer it (“practically” unedited) 
as a “psychological study, well worthy of careful analysis.”21 The text was originally published 
by the Medico-Legal Society of New York in their Medico-Legal Journal and sold only to those 
in the medical or legal professions.22 The book had lower sales than Herzog had hoped for, but 
stands as one of the earliest records of an autobiography from a person who constructed a 
narrative explaining that they were a woman rather than a man, and who explicitly self-identified 
as an “Androgyne.”  
Published in 1933 in Germany, Man Into Woman: An Authentic Record of a Change of 
Sex told the story of Lili Elbe. Lili, formerly Einar Wegener, used the name Andreas Sparre in 
the place of Einar in the text.23 The book includes Elbe’s diary entries, letters, and conversations 
with Niels Hoye, the book’s editor. Beacon Press, founded in 1854 by the American Unitarian 
Association, first published Elbe’s text in the U.S. Popular Library later issued a new edition. 
Established in 1942, Popular Library of New York published paperbacks and re-printed detective 
stories, only later expanding to include other genres. Today both intersex and trans communities 
                                                       
19 Earl Lind, Autobiography of an Androgyne (New York: Arno Press, 1975). ii. 
20 Ibid. ix. 
21 Ibid. xii-xiii. In her analysis of Lind’s autobiography, historian Melissa Stein notes that “Werther was keenly 
aware of scientists’ power to shape popular discourse and thus their potential to save individuals like himself from 
both social ostracism and arrest.” Melissa N. Stein, Measuring Manhood: Race and the Science of Masculinity, 
1830-1934 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 24. 
22 Werther even used Latin terms for sexual acts he claimed he did not want laypeople to understand. Regardless of 
his knowledge of the power of medical and legal professionals to shape multiple discourses, obscenity laws would 
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claim Lili’s autobiography as part of their history. Regardless of who claims this text, it was one 
of the first written for a popular audience by an individual who underwent a “sex change.” Not 
nearly as sexually explicit as Lind’s, Elbe’s narrative was shaped for a broader audience.  
After garnering global attention in 1952, Christine Jorgensen’s notoriety created demand 
from the public for more “sensational stories” of sex change. The number of autobiographies 
grew post-Christine Jorgensen, or as Meyerowitz has referred to it, “A.D.” or “After 
Denmark.”24 In 1954, Roberta Cowell’s autobiography, The Roberta Cowell Story, was 
published by the British Book Centre of New York, then owned by publishing mogul Robert 
Maxwell.25 One year later in 1955, Tamara Reese published her narrative, “Reborn”: A Factual 
Life Story of Transition from Male to Female.26 Originally published by a small publishing house 
in Los Angeles, it sold for $1 and eventually fell into obscurity. Charlotte McLeod’s story was 
published in 1956, although not by a book publisher. Her autobiography, much shorter than her 
peers, was published in Mr. Men of Distinction magazine out of New York. Mr. generally 
published on sensational and scandalous topics, and in the years between 1957 and 1960 
included titles like: “Why Homos Hate Elvis,” “An Insider’s Report on Swap Clubs,” “Kissing: 
An Exhaustive Study of an Exhilarating Pastime,” and “7 Foolproof Alibis to Con the Wife.”  
Some autobiographies written in the 1950s and 1960s were never published but tell very 
similar stories and utilize similar rhetoric. Louise Lawrence, a well-networked transvestite, wrote 
a 117 page autobiography entitled Lawrence Autobiography. It is supplemented by a shorter 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
have prevented him from selling his text to a general audience. Measuring Manhood: Race and the Science of 
Masculinity, 1830-1934. 24. 
23 Lili’s story was depicted in the 2015 film, The Danish Girl. I will discuss the film at the end of this chapter. 
24 Joanne Meyerowitz, "Sex Change and the Popular Press: Historical Notes on Transsexuality in the United States, 
1930-1955," GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian & Gay Studies 4, no. 2 (1998). 171. 
25 Maxwell, originally from Czechoslovakia but based in Britain, owned a vast network of publishing houses. As 
such, Cowell’s book was also published in London, Melbourne, and Toronto that same year. Despite the broad 
geographical reach, Cowell’s story would never know the notoriety of Christine Jorgensen’s. 
26 Tamara Reese, "Reborn": A Factual Life Story of Transition from Male to Female (n.p.1955). 
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piece (six pages) entitled Lawrence Autobiography 1948-1957. Both are housed in the Louise 
Lawrence Collection in the Kinsey Institute archives. The content of the works place the writing 
around the late 1950s and early 1960s. Perhaps in preparation for publication, someone, 
presumably Lawrence, began editing the typed-piece, as is evidenced by markings throughout 
the text.  
Hedy Jo Star published her first autobiography in 1955 with an introduction written by 
sexologist Edwin Poole. Published first through Allied Books as I Changed My Sex!, it was 
reissued in 1963 through a now defunct publisher – Novel Books, Inc. out of Chicago – with a 
new title: “I changed my sex!”: the autobiography of stripper Hedy Jo Star formerly Carl 
Hammonds; with an introduction by Edwin Poole. Star published another autobiography under a 
different title, My Unique Sex Change, in 1965, again through Novel Books. The text of the 
autobiography remained the same, but this newer issue appeared without the introduction by 
Poole and with fewer photos. A pulp publisher known for its erotic fiction, Novel Books reached 
a wide audience and marketed their books with scandalous and catchy titles and descriptions.27 
Another transvestite, Abby Sinclair, published her autobiography, I Was Male, in 1965 through a 
subsidiary of Novel Books, Inc., called Specialty Books. In line with Novel’s reputation for 
publishing scandalous texts, on the cover of Sinclair’s book is the proclamation that it is “A story 
that makes Christine Jorgensen’s and Hedy Jo Star’s read like Dick and Jane!” promising more 
erotic and explicit discussions and descriptions of gender transgressions.  
The last two narratives I examine appeared in the late 1960s. In 1967, fifteen years after 
her story broke in the U.S, Christine Jorgensen: A Personal Autobiography was published by 
Paul S. Eriksson through Bantam Books. Originally in a hardcover that sold 24,500 copies, the 
                                                       
27 Novel bragged that some of their fiction had been reviewed by Playboy Magazine, creating for themselves a less 
than bourgeois reputation. 
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book eventually sold just under 450,000 copies.28 Jorgensen’s recognizability helped her 
autobiography receive a much wider audience than the other texts, and Harry Benjamin’s 
introduction provided certain legitimacy as an “approved” text of sexology. Lastly, in 1968 R.L. 
Savage submitted her never published autobiography to Harry Benjamin and it is now housed in 
the Harry Benjamin collection also in the Kinsey Institute archives. Savage claimed that the 
document was written to assist “medical personnel in diagnoses and the planning of therapy” for 
those with problems similar to hers.29 Despite the fact that this autobiography was never 
published, it was familiar enough to Benjamin that he referenced Savage’s story several times in 
The Transsexual Phenomenon, thus providing this autobiography some circulation, albeit 
indirectly. Again, knowing that Savage submitted her autobiography to a sexologist rather than a 
publisher helps to situate her narrative and its possible goals.  
 
Introducing the Characters, Introducing the Narratives 
 Many of the autobiographies begin with an introduction written, most often, by a 
sexologist or other medical professional. These introductions worked to legitimize the narratives, 
serving as a type of endorsement of authenticity. They also framed the texts, and provided the 
reader with various ways they might interpret the texts: as narratives of despair, of hope, or 
sometimes as even a spectacle of perversion.30 As the first section to be read by the reader, these 
forewords and introductions set the tone for what followed. Even in the autobiographies of these 
authors, sexologists continued to have the first word, continued to discipline and shape these life 
narratives.  
                                                       
28 Richard F. Docter, Becoming a Woman: A Biography of Christine Jorgensen (New York: Haworth Press, 2008). 
218. 
29 R. L. (Lynn) Savage,  in Harry Benjamin Collection (Kinsey Institute). 1-1. 
30 In addition, sexologists argued for their own approaches and the appropriateness of their view.  
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 Roberta Cowell’s text begins with two excerpts that function to frame her narrative as 
dispassionate, factual, and sympathetic. The first one page excerpt is part of a Reuter’s dispatch 
from April 17, 1954, from Salvator Mundi Hospital in Rome, Italy. The excerpt consists largely 
of quote from Professor George Randegger who, the reader is told, is “head of Rome’s leader 
International Hospital, where Roberta Cowell had spent three weeks.”31 Randegger begins: 
“From the hormonic, physical and psychological going of view, Miss Cowell is now absolutely a 
woman. Her voice, mental attitudes and sexual attributes are entirely those of a woman.”32 
Before being exposed to any of Cowell’s narrative, the reader is provided with a legitimizing 
statement as evidence of her womanhood and her heterosexuality. Randeggar even confirmed the 
“existence of menstruation” in Cowell, stating that it occurred before she had undergone any 
surgical intervention. He also commented on her intelligence and background: “She is of a high 
intellectual level, her father is a surgeon,” further legitimizing her narrative.33 
Canon A.R. Millbourn, then head priest of The Cathedral in Bristol wrote the second 
excerpt. Millbourn’s two-page foreword paints Cowell as a “dispassionate” writer, one who had 
the “courage” to present “her own observations of herself.”34 He waxes philosophic about the 
moral and theological implications of the story and the lives of those who are like Cowell, but he 
presented himself as one who had been changed by Cowell’s story and by her friendship with 
him. A clergy person affirming to the readers that her approach was “dispassionate” bolsters her 
truth claims, in part because the affirmation comes from a church leader, but also because it 
suggests that she is led less by emotion and more by a desire to tell her story in a straightforward 
manner.  
                                                       
31 Roberta Cowell, Roberta Cowell's Story (British Book Centre, 1954). 7. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 10. 
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 Dr. Edwin Poole wrote the introduction to the first iteration of Hedy Jo Star’s 
autobiography. Poole’s introduction functioned very differently than those found in Cowell’s 
text. Poole began by telling a story of a beautiful bride in a white wedding gown who, after 
marrying her husband, was unable to fulfill her sexual obligations to him. This was because, 
according to Poole, this woman was Christine Jorgensen whose surgery had left her only with a 
“fold similar to the female opening” and without a vagina.35 After revealing that he was 
discussing Jorgensen, he posed the question “Why would anyone want their sex changed?”36 
Discussing hermaphroditism as one justification, he quickly distinguished the Jorgensen case as 
one caused by “purely psychological” trouble that stemmed from poor hereditary background.37 
He is clear in his assessment of Jorgensen and others like her: “Perverted values were the basis 
for… requesting an operation ‘like the one Christine had’… true cure lay in the field of 
psychiatry and not surgery.”38 He did not mention Star until the very last line of his foreword: 
“For the actual dramatic and exciting story of the first woman in the United States, Miss Hedy Jo 
Star, to have a sex change, read the following completing account my Miss Star herself.”39 His 
purpose in this foreword is unclear, as is his assessment of Star. Providing this as an entree into 
Star’s narrative, Novel Books sets the stage for readers to be suspect, to be on the lookout for 
perversion, and to easily find it. 
 Abby Sinclair’s autobiography contained both a foreword and an introduction. The 
editors of Novel Books wrote the foreword to Abby Sinclair’s autobiography, citing the expertise 
of doctors as they worked to define sex, sexuality, and transvestism as well as the causes of these 
disorders. Citing their “expert” Dr. Saunders, the editors asserted that the cause of these “mix-
                                                       
35 Hedy Jo Star, I Changed My Sex! (Chicago: Novel Books, Inc., 1963). 6. 
36 Ibid. 7. 
37 Ibid. 8. 
38 Ibid. 9. 
39 Ibid. 10. 
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ups” were most often because of “some accident of fertilization or development.”40 Additionally, 
they argued that transvestism was a “mental, not physical” sexual mix-up, where the “case of the 
transsexualism [was] an extreme type of transvestism in which the male patient desires to wear 
not only ‘the clothes of the opposite sex, but feels that nature intended him to be a member of 
it.’”41 They, like others, differentiated these “sexual problems” from homosexuality, but were 
clear in their assessment regarding these conditions: “It may be mental — or it may be physical 
— but either way it’s a cause for concern and anxiety among parents, teachers and doctors.”42 
Firmly placing the burden of responsibility on parents, teachers, and doctors, the editors frame 
these “conditions” as preventable, appealing to the reader to always be on the lookout for 
“warning signs” or ways in which they can prevent these “perversions” and “disorders.”  
Sinclair’s book also contained an introduction written by George Griffith and Carlson 
Wade. They began their introduction by categorizing men who “demand that surgeons remove 
their sex organs and transform them into women” as a “new species of sexual being on the rise in 
the United States today.”43 They also characterized transsexual women as “deviant 
heterosexuals” who were on an endless quest to “prove” their womanhood. Griffith and Carlson 
believed that transsexuals themselves were responsible for this “deviance” and moral failing, and 
were the result of a “disavowal of the responsibility of being a male.”44 Following from this 
disavowal, they believed, was a “great flaw: Many of the ‘new women’ turn into harlots,” and 
become “prostituted, taking men into their arms again and again in order to prove that they are 
                                                       
40 They referenced intersex conditions specifically as the “most common accident of sexual mix-up,” on that is 
caused by “adrenal virilization,” urging females who are suffering from these conditions to partially amputate their 
“oversized organ that makes her look like a boy.” Abby Sinclair, I Was Male (Chicago: Novel Books, Inc., 1965). 7. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 9. 
44 The authors argue that this disavowed was often caused by alcoholic fathers who beat them in childhood. 
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women.”45 The authors constructed individuals who desired sex-changes as lacking 
responsibility and as delusional, and if able to obtain surgical intervention they continued on this 
path of immorality and became “harlots.” Clearly, the antidote for this was to be of sound mental 
health, to be monogamous, and to assume responsibility for being a male. That the book began 
with an introduction constructing transsexuals like Sinclair as individuals who were delusional, 
deviant, immoral, and irresponsible sets the stage for readers to search for indications of these 
characteristics.  
 Harry Benjamin wrote the introduction to Jorgensen’s autobiography and it differed 
significantly from Griffith and Carlson’s. It seems fitting that the most well-known sexologist, 
Benjamin, would write the introduction to the autobiography of the most well-known transsexual 
at the time. In his short piece, Benjamin summarized the medical aspects of transsexualism, 
defined terminology like “gender role identity” and “sex change,” differentiated homosexuality 
from transsexualism, and even discussed what might “cause” transsexualism. Ultimately, though, 
he constructed Jorgensen as a sympathetic character worth of empathy and understanding. 
Despite his assertions that there was “no conclusive proof” of causes, he asserts that “[i]t would 
take much rigid preconception to ascribe Christine’s case to anything but an inborn, although not 
hereditary, condition.”46 With this statement, he excused Jorgensen from any responsibility for 
“causing” her own transsexualism, but he was also engaged indirectly with the vestiges of 
eugenic influence on the diagnosis. Written in 1967, more than two decades after eugenics lost 
explicit public support in the U.S., he still was compelled to engage in discourses of eugenics, 
even if only to dismiss notions of transsexualism as a hereditary “deviation.”  
 
                                                       
45 Sinclair, I Was Male. 13,10. 
46 Christine Jorgensen, Christine Jorgensen: A Personal Autobiography (New York: Paul S. Eriksson, 1967). ix. 
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Legitimizing Their Lives 
 One aspect of truth production present in almost every autobiography focused on 
definitional boundaries among transvestitism, transsexualism, hermaphroditism, and 
homosexuality. Some writers distanced themselves from transvestism and transsexualism by 
claiming to be hermaphrodites. Others claimed the term transvestite or transsexual within the 
narrative, but never both. All of the narratives, however, produced protagonists who rejected 
homosexuality.  
Transvestism, Transsexualism, and Hermaphroditism 
Two authors, rather than identifying with transvestism or transsexualism, claimed instead 
to be hermaphroditic. Lili Elbe in 1933 claimed to be a hermaphrodite, citing her doctor’s 
discovery of ovaries within her body. Roberta Cowell in 1954 also narrated her story as one of 
hermaphroditism. After writing about several encounters with psychiatrists and disclosing her 
struggle with “living in misery” because of her “abnormality,” she narrated a visit with a doctor 
wherein he confirmed that “there seemed to be some degree of hermaphroditism present” in her 
body.47 She claimed to see a positive shift in her morale after being told that an inherent 
“feminising factor had been at work” within her body.48 She continued, referencing feelings of 
shame and relief:  
 The intense shame I had felt began to disappear. Once I realised [sic] that my 
femininity had a physical basis I did not despair myself so much. I now know, of 
course, that I was physically abnormal, but I could accept a degree of involuntary 
femininity without losing self respect.49 
 
Furthermore, because Cowell’s “condition” had a physical basis, she could be “fixed” by 
medical intervention. Cowell rhetorically constructed transvestism, then, as a psychological 
                                                       
47 Cowell, Roberta Cowell's Story. 82. 
48 Ibid. 83. 
49 Ibid. 83. 
 
 136 
problem, and thus, “psychotherapy can cure the transvestite - if he fully cooperates, and really 
wants to be cured.”50 Cowell attempted to construct her position as one necessitating medical, 
but not psychiatric, intervention. As such, the solutions to her problems were clear, and she 
hoped that “medical science will find a solution to the ‘problem of the transvestite.’”51  
The narrative referenced Jorgensen several times, and proclaimed that Cowell’s situation 
and Jorgensen’s “were widely different,” indicating that Jorgensen’s transsexualism was caused 
by choice, perversion, psychiatric instability, or all three rather than by an inherent biological 
“truth.” Jorgensen by definition could not be hermaphroditic because “the cause is the mind 
rather than in the body” for people “like her.”52 Cowell continued: “The distinctive feature in her 
[Jorgensen’s] case, of course… was the fact that the change had apparently been induced entirely 
through artificial means, no spontaneous changes having taken place at all (as they did in my 
case).”53 The narrative aligned transvestism (and by definition transsexualism) with 
homosexuality, presenting transvestism as being caused by “deep-seated homosexual 
tendencies… Usually another contributing factor is exaggerated narcissism… fetishism is usually 
evident… often an element of masochism is present.”54 More than aligning homosexuality with 
these other, non-desirable labels, her words distanced her position as a hermaphrodite from these 
“other” pathological categories.  
 Competing definitions of transvestite, transsexual, hermaphrodite, and homosexuality 
revealed different and evolving understandings about how to define sex and sexuality. In early 
sexological writings from the 1940s, sex was defined according to the gonads. One sexologist 
                                                       
50 Ibid. 136. 
51 Ibid. 138. 
52 Ibid. 137. 
53 Ibid. 130. Jorgensen presented her own case as not one of hermaphroditism, but as a correction of a “glandular” 
problem, that her body was not 100% male to begin with so they were simply helping her body manifest is female-
ness. Jorgensen, Christine Jorgensen: A Personal Autobiography. 111, 123-126. 
54 Cowell, Roberta Cowell's Story. 136. 
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argued in October of 1946 that Lili Elbe became “in reality a female. Just as the testicles 
proclaim the man, so the ovaries make the female.”55 David O. Cauldwell asserted in 1947 that 
“[b]iologists distinguish sex by external characteristics. Sexologists distinguish sex by the 
gonads.”56 However, by 1954 explanations of sex had become more complicated. Harry 
Benjamin acknowledged the role of chromosomes, genetics, and gonads in defining sex, but 
concluded that sexology’s approach to determining sex was still “incomplete,” was complex, and 
that sexologists were unable to always clearly discern a person’s “true sex.” Despite sexologists’ 
acknowledgment concerning complexity and difficulty of defining one’s “true sex,” Cowell and 
other writers claimed physical hermaphroditism—rather than transvestism or transsexualism—as 
evidence of their need for surgical intervention, relying on older models whereby sex was 
defined by gonads.  
 Those who did claim transvestite often framed their “condition” as wholly distinct from 
“transsexualism.” Louise Lawrence’s narrative framed the terms as distinct subjectivities: “there 
was very little in common in the thinking of the transexuals [sic] and the transvestites.”57 In her 
text, she dismissed transsexual’s claim to femaleness. She recounted her experiences with them: 
“over the years I have met some transexuals [sic] who were absolutely beautiful [but] I still 
could not consider them as real females.”58 The discursive jockeying for a more “legitimate” 
positionality here is evidenced by her dismissal of transsexualism as a viable and legitimate 
position, as well as her casting of transsexuals as petty and delusional. She claimed that 
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transsexuals saw transvestites as inferior because transsexuals believed themselves to be real 
women and transvestites “were only males in female clothing.”59 Overall, she constructed 
transvestites as successful and realistic, in part because of their “ability to learn AND ACCEPT 
who and what they really are,” an acknowledgement that set them apart from transsexuals.60 
 Christine Jorgensen’s narrative also distinguished between transvestism and 
transsexualism. While working with a journalist, Irmy Johnson, for a five-part series to appear in 
American Weekly, Jorgensen described meetings she had with Johnson and Dr. Hamburger since 
“most of the medical information [Irmy] sought could only be obtained from” Jorgensen’s 
doctors. Jorgensen’s story of the first time she heard the term “transvestism” during one of these 
meetings is recounted. While Hamburger believed that Jorgensen “would fit into this category” 
of transvestism, the narrative presented Jorgensen as lamenting the terms used in the press 
because of the popular understanding of “transvestite” as describing “a person obsessed with the 
desire to wear cloths of the opposite sex.”61 Christine claimed to fear that if the public associated 
her with the term, she would be placed in “a narrow category which led many intelligent people 
to believe the stories that circulated at the time: that I had been a female impersonator before 
going to Denmark, and in my private life as ‘George,’ I doted on wearing feminine clothing.”62 
Christine’s narrative is careful to present her as wearing feminine clothing only after her first 
surgery and after she changed the sex marker on her passport. Transvestism was presented in the 
text as synonymous with female impersonation, where transsexualism - Christine’s preferred 
term - was presented as authentic, as the real desire and embodiment of white, heterosexual 
womanhood. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
individuals who preferred the spelling with one ‘s’ as an attempt to distinguish “transsexual” as a psychiatric and 
medical word from “transexual” as a term for an identity. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 5. 
61 Jorgensen, Christine Jorgensen: A Personal Autobiography. 173. 
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The expertise of sexologists were cited throughout Jorgensen’s the text, lending the text 
legitimacy for readers wanting these “expert” opinions. Harry Benjamin was cited regarding his 
development of the term transsexualism to “designate a problem that differs essentially from that 
of transvestism.”63 Citing Jorgensen’s refusal to wear feminine clothing while she “retained any 
evidence of masculinity,” the narrative also worked to distance her from gender deviance.64 After 
her “sex change” surgery, her previous legal name, George, was even placed within quotes to 
indicate her distance from that name and its masculine connotations since she had become a 
woman. Engaging in discourses of transvestite pathology, the term transvestite was defined as 
“naming a disturbance of behavior and emotions.”65 The earlier term “eonism” was also 
discussed, but framed as “psychic hermaphroditism.”66 This definitional maneuvering worked to 
distance Jorgensen from transvestism, cross-dressing, emotional and behavioral disturbance, as 
well as psychiatric “disorders.”  
 The authors’ efforts to clearly distinguish these terms helped to draw boundaries 
concerning “more” and “less” pathological condition. They constructed their chosen subjectivity 
as valid, legitimate, and anything but pathological, a construction that differed sexological 
literature that often framed all individuals associated with the terms as pathological, or at least 
perverted, to some degree. Regardless of which “abnormality” the authors believed to be more or 
less pathological, they were consistent in their attempts to distance themselves from “mental 
illness” or other psychiatric conditions.  
Sex & Psychiatric Disability 
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 Among the various rhetorical moves taken by the authors to construct and present 
themselves as “sane” and “normal,” they often discussed the ways in which they embodied 
white, heterosexual, and able-minded womanhood. This work distanced them from psychosis 
and psychopathology as they dismissed claims of psychological perversion. The authors also 
engaged discourses of degeneracy, reflecting a eugenic influence in 1950s and 60s culture, 
alongside themes of sexuality and gender that belied investments in whiteness and able-
mindedness. Many writers even defined transvestism and transsexualism as conditions caused by 
psychiatric disability. As such, they aligned sexual abnormality with disability. Furthermore, 
because of the ways in which eugenics aligned disability with immorality, a more indirect 
connection was drawn between transvestism and immorality.  
 In her 1933 autobiography, Lili Elbe narrated several incidences where doctors labeled 
her as a “hysterical subject” and as “perfectly crazy.”67 Yet, when describing a particular visit to 
a doctor, Elbe recounted feelings of discomfort and framed other patients as abnormal: “In this 
large room a group of abnormal persons [were] holding a meeting- women who appeared to be 
dressed up as men and men of whom one could scarcely believe that they were men.”68 Elbe 
claimed to be disgusted by “[t]he manner in which they were conversing.” Elbe continued: “their 
movements, their voices, the way in which they were attired, produced a feeling of nausea.”69 By 
presenting the group of patients as abnormal and disgusting based on the performance of gender 
deviance, this section serves to establish Elbe’s normality in relation to them, as well as to 
distance her from men who cross-dressed or “pretended” to enact womanhood.  
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 In another section, Elbe framed her condition as different than those other “degenerate” 
conditions. Elbe narrated an encounter where a doctor affirmed her claim to womanhood: “The 
doctor… said to me today: ‘When I saw you first, I thought you were a pitiful, degenerate, 
unfortunate creature, but now… I can see that you are a healthy and vigorous woman.’ I cannot 
tell you how happy these words made me.’”70 These words echo Cowell’s discussion of shame 
and self-respect. If either of these women were understood to be “degenerate” or psychically 
disturbed, the narrative suggests that neither would, or could, feel self-respect. Similarly, because 
of cultural understandings of womanhood, they would not be able to claim and unequivocally 
access discourses of “proper” womanhood rooted in whiteness, heterosexuality, and able-
mindedness. In fact, Elbe, describing a doctor’s declaration of her as a “healthy and vigorous 
woman,” explicitly aligned this with her access to white, heterosexual womanhood. Her 
consistent claims to heterosexuality, her financial successes, and her performance of submissive 
femininity all served to characterize her as a “healthy and vigorous woman.”71  
Homosexual Perversion 
 Another consistent theme throughout the autobiographies was claims of feeling distaste, 
or even disgust, regarding homosexuality. This assisted in the authors presenting themselves as 
heterosexual women. While the strategies used by the authors evolved over time, as did notions 
of whiteness, heterosexuality, and able-mindedness, there existed a consistent disciplinary drive 
within these autobiographies for authors to differentiate themselves from those “other” perverse 
homosexuals. In doing so, they attempted to create subjectivities that were non-pathological, 
perverse, or deviant, but also subjectivities that cast them as respectable, legitimate, and 
productive citizens.  
                                                       




 Lili Elbe, writing in 1933 well before the establishment of any homophile advocacy 
groups, clearly indicated her position in relation to homosexuality both before and after her 
surgical intervention. One conversation with a friend narrated in the text while Elbe was still 
Andreas (Einar) illuminated this move: “I have indeed, seen with my own eyes that you [Elbe] 
attract women, and this is the clearest proof that you are genuine fellow.”72 Here, heterosexuality 
is “proof” of Wenegar’s manhood. When asked by this friend if Andreas had “at any time been 
interested in your own kind,” the response is clear: “[Andreas] shook his head calmly… ‘Never 
in my life. And I can add that those kinds of creatures have never shown any interest in me.’”73 
When recounting a time when she was part of a ballet as Andreas, she explicitly framed her 
interactions with men as firmly not homosexual: “if he as much as touched me, I felt so confused 
that I did not know where to look. In all the psychic disturbances which I then experienced, 
nothing of an erotic nature played the slightest part. In this respect… I had thoroughly sound 
natures.”74 Elbe equated homosexuality with an unsound nature, as a psychic disturbance, and 
cast homosexuals as sub-human “creatures.” The narrative functions to distance Elbe from each 
of these degenerate and undesirable subject positions inhabited by those other than herself. 
 Furthermore, when Elbe reminisced about traveling with her then wife, Grete, she 
narrated various instances of men flirting with her, and explained that later her doctors would see 
those instances as the times when Lili could be “distinctly recognized in appearance for the first 
time.’”75 In describing Lili’s sexual desires, she claimed she “no longer felt anything in [her] 
blood of these emotions of Andreas, of the erotic sensations which he had experienced with 
women.”76 Regardless of meaning or motivation, what is at stake in distinguishing her sexual or 
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erotic feelings from those of Andreas was her ability to construct herself as wholly heterosexual 
both before and after her transition. As a heterosexual woman, she could claim herself as “a 
perfectly ordinary woman among other women.”77 
  In the 1950s, Roberta Cowell presented her “feminine characteristics” as anything but a 
tendency towards homosexuality. Claims about her loathing for homosexuality followed: “my 
inclinations, as they developed, were entirely heterosexual. I was horrified and repelled by 
homosexual overtures, and this loathing included any boy who showed the slightest sign of being 
‘sissy.’”78 When a man flirted with and made a pass at her while she was living as a man, Cowell 
described herself as having feelings of revulsion. Several chapters later, when playing a role in 
school at the theater when she was forced to wear skirts, it is made clear that, for Cowell, “it was 
important to make my stand perfectly clear, and I had no doubts about where I stood — I had no 
homosexual tendencies whatever; I was masculine… in every way that mattered.”79 Presumably, 
following her assertions about her feminine characteristics, heterosexuality was a central aspect 
of what “mattered” in terms of masculinity.80  
Similar to Elbe, Cowell worked to present herself as heterosexual both before and after 
her transition, even claiming to be “unsexed” for a short period of time. When discussing her 
heterosexual relationship with women as a man she was very vague, at one point referencing 
“physical abnormalities.” However, she was quick to assert that “During the entire period of my 
metamorphosis I had been… unsexed. I was not interested in men or women” and that “when my 
                                                       
77 Ibid. 247. 
78 Cowell, Roberta Cowell's Story. 11. 
79 Ibid. 66. 
80 Cowell, beyond expressing her revulsion for homosexuality, also repeatedly stated that she hated physical contact 
with men. However, physical contact here is very specific. She described comfort in physical violence, particularly 
against homosexuality, narrating an encounter with a particularly feminine homosexual man: “I would have 
refrained from actually kicking his spine up through the top of his head.” Ibid. 83. 
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female libido developed, it was a perfectly normal one.”81 She claimed that the idea of kissing a 
man might be something she would consider [as a woman], but the idea of kissing women (now 
as a woman herself) was as absurd as kissing men would have been in her “previous” life.82 She 
was consistent in asserting her “normal” sexuality and her journey towards becoming a “normal” 
(read: heterosexual) woman.  
Many other authors also claimed to disdain homosexuality. Charlotte McLeod, who 
published her autobiography in 1956 during the Cold War Red Scare, was explicitly homophobic 
in her rhetoric. When her doctors suggested male hormones to help with her feminine desires, 
McLeod explained her reaction, claiming that she “thought it was a dangerous experiment to 
attempt for it might wind up making me a maladjusted homosexual.”83 This reaction 
characterized her as fearing homosexuality more than being a transvestite or transsexual. Louise 
Lawrence, writing almost a decade later, recounted a time when she was arrested for stealing 
women’s clothes as a young man. While being taking to a detention home, officers questioned 
her, and she narrated her fear: that “people thought I was a ‘queer’, a homosexual, a ‘fairy’; that I 
must masturbate an awful lot and that was probably one reason why I did such bad things.”84 Not 
only did Lawrence equate criminality and masturbation with homosexuality, she also firmly 
attempted to move herself away from those associations.  
Christine Jorgensen in 1967 was also quick to distance herself from homosexuality, and 
continually asserted her heterosexuality, particularly after her surgeries.85 Previous to 
                                                       
81 Ibid. 119, 12. 
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83 Charlotte McLeod, "I Changed My Sex," in Transsexual Vertical File (Mr. : Kinsey Institute, 1956). 12. 
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85 Since homosexuality and communism were publicly linked in the 1950s, Jorgensen shied away from any 
homosexual label, claiming that any experiences she had with men occurred after her sex change operation. Despite 
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“becoming” a woman, she discussed her attraction for men as a woman, but was clear in her 
communication that she did not act upon any of these attractions, as that would have constituted 
a homosexual encounter which she “refused” to even consider. R.L. Savage, too, wrote of his 
nervousness when he thought he might actually be a homosexual, and characterized 
homosexuality as those who were “fairies” and “queers” and were “doomed to disaster.”86 Each 
individual’s text reflected a disdain for homosexuality, but more than that, they reflect an 
association of homosexuality with negative moral character, criminality, or psychiatric disability, 
associations that they used to align their own non-homosexual identities with upstanding moral 
character and well being.  
 
Modes of Justification 
In their autobiographies, the authors made attempts to frame their abnormality as out of 
their control, and to define and distinguish themselves from the “abnormals” who chose 
perversion. Casting themselves as those whose deviations were congenital, transvestites, 
transsexuals, and those that claimed the condition of hermaphroditism, jockeyed for their place 
within the shifting hierarchies of abnormality. These narratives worked to not only distinguish 
between gender abnormality and these “other” deviances, but also navigate discourses of 
justification: how could one justify their abnormality in a way to cause empathy rather than 
disgust?87  
Lili Elbe clearly staked her claim with appeals to her own hermaphroditism. Today, both 
trans* and intersex communities claim Elbe’s autobiography as part of their own cannon, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
been linked because of various instances, one of which was Harry Hay, co-founder of the early homophile 
organization The Mattachine Society and known communist.  
86 Savage. 4-9. 
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revealing an interesting fissure in the genealogy of these narratives. While intersex communities 
are often absent from current discussions regarding transsexualism, their histories are intricately 
intertwined. Elbe was not the first, nor was she the last, to lay claim to “hermaphroditism” to 
justify her desire to become a woman. In addition, she did not frame her case as one of 
degeneracy, but she did rely on physiological explanations for her “condition.” 
In the mid-fifties, some writers engaged hereditary concerns, despite the lowered 
visibility of eugenics post-WWII. Roberta Cowell, referencing her own “case,” wrote explicitly 
about research that was being done into her heredity and connected this research to her aunt who 
was born with “a congenital absence of vagina.”88 Neither she nor her doctors claimed that this 
was related to her “condition,” but that they discussed heredity at all was evidence of the 
continuing influence of eugenics on explanations for gender deviance, and perhaps would even 
serve as justification for surgical intervention to “correct” a “degenerate condition.” Cowell, 
claiming that she understood herself as abnormal, argued that her doctors needed to fix “nature’s 
mistake.”89 She framed her “abnormality” as the fault of nature rather than her own psyche or 
mental status. She further connected her condition explicitly with the body when she referenced 
a conversation with her surgeon about the completed “operation to correct the congenital absence 
of a vagina.”90 Her alignment between “nature’s mistake” and the “congenital absence” of a 
vagina excused her from having any responsibility for her desire to become a woman, thus 
placing her outside accusations of being morally suspect or psychologically “ill.” 
 Charlotte McLeod narrated her belief in the cause of transvestism as located either in the 
body or the mind. She clarified this claim, however: “For 95 per cent of these victims of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
87 Additionally, locating the cause of these “conditions” in the body justified surgical intervention rather than 
psychological. This drive to locate transsexualism and its cause in the body reflected eugenic influence and concerns 
that this type of “degeneracy” could be passed on to children, either genetically or through the environment.  
88 Cowell, Roberta Cowell's Story. 96. 
89 Ibid. 104. 
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misdirected sex, I believe the treatment probably should be mental.”91 The other five percent 
required medical and surgical intervention, and she answered a rhetorical question regarding the 
growing attention being paid to “sex change” operations: “Sex change is not a new ‘fad’… It is a 
serious medical answer to a serious medical problem… He cannot be rightfully blamed for these 
conditions anymore than if he had been born with cerebral palsy.”92 Her analogy between her 
“condition” and cerebral palsy not only analogizes gender deviance and disability, but it also 
serves here to legitimize surgical intervention for those whose condition is “caused” by the 
body.93 One significant difference between her narrative and Elbe’s is that she engaged 
discourses specifically pertaining to “sex changes,” whereas Elbe did not. McLeod published in 
the 1950s, after the concept of “sex change” had circulated in the popular press, creating an 
audience of readers who were somewhat familiar with what that term might mean. She framed 
her own “affliction,” though, as fully congenital, out of her control, and necessitating a “sex 
change,” thus prompting her to appeal to the American public for understanding rather than 
ridicule: “The American public needs to accept the fact that there can be physical affliction 
pertaining to sex, just as to other organs of the body. Just because it deals with sex, we need not 
blush and run or make crude jokes.”94 While she framed her condition as out of her control, she 
still sought absolution and empathy as a result of her confession regarding her “physical 
affliction pertaining to sex.”95  
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91 McLeod, "I Changed My Sex." 12. 
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93 Ibid. Chaz Bono in 2011 makes a similar claim, that being trans is a “birth defect” similar to being “born with a 
cleft palate.” I discuss this claim again in the conclusion.  
94 Ibid. 
95 Latina Seville, whose autobiography was in the back of Abby Sinclair’s text I Was Male, approached her 
explanation for surgical intervention differently than most other authors of the time. Rather than identifying the 
cause as congenital, she claimed that her desires were potentially psychological. She explained that one reason she 
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Unlike some authors who claimed to have always been female, Latina claimed that after her “change” she still had 
the mind of a man, that the “surgeon’s scale could not change that.” She continued, wondering if “perhaps with 
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 In her narrative, Jorgensen affirmed her claim from 1953 that firmly placed the cause of 
her transsexualism in her body. She recounted a conversation with Dr. Hamburger and claimed 
he said that her trouble was “very deep-rooted in the cells of your [Christine’s] body… your 
body chemistry and all of your body cells, including your brain cells, may be female. That is 
only a theory, mind you.”96 Rather than laying claim to hidden ovaries or physical 
hermaphroditism, she appealed to a biological explanation for sex dimorphism of the brain, 
claiming that her brain was “undoubtedly female.” However, she was not consistent in her 
agreement with Hamburger’s theory, and asserted that the “origins of transsexualism” might be 
“at least partly due to heredity or abnormal glandular functions before birth.”97 Despite writing 
almost thirty years after the height of eugenics in the U.S., her discussions of hereditary 
abnormalities in relation to transvestism is evidence of the continuing influence about eugenics 
and notions of degeneracy on discourses of transvestism and transsexualism. Jorgensen at no 
point uses the term “degenerate,” but what her reference to hereditary recalls in terms of 
connection between those “causes” and eugenics is difficult to ignore. 
 R.L. Savage did directly reference degeneracy. Her narrative reflected a particular 
interest in communicating fears of being seen as a “degenerate.” In her autobiography she 
appealed to medical authorities to provide her with the “truth” of hier condition, but also 
expressed fears about seeing a doctor because she claimed she did not want “to be exposed to 
self-righteous physicians who would look at my clean shaved body and little breasts and then 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
psychiatric help, I could have learned to adjust to my male-female body.” Latina’s narrative aligned with 
homophobic sentiment rooted in the notion that sex deviates were “mentally ill,” and could spread their deviance to 
those around them. She perpetuated this narrative when she expressed concern in relation to raising children. She 
discussed marriage and the social status marriage could afford, but then she narrated her doubts: “it wouldn’t be fair 
for me to marry a young man. I can’t bear children and I would be afraid to adopt a child for fear of mixing him up 
that way I’m mixed up. No, people like me shouldn’t raise children.” Latina Seville, "I Want to Be a Male Again," 
in I Was Male (Chicago: Novel Books, Inc., 1965). 83, 91, 95. 
96 Jorgensen, Christine Jorgensen: A Personal Autobiography. 102. 
97 Ibid. 327. 
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accuse me of being a ‘degenerate.’”98 At no point did she postulate what might have “caused” 
her transvestism, but she did suggest that her life and actions should not indicate degeneracy, that 
“in fact I think I am of quite sound mind and have a reasonable degree of maturity.”99 Regardless 
of Savage’s approach to the etiology of transvestism, her engagement with discourses of 
degeneracy is yet another example of the lasting impact of eugenic ideology on discourses of 
transvestism and transsexuality.  
As they constructed explanations for transsexualism and transvestism, authors sometimes 
discussed their own chromosomal make-up, and almost all mentioned their hormone levels or 
presence of female gonads. Then, as is true in 2016, the presence or absence of genitals revealed 
the “truth” of normative understandings of manhood or womanhood.100 They also claimed that 
the desire to be women was something out of their control. Jorgensen discussed her feminine 
leanings from a young age and relied on theories of inherent bi-sexuality (of sex, not sexuality); 
Cowell framed her condition as one of hermaphroditism, similar to Elbe. Each writer engaged 
discourses of authenticity as they explained their undeniable, as they framed it, womanhood. By 
grounding their “abnormality” in their bodies they might avoid accusations of deception, 
perversion, or pathology; they had been women the whole time and were merely “fixing” natures 
mistake. Their claim to naturalness and legitimacy rested on an appeal to a contradiction: nature 
made them women (not a mistake) but they were born with male bodies (a mistake). To remain 
surgically unaltered in their “natural” state they would have remained feminine men, troubled 
and perverse. However, accessing surgery to change their “natural” albeit “mistaken” sex, they 
could then inhabit normal, heterosexual, white womanhood.  
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The discourses of degeneracy and morality played a central role in shaping how these 
authors narrated their transsexual, transvestite, or hermaphroditic subjectivities. The authors 
narrated boundaries between congenital conditions that they believed had no bearing on one’s 
moral, intellectual, or civic character and other conditions that were caused by psychological 
disturbances and could be cured by psychotherapy. Of these two etiologies, the authors were 
consistent in their attempts to shift the discourse away from the notion that all abnormality 
indicated degeneracy or moral inferiority, and instead towards the idea that—if they had no 
choice in the matter—their upstanding, moral character was unaffected.  
 
Normal (White) Womanhood 
Transwomen’s negotiation of sexuality and femininity at the intersection of race was 
indicative of larger discourses of respectability, legitimacy, and normality. Appealing to 
whiteness in particular, and its attendant presumptions of heterosexuality and class stability, was 
one very powerful discursive move that transwomen employed as they framed their lives and 
their stories.101 Whiteness was not a stagnant category, but as Emily Skidmore argues, “White 
transwomen were able to articulate transsexuality as an acceptable subject position through an 
embodiment of the norms of white womanhood, most notably domesticity, respectability, and 
heterosexuality.”102 However, she argues, in order to portray themselves as embodying these 
norms, they subjugated other “abnormal” bodies, that “transsexual subjects were “sanitized in the 
mainstream press and rendered visible through whiteness.” As a result, other manifestations of 
gender “deviance” were made visible through “nonwhiteness,” through labels not associated with 
                                                       
101 Feminist Hazel Carby argues that the “ideology of true womanhood was as racialized a concept in relation to 
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proper and normal whiteness—things like degeneracy, mental illness, perversion, homosexuality, 
and other pathological “conditions.”103 However, her claims apply to more than just gender 
variance. Various forms of degeneracy, psychiatric disability, perversion, and non-normative 
heterosexualities were also made visible through nonwhiteness, through a distancing of those 
“others” from whiteness using the mechanisms of white supremacy. Through white 
transwomen’s rejection of what were widely considered qualities associated with non-white 
women (sexuality, degeneracy, and disability), transwomen became more intelligible as 
“‘authentic” (read: White) women, and others, less so. 
 Lili Elbe, for example, described her feminine characteristics in great detail to establish 
her “authentic femininity.” Post-surgery, Lili narrated rapidly occurring changes to her 
embodiment; masculine features were suddenly feminine. She claimed her voice to be “that of a 
woman” immediately following surgery.104 She also professed a concern that she would no 
longer have the same interests as Andreas: “How altogether different from her Andreas Sparre 
had been! Now there was only a perfectly humble woman, who was ready to obey, who was 
happy to submit herself to the will of another.”105 Following surgery, she also described her 
comportment not as chivalrous, as she had previous done, but instead as one of feminine 
submission. She narrated several instances where this subservience is highlighted, particularly in 
her encounters with her doctor, whom she called “the professor.” For example, when she arrived 
to check into the center where her surgeries were performed, the professor told her that she 
would have to wait. Lili recalled that she was unable to respond with anything but subservience 
to him. She claimed to believe that the professor “had deprived her of her will” and “observed 
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how he sought to evoke her feminine impulses by being alternately mild and stern. Had he not 
deliberately provoked an eruption of all the primitive instincts of her womanhood?”106 She 
constructed the narrative in a way that required her to reinforce these differences: “I had to 
demonstrate every day that I was a different creature from him, that I was a woman.”107  
 For the authors, accessing white femininity was crucial to presenting themselves as 
heterosexual women who were palatable to a general readership, particularly as readers were 
confronted with the unfamiliarity of a “sex change” and their possible resistances to it. When 
reminiscing about her decision to become a woman, for example, Cowell discussed how success 
would only be achieved if she were to become a “socially acceptable” woman, something that 
necessitated acceptable (hetero)sexuality.108 Her claim to a “normal” sexuality functioned to 
distance her from any assumptions of homosexual desire, a label that carried with it, at the time, 
associations with criminality, perversion, degeneracy, but also communism and anti-patriotic 
sentiments. Sinclair also echoed the sentiments of Cowell: “My emotions were those of a 
woman. My sensitivities were those of a woman. And my sexual cravings were those of a 
woman.”109 Framing her “normal” American womanhood as heterosexual was necessary to 
legitimize her surgical transition, and she further legitimized this by recounting a story of finding 
a man to love her.110  
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 Similarly, many authors laid claim to an innate and natural feminine comportment. 
Cowell, like Elbe, offered readers examples of changes towards femininity that occurred during 
and after surgery. She claimed that her mental processes slowed and that her intuition rose. She 
also gained the “ability” to blush.111 Her general nature became “milder and less aggressive” and 
she developed a “strong maternal instinct, and a new strong interest in domestic work.”112 
Cowell’s claim to these “feminine” instincts clearly indicates what she associated with proper, 
white womanhood. Others, like Charlotte McLeod, did not just associate these qualities with 
womanhood, but also stated that they were required for successful transition.113 Ten years later, 
in the midst of the Cold War, Sinclair also touted an affinity and commitment to not just 
“normal” womanhood, but normal American womanhood. In fact, she provided numbers 
attempting to normalize and legitimize surgical intervention: “There are, according to two 
surgeons with whom I’ve talked, between 1000 and 1500 sex-changes living the lives of normal 
American women.”114 While the term “American” is always a loaded and often presumptive term 
aligned with U.S. Americanness, this was heightened during the Cold War, during the dismissal 
of “sexual deviants” from all government positions, and at a time when the U.S. was attempting 
to create an image of itself as strong, independent, and healthy. She attempted to normalize and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
crotch and sat upon” he would become erect but only “at the very internal base of the penis” and he would continue 
until climax. For Savage, this became “a way of achieving a ‘female’ orgasm with penis not existent and the 
‘clitoris’ (the erect stump at the penis base) being stimulated.” Despite referencing his penis several times, his 
extensive explanation regarding masturbation in effort to mimic female orgasm serves as an attempt to minimize the 
physiological male aspects of Savage and highlight their desire to engage in sexuality and sex as a female. Savage. 
4-6, 4-7. 
111 Cowell, Roberta Cowell's Story. 98. 
112 Ibid. 98, 116. 
113 She framed surgical transition as something people had been misinformed about, that “a man who has a 
masculine physique and an effeminate mind, who hopes to find an answer to his frustrations in surgery, is doomed 
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black men and from white characterizations of inappropriate black sexuality more broadly. McLeod, "I Changed My 
Sex." 10. 
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frame surgical intervention as something that produced healthy and productive citizens, citing all 
the people around that no one would know is a “sex-change” – those “all around” us, such as 
“secretaries and seamstresses, file clerks and fashion designers, dancers and decorators.”115 
 Beyond casting “normal” womanhood as American, white, heterosexual, and “healthy” – 
or non-disabled – Cowell also framed femininity as synonymous with beauty and naturalness. 
She recalled one psychologist telling her that she was “a complete woman - a normal female in 
every respect.”116 She framed being a complete woman as being beautiful. She explicated her 
interpretation of femininity later in the text, and argued that “each individual has a decidedly 
different level of femininity. There is no prior assurance or guarantee that a sex change will 
create an instantly beautiful girl.”117 This femininity was presented as always already white, 
evidence of what English and Afro-American scholar Hazel Carby argued in 1987: “The 
ideology of true womanhood was as racialized a concept in relation to white women as it was in 
its exclusion of black womanhood.”118 Cowell later discussed older transwomen who she 
considered ugly, those who she characterized as having lost their “femininity,” thus asserting 
ageist tendencies alongside racist, heterosexist, and ableist notions of femininity.119  
 Christine Jorgensen’s portrayal of herself as a white, heterosexual woman is also well 
documented. She, almost more than any other transwoman from this time period, succeeded in 
aligning her image with the epitome of white, heterosexual, middle-class, sophisticated 
femininity. Newspapers reporting positively about her presentation and commented on the 
success of her femininity, which included her mannerisms, clothing, among other aspects of her 
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comportment. Emily Skidmore argues that Jorgensen’s story, more than any other, helped to 
define the borders of transsexual subjectivity. Jorgensen’s “proximity to white womanhood” — 
the alignment of her narrative alongside narratives of whiteness – helped “define the boundaries 
of ‘transsexual’ identity” in the popular press.120 However, her narrative and representations did 
more than this. Her story in the popular press and in sexological literature helped shape, specify, 
and narrow the boundaries of transsexual identity for sexologists and other medical 
professionals. In her autobiography, Jorgensen established a narrative in which she journeys 
from male effeminacy (without cross-dressing) to being fully female “down to her cells.”121 
Jorgensen’s polished narrative of femininity positioned her among “appropriate discursive 
figures” and was indicative of “the strong disciplinary mechanisms within the cultural ideology 
of race, gender, and sexuality” within Jorgensen’s post-war social milieu.122 The Christine 
Jorgensen Story provided an avenue for readers to understand Jorgensen as an acceptable woman 
via her whiteness, her heterosexuality, her femininity, and her class status, while simultaneously 
casting other subjects as pathological (transvestites and homosexuals). While this positioned 
non-white and non-normatively heterosexual transvestites and transsexuals as pathological, it 
simultaneously helped to position her as authentic and legitimate to a large audience. This 
validation of Jorgensen’s brand of transsexuality, however, continues to affect who is recognized 
and affirmed as a “legitimate” transsexual.  
 The femininity R.L. Savage approximates is also undoubtedly tied to her understanding 
of race. At one point in her text, she compared being transsexual to being black. She feels pain 
over the bad things happening in the world:  
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the racial problem… these things are signs of something deeply wrong with our 
culture. People are so hurt by all this. In fact is it not possibly just as difficult for 
many Negroes to find an identity as it is for a TS? Isn’t that really the same sort of 
problem, society not leaving you alone and not allowing you to be free to live as 
you want? It horrifies me to think how the millions of Negroes in this country 
must feel.123 
  
This narrative, producing a equivalence between racial “others” and Savage’s transness, 
presented itself again later in the text: “I could see how there were other really hopeless 
situations one could be born into in our society… here were beautiful, loveable little children 
who would be doomed to disaster because of the racial backgrounds, because no one would have 
them.”124 This is evidence of what feminist scholar Adrienne Rich described as “white 
solipsism,” defined as the tendency to: 
think, imagine, and speak as if whiteness described the world… it is a tunnel-vision 
which simply does not see nonwhite experience or existence as precious or significant, 
unless in spasmodic, impotent guilt-reflexes, which have little or no long-term, 
continuing momentum or political usefulness.”125 
  
Savage leveraged blackness and black subjectivity in order to cast herself as a sympathetic 
figure, one who was “horrified” by what the “Negroes in this country must feel.” She analogized 
the experiences of transsexuals and those of Black people in the U.S. in an effort to establish 
feminine empathy, demonstrating an understanding of womanhood steeped in white supremacist 
ideals. 
These autobiographies highlight various aspects of race, gender, sexuality, and disability. 
More than this though, they accomplish what historian Chad Heap described as the “emergence 
and codification of a new twentieth-century hegemonic social order – one that was structured 
primarily around an increasingly polarized white/black racial axis and a hetero/homo sexual 
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binary that was defined in reciprocal relationship to one another.”126 These transsexual, 
transvestite, and hermaphroditic narratives helped to construct boundaries around these 
subjectivities. More than this, though, they also helped to structure and solidify the distinction 
between “more” and “less” legitimate gender variant subject positions at the intersection of race, 
disability, and sexuality. These texts are an example of the ways in which “notions of sexual 
propriety and respectability became integral to the definition of race,” where nonwhite groups 
claimed and secured whiteness at the “expense of black subjugation and in the refashioning of 
sexual normalcy and difference from a gendered system of marginalized fairies and mannish 
women to a cultural dyad that privileged heterosexual object choice.”127 They subjugated others 
in an attempt to access what they described as desirable subjectivities.  
 
For the Greater Good 
 Alongside heterosexuality, whiteness, and femininity, many authors engaged with 
discourses of citizenship and social responsibility. They utilized, however, their access to 
heterosexuality, whiteness, and femininity, as a way to legitimate their claims regarding their 
proper role as citizens. Their engagement with these discourses distinguished their writings from 
those published by sexologists; rarely did sexologists reference transvestites or transsexuals 
alongside positive notions of citizenship. While their characterization of themselves in relation to 
citizenship and society differed from one another, what was consistent was that they constructed 
new and positive concepts of citizenship that included their own subjectivities as transsexuals, 
transvestites, or hermaphrodites.  
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 Roberta Cowell referenced being “useful” as she narrated a story of journeying from 
desperation to eventual hope of bringing her “life force” and “vital energy” into the world as a 
useful citizen. She began with referencing racial degeneration: “one of the chief signs of racial 
degeneration is a weakening of the distinguishing marks of the male and female. In my own case, 
my secondary sex characteristics were poorly developed, and I had some female characteristics. 
It seemed to me that here was a strong moral argument for putting an end to my life.”128 This 
section of the narrative linked racial degeneration and morality and, more specifically, framed 
white racial degeneration as morally justifying suicide. Cowell continued, arguing that the only 
thing that kept her alive in the face of this degeneration was the possibility that she “might 
become a useful member of the community.”129 This juxtaposition between racial degeneration 
and being a “useful member of the community” highlighted the discursive alignment being made 
in the narrative between degeneracy and being a burden on the community on the one hand, and 
whiteness and citizenship on the other. Not only was Cowell constructing a subjectivity for 
herself wherein she would occupy the position of “useful member,” but she produced those 
unlike her as burdens, degenerates, and not worthy of citizenship unless they participated 
actively in whiteness and productivity.  
 Cowell also declared herself as sane, justifying her “abnormality” with physical rather 
than psychological reasons. In discussing her “sanity,” the narrative framed her psychological 
treatment as “more in the nature of character analysis” rather than the “removal of 
psychoneurosis.”130 After linking whiteness and citizenship, a story is then told about an 
interaction with a “famous sexologist” telling her that she had feminine aspects to her physiology 
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and this was what caused her “abnormality.”131 Cowell’s narrative here produces links among 
able-mindedness, whiteness, and citizenship, and she discursively aligns gender deviance caused 
by anything other than hermaphroditism with degeneracy, psychiatric disability, and immorality.  
 Louise Lawrence, in the second installment of her autobiography, engaged these 
discourses on the first page of her narrative. Lawrence narrated the result of engaging in 
relationships with others “involved” in transvestism, citing interactions with a transvestite:  
With her tremendous knowledge of psychiatry and psychology, [she] was able to 
impart to me the realization that I was a total person. Even if I did have a 
‘problem’ I could still function as a contributing member of society. I did NOT 
have to be just another creature taking up space on this planet but that I could do 
something worth while [sic].132 
 
The narration here equated being “a total person” with being a “contributing member of society,” 
setting both of these subject positions over and against “creatures” who fail to do things that 
were worthwhile. Directly following this quote, the reader is given an example of what this 
“worthwhile” action might consist of for Lawrence: “knowing [herself] for what [she] really was 
and not the image [she] THOUGHT [she] should be.”133 The narration continued, explaining that 
for Lawrence this was supposedly made manifest by recognizing that she was a “male,” but 
living as a “female.” To be worthwhile, in other words, transvestites had to recognize and 
acknowledge their maleness, regardless of their choice to live as a female, echoing similar 
sentiments made by Virginia Prince and her dismissal of transsexualism as delusional. At no 
point is the reader provided with examples in the narrative of what other “worth while” actions 
might be, but the narrative clearly aligns this concept of usefulness with Lawrence and the ways 
in which she portrayed her decision to live fully in the female “role” as a transvestite.  
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 Christine Jorgensen’s transsexual narrative constructed her as a white woman of self-
mastery and self-discipline both over her sexuality and her feminine desires while living as a 
man. She claimed in the text that she never cross-dressed. Instead, the narrative provided the 
“first” instance that she dressed as a woman, only after being declared a woman on her passport, 
once she had received “official sanction” as a woman from the American Embassy in 
Denmark.134 Describing the masculine clothes she wore to the Embassy before her passport 
reflect her new identity produced an alignment between her clothing and her state sanctioned 
sex. Skidmore discusses this incidence, arguing that by adding this story to her narrative, 
Jorgensen was able to avoid “being accused of ever having been a male cross-dresser, and … 
placed her embodiment in terms of proper U.S. citizenship and narrated her sex reassignment 
through allegiance to the disciplining apparatus of the U.S. state.”135 Jorgensen, as noted above, 
also repeatedly articulated distaste, even disgust, for homosexuality. The narrative portrayed 
Jorgensen as always heterosexual, interested in state sanctioned citizenship and documentation, 
and as properly feminine in her heterosexuality once she began to dress as a woman. In her 
discussion of nationalist discourses, Laura Ann Stoler argues that they “marked out those whose 
claims to property rights, citizenship, and public relief were worth of recognition and those who 
were not.”136 Jorgensen’s narrative cast her as worthy. The engagement with discourses of proper 
and respectable sexuality and femininity, at the intersection of her claim to U.S. citizenship as a 
white woman, were, according to Stoler’s analysis of race “productive of racial distinctions, of 
clarified notions of ‘whiteness.’”137 Jorgensen’s narrative reified connections between whiteness, 
heterosexuality, and appropriate (read: state sanctioned) femininity over and against transvestism 
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and homosexuality, two “conditions” that her narrative framed as standing in opposition to 
respectability, but less obviously in opposition to her embodiment of proper white womanhood. 
 Savage’s narrative engaged discourses of civic engagement from the beginning. The 
autobiography cast Savage as wholly woman, and drew connections between his desires to be a 
woman and his ability to be a useful citizen: “[I] felt like a female in both mind and body… the 
only way it is possible for me to continue to function as a stable, contributing member of 
society… is to undergo a sex change and become a woman.”138 The narrative repeated itself as 
his autobiography came an end: “My conclusions are that I need the change of sex in order to 
live, and be a productive member of society, and provide income for my family.”139 These lines 
of text produced Savage as an individual committed to his family and to the country, as a good 
person who needed a sex change in order to fulfill society’s expectations of him.  
 Despite the lack of direct discussion of citizenship in many of these narratives, tracing the 
ways in which they engage discourses of citizenship at the intersections of race and disability 
reflected attempts to produce notions of who could and could not embody proper citizenship. 
Disability scholar Nirmala Ervelles argues that in the U.S. and in Europe, “nation-building was 
intimately intertwined with eugenics policies that marked people of color and people with 
disabilities as ‘unfit bodies’ and ‘unworthy citizens.’”140 Erevelles references M. Jacqui 
Alexander and Chandra Talapade Mohanty and their assertion that 
“colonial/postcolonial/neocolonial nation-state[s] conflate[] (white)(hetero)sexuality with 
citizenship and organize[] a ‘citizenship machinery’ that renders suspect all who deviate from 
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white heterosexual norms of citizenship.”141 Despite their attempts to produce themselves as a 
“non-suspect,” some of the authors failed to avoid suspicion. Jorgensen, for example, was under 
investigation by the state commission of New York for a short time. She was suspected of 
communist ties because of a so-called “pro-communist statement” she made the day she returned 
to the U.S. from Denmark.142 Jorgensen narrated her surprise upon learning this from a 
journalist: “I stared at him in disbelief” and “wondered what I possibly could have said that was 
misconstrued as un-American or Communist-inspired.”143 The statement in question regarded 
Jorgensen’s reply of “Yes” when asked by a reporter if “Europeans have more understanding 
about sexual problems such as [hers], than Americans do.”144 Jorgensen presented herself in the 
narrative as finding it “inconceivable” that she held or espoused any un-American sentiments, 
that “comparison of understanding problems of a sexual nature,” was something “less than 
treasonous.”145 The reasons for suspicion for communist ties in the 1950s and 1960s were many, 
but her deviation from white heterosexual norms of citizenship rendered her suspect, even 
briefly, despite her efforts to appear otherwise.  
 Citizenship in the mid-twentieth century was a concept fraught with anxieties about 
immigration, race, and disability. Erevelles claims that disability was “a political and analytical 
category deployed by the colonialist state to patrol the boundaries of citizenship.”146 While 
disability is most often equated with physical disability, being “diagnosed” as deviant in terms of 
sexuality or gender was part and parcel of this discounting act. In his work on transgender 
citizenship, communications studies scholar Isaac West argues that: 
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The performativity of citizenship entails a reiteration of discourses already operating in 
culture, discourses saturated with history and ripe with the potential for appropriation… 
They do citizenship as they rely upon certain discursive expectations to gain recognition 
as subjects. At the same time, they also undo citizenship as subjects articulating 
unexpected elements into their demands for recognition.147 
  
The autobiographies produced their subjects as citizens, as individuals who did citizenship based 
upon, and in complicity with, white normativities and subjectivities, while simultaneously 
undoing normative expectations of citizens as what we would now identify as cisgender. 
Aligning themselves with respectable white femininity, they attempted to expand constructions 
of citizenship to include transvestites, transsexuals, and hermaphrodites, although narrowly 
defined to include only white, heterosexual, and ablebodyminded individuals inhabiting these 
subject positions.148  
 
The Face of Transsexuality 
Many published autobiographies from the twentieth century included photographs of the 
authors, both solo shots and photos with other people in their lives. These pictures often 
functioned to establish the narrator’s whiteness, class, ability, and heterosexuality; more 
specifically the photos made their whiteness more tangible by utilizing class and sexuality 
signifiers. Transfeminist scholar Bobby Noble discusses how whiteness “comes into visibility as 
whiteness when it is articulated through class,” where white is a “class-based race: the higher up 
you go, the whiter you get.”149 Noble discusses this whiteness-made-visible in relation to his own 
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story, but this formulation illuminates many of the ways in which these trans writers accessed 
whiteness via class and class associations, whether it be through their clothing, activities they 
performed, or the elegance of the events they attended.  
The photographs in Cowell’s autobiography work to establish her as an authentic white 
woman. The cover of Cowell’s book foregrounds a “before and after” shot. On the left, she is 
pictured as a dapper white man in military uniform looking straight into the camera, meeting the 
gaze of the reader. On the right, she is pictured with long hair, wearing a low-cut, square 
neckline dress. She holds a flower in her right hand and gazes at it rather than the reader. On the 
back cover, there are two more photos of her as a woman, with the larger one a full-body photo 
of her wearing a strapless formal gown. She is lifting the dress up along her right leg in a motion 
that suggests she is reaching for a garter belt or adjusting her hose. She is clearly identifiable as a 
white person, reads as able-bodied in her full-body shot, and her demure posture on the cover 
and the revealing leg-shot on the back hint at a submissive but inviting sexuality. As her text was 
published for a mass audience, it can be assumed that the photos were meant to titillate a 
mainstream, heterosexual audience rather than attract those whose desires were homosexual, thus 
producing her as an object of the heterosexual gaze. Furthermore, the inclusion of her military 
photo implicitly implies her mental health, in part because of the physical and psychological 
examinations one must pass to enlist in the first place.  
Hedy Jo Star’s autobiography, I Changed my Sex!, features thirty-one photos in all.150 A 
majority of these photos show Star in dance costumes ranging from full-bodied gowns to mini-
skirts with pasties over her breasts. Her sexuality is highlighted in her poses as well as in how 
she gazes at the camera. Several photos depict Star with Ray Milo, a man whom she dated for six 
years. Firmly establishing her heterosexuality as a woman supported her narrative that she was a 
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heterosexual woman even before she was able to obtain her “sex-change surgery.” In further 
support of this narrative, two photos show Star as a young boy, but as one who “looked more like 
a young girl than a young man.”151 Another, a picture of Hedy Jo Star sitting in her short skirt 
and pasties affirmed that even before she underwent breast augmentation, “Hedy Jo was more of 
a woman than most strippers.”152 Further shoring up her heterosexual appeal, even if moving 
away from “respectable” white feminine heterosexuality, were three two-page spreads that 
functioned as centerfolds within the text, a la Playboy Magazine.153 In the midst of changing 
discourses about white womanhood and sexuality in part because of publications like Playboy 
and the audiences it created, the centerfolds in Star’s text do not exclude her from access to 
normative white womanhood.  
The second iteration of Star’s autobiography, My Unique Change, includes many of the 
same photos from I Changed my Sex!. The cover features the “before and after” shot, with Star 
as a white man in the upper left corner wearing a suit and tie looking into the camera and in the 
bottom right corner as a woman with long flowing hair gazing just to the side of the camera. She 
is presumably wearing a strapless dress, but none of the dress can be seen in the photo. There are 
also two photos on the back cover. The upper left is the larger shot of Star from which the cover 
photo was taken. However, now the viewer can see Star and her mother. The copy tells the 
reader that “he” is twenty-two years old and asks how he could “become the voluptuous, sought-
after, world-renowned exotic pictured below?” The photo “below” captures Star seductively 
gazing into the camera, lips pursed just slightly, and again in a (presumably) strapless dress that 
is not visible in the photo. Of the seven photos included in the text, five are full-body shots of 
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Star, ranging from burlesque-type outfits to full-length ball gowns. The fourth of the five full-
body shots pictures Star wearing a short-fringed skirt, pasties on her breasts, fishnet tights, high-
heels, and a sheer train that she holds out to her sides. The photo on the right of that, not full-
body, pictures her with her “(former) sweetheart” Ray Milo, as he leans over her right shoulder 
close to kissing her right cheek. Answering the question asked on the back of the book “How can 
a man fall in love with another man – and yet not for a moment be a homosexual,” these photos 
function to highlight her sexual appeal but more specifically her white, feminine, able-bodied 
heterosexual appeal. Again, no explicit reference is made to psychiatric disability, but her 
wellness communicated through other means implies mental health – that she is a successful 
performer, white, and heterosexually partnered, indicates moral, healthy choices for a white 
woman.  
Of the three photos published in Reese’s autobiography, only two are photos of her. 
Those two, however, follow the obligatory “before and after” photos with the first depicting her 
as a tall, feminine woman in a dress with a shawl draped over her shoulders - she looks away 
from the camera with a slight smile on her face. The second is a photo of her when she was a 
man in the military. Dressed in uniform and wearing a pea coat, the subject looks into the camera 
with a smile on his face with his wrists bent upwards on each side in what some might consider 
an effeminate pose. The third photo, however, is of a document stating than “Robert Rees 
(Known as Temora Rees) is not of the masculine sex and therefor recommend that she may be 
considered as a female [sic].”154 It is then signed by Reese’s psychiatrist and addressed to the 
American Ambassy [sic] at Rotterdam. This photo is provided along with Reese’s narrative 
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concerning the process she underwent to have her passport reflect her new identity. This note, 
signed by a medical professional, functioned to legitimize her right to officially claim 
womanhood. 
Jorgensen’s autobiography contains twenty-six photos, including a two-page collage of 
newspaper articles featuring her story. Several of the photos show Christine as a little boy, and 
several others feature her as an adult man. One photo shows Private First Class George 
Jorgensen at Fort Dix, with the caption indicating that PFC Jorgensen weighed “only ninety-
eight pounds.”155 The last photo of Jorgensen looking masculine is a headshot, with the caption 
“In Denmark during the Fall of 1951, after the first operation and before the legal change from 
George to Christine.”156 This narration of her as “George” post-operation but before the “legal 
change” to Christine supports the way in which Jorgensen framed herself as a law-abiding 
citizen. Even though she claimed here that she had undergone her first operation, this photo 
serves to establish her refusal to identify or dress as a woman until the U.S. acknowledged this 
change. Every photograph after this is of Christine - either in full-length dresses, furs, or less-
formal dresses. The one exception is a picture of “Relaxation” in Australia of 1961, where 
Jorgensen is pictured waterskiing in a swimsuit. This photo functions to solidify to the reader the 
reality of her feminine form that can be seen even when wearing a one-piece bathing suit.  
The photographs presented in these autobiographies function on many different levels. 
They worked to establish the authors’ whiteness, class status, able-bodied and able-mindedness, 
as well as their heterosexuality. In particular though, the before and after photos that in many 
contexts might emphasize the malleability of gender, instead emphasized the permanence of 
gender and that these women were “finally revealing” their true selves. Julian Carter, along with 
                                                       




transgender studies scholars David J. Getsy and Trish Salah, discussed the role of photographs in 
transvestite and transsexual autobiographies, arguing that:  
While trans autobiographies are shaped by generic conventions that work to isolate the 
trans subject as a unique individual, trans photographic portraits often function as 
evidence of a particular person’s physical presence. However, photography’s indexical 
function places the trans body in a double bind: it must declare its visibility, but in doing 
so, it initiates the diagnostic gaze that demands that the temporal process of transition be 
legible on the body… both auto- biographies and photographic portraits reflect the 
diagnostic texts and images that powerfully shaped much trans becoming in a mid-
twentieth-century medicalized Western context.157 
 
The texts that included photographs produced physical evidence of their author’s surgical 
transitions as well as assertions of their legitimate claim to womanhood. For authors claiming a 
transsexual subject position, both then and throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first 
century, this “evidence” also functioned to further establish physical transition as foundational to 
legitimate and “true” transsexuality.  
 
Multiplicity and Contradiction 
These texts provide insight into how the authors engaged with, helped to shape, and were 
shaped by discourses of eugenics and sexology, but also race, class, and disability. The authors 
employed various strategies in their writing as they engaged with a “multiplicity of discursive 
elements” that played roles in the construction of the subjectivities they claimed and inhabited.158 
Because their texts reached a wider audience than the medical publications of the sexologists, 
these autobiographies helped to shape these discourses on a large scale. As they utilized the 
“expertise” of sexologists, the authors both acquiesced to and challenged the constructions of 
their “conditions” in the public sphere. Those that claimed hermaphroditic status to justify and 
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legitimize their surgeries forced readers to grapple with the differences between “physical” sex 
mix-ups and “psychological” mix-ups. Furthermore, it required readers to engage questions of 
sexuality and morality, regardless of the answers to what “caused” these individuals to desire to 
be or identify as women.  
 The authors towed a very precarious line as they navigated the terrain of pleading for 
sympathy and understanding while simultaneously subjugating others in order to make that 
appeal. This precarious line is illuminated by Jennifer Terry’s work regarding Alfred Kinsey’s 
study of sexuality and the threat that his work posed to cultural expectations of sexuality. 
Kinsey’s scale constructed a sexuality where no clear boundary existed between heterosexuality 
and homosexuality. In effect he “made the border between homosexuality and heterosexuality 
permeable and highly contingent.”159 Similarly, the authors of these autobiographies, in their 
appeal to either physical or psychological causes for their “conditions” threatened to blur the 
seemingly clear boundaries of male and female. Yet, in their attempts to make their stories safe, 
palatable, and empathetic, the writers employed strategies that celebrated normal white 
womanhood and aligned their own identities with this acceptable and desired embodiment.  
 
Lasting Impacts 
 Since 1968, numerous transvestite, transsexual, transgender, and intersex autobiographies 
have been published. However, some of the narratives discussed here continue to shape trans* 
discourse even in 2016. Most recently Lili Elbe’s narrative was fictionalized and portrayed in the 
2015 film The Danish Girl. Lili, played by Eddie Redmayne, is described by the director Tom 
Hooper as a trans woman, despite the fact that “trans woman” was not a term available to Lili. In 
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fact, as discussed above, Lili narrated her own story as one of hermaphroditism, what in 2015 
would be referred to as an intersex condition. Hooper goes so far as to claim that the film is also 
about “reclaiming trans history.”160 Furthermore, in an interview he discusses the work he and 
Redmayne did in trans* communities as they researched the role of Lili Elbe.  
Hooper acknowledges that the word “transgender” was not available to Lili, but he and 
many individuals in trans* communities in 2016 see her as part of transgender history. The film 
is not without critique, with one author claiming that “the film obscures the real story of Lili on 
many levels [including] her birth as an intersex baby.”161 Regardless of the “truth” of Elbe’s 
“condition,” it is interesting to note the anxieties from the cast and crew as well as those within 
trans* communities about the portrayal of Lili, how her story is told in terms of identity, and if 
she is seen as truly embodying transness or if her character is a portrayal of gender transgression 
that is “regressive, reductive and harmful” to contemporary trans* communities.162 The 
narratives from the twentieth century continue to impact how transpeople are understood in the 
twenty-first century, and they exist alongside other visible and out transgender individuals – 
Caitlyn Jenner, for example. These narratives and their portrayal continue to shape how people 
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CHAPTER 4  
The Legacies of the Diagnoses 
 
Medical science… determines normative gender through a… raced, classed and sexualized 
body… marginalized gender identities can approximate the norm in part  
through clinging to ideals of whiteness and class status. 
-Toby Beauchamp, 2013 
 
On June 9, 2015, Olympic athlete and reality show personality Caitlyn Jenner was 
featured on the cover of Vanity Fair. This was her first appearance as Caitlyn rather than as 
Bruce. In a photo taken by famous photographer Annie Leibowitz, Caitlyn is pictured in a white 
corset, in a demure and feminine pose, exuding feminine sexuality. After over ten hours of facial 
surgery, she had shaped her face and her look to be more normatively feminine. Jenner’s chosen 
aesthetic aligns with normative standards of beauty, standards rooted in the very same histories 
as trans-diagnoses; standards that are embedded with racist, ableist, classist, and heterosexist 
expectations. Jenner’s entree onto the scene will undoubtedly be transformative, in part because 
her visibility transcends that of most out transwomen in the 2010s. Her embodiment of 
whiteness, wealth, and fame puts her in a position to wield power with public audiences.  
She is transparent, to a degree, about her privileged status and her access to medical 
intervention that many cannot afford. That Jenner’s story echoes that of Jorgensen’s reflects the 
discursive shifts from the last sixty years, or the lack thereof.1 While new terms have emerged 
since Jorgensen’s time (namely: transgender, cisgender, genderqueer), the media worked to 
define terms that have been in circulation since the 1960s. While Jenner is one of the first to 
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publicly deviate from the normative trans narrative (she has been clear in her lack of desire for 
bottom surgery, or at least clear in her uncertainty), her otherwise normative transition (facial 
surgery, hormones, high femme aesthetic) as a white woman, and the media coverage of it recalls 
the media frenzy surrounding Christine Jorgensen over half a century ago.  
Jenner’s visibility is one example of how media representations grew exponentially 
between 2010 and 2016. Despite the good that can come from more visibility of trans* people in 
popular culture, as well as the attention that is being given to some of the inequalities transpeople 
still face, my concern about visibility mirrors one voiced by Sandy Stone in 1987. Stone 
discussed what some considered the victory of transsexualism appearing as a diagnosis in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1980: these are pyrrhic 
victories, victories of assimilation, or claiming intelligible subject positions where power can 
take hold. Beyond the reification of whiteness, beauty, and heterosexual womanhood as 
definitionally bound together, this visibility makes palatable only certain trans* embodiments 
seen as in line with citizenship and clearly defined gender (if not also sex). These are 
continuations of the very embodiments sanctioned by sexologists in their construction of the 
diagnoses during the 1950s and 1960s.  
In this chapter, I trace the histories of transsexual and transvestite discourses from the 
1960s until 2016. In particular, I show how the histories traced in the first three chapters 
impacted the diagnoses, transactivism, and the proliferation of terminology for gender non-
conformity through the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. Official diagnoses in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) have evolved and changed since 
1952. The term “transgender” has come into popular use and emerged, in part, as a rejection of 
the medicalized terms “transsexual” and “transvestite.” Contemporary transactivism that resists 
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many things including medicalization, the withdrawal of social services, and being excluded 
from mainstream advocacy organizations and movements occur and are necessary, in part, 
because of histories of medicalization and dismissal. Contemporary struggles for inclusion, 
particularly within lesbian and gay organizations, reflect the discursive histories of boundary 
drawing that occurred from both sexual minorities and those deemed “gender deviant.” Eugenic 
legacies continue to shape economic and governmental policies that result in the withdrawal of 
resources and access to services that too often result in the death of those inhabiting trans* 
subjectivities in 2016. I work through each of these topics in turn. 
 
Institutionalizing the Diagnoses  
Despite their inseparable evolution, the histories of transvestism and transsexualism 
differ in relation to larger discourses concerning psychiatric disability. This is evidenced most 
clearly by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the standard 
manual used by mental health professionals to diagnose and treat patients. The discursive 
construction of both transvestite and transsexual emerged alongside one another in the first half 
of the twentieth century. However, the discourses have moved apart, resulting in two very 
different subjectivities – which in turn affects how these communities exist in relationship to one 
another even outside of medical contexts. Yet, both discourses are still tied to a long-standing 
alignment among gender-deviance, fetishes, and psychopathology.  
Transvestism: 1952-2016 
Some version of transvestism has been included in every iteration of the DSM. The first 
iteration of the DSM, published in 1952, included the vague diagnosis of “psychopathic 
personality with pathologic sexuality,” indicating that any sexual deviation was a manifestation 
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of a sociopathic personality disorder. Additional terms were provided under this diagnosis to help 
specify one’s condition, including “homosexuality, transvestism, pedophilia, fetishism, and 
sexual sadism, including rape, sexual assault, mutilation.”2 Sixteen years later in 1968, the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) published the DSM-II and classified these same sexual 
“deviations” in the broad category of “personality disorders and certain other nonpsychotic 
mental disorders.”3 Again, homosexuality, fetishism, and transvestism were offered as diagnoses 
alongside pedophilia, necrophilia, and other “sexual deviations.”  
With the publication of the DSM-III in 1980, the term “paraphilia” was introduced under 
the umbrella term “psychosexual disorders” and recategorized transvestism as “transvestic 
fetishism.” A paraphilia is defined as:  
recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges or behaviors generally 
involving (1) nonhuman objects, (2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one’s 
partner, or (3) children or other nonconsenting persons that occur over a period of 6 
months… caus[ing] clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, 
or other important areas of functioning.4 
  
Not only is transvestic fetishism listed alongside other non-normative sexual practices such as 
sadism and masochism, but also alongside pedophilia. Furthermore, the conflation of nonhuman 
objects, human children, and “other nonconsenting persons” is intricately tied to constructions of 
disability that are infantilizing and dehumanizing.  
The DSM-III-R (the revised third edition) published in 1973 further clarified 
transvestism, reflecting psychiatric understandings of the term. As historians Vern and Bonnie 
and Bullough note, the 1973 definition was narrowed to “focus on men who have recurrent, 
intense urges to cross-dress and sexually arousing fantasies that disturb them,” but they also note 
                                                       
2 A. Aggrawal, Forensic and Medico-Legal Aspects of Sexual Crimes and Unusual Sexual Practices (Baco Raton, 
FL: CRC Press, 2008). 47. 
3 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, II ed. (Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1968). 




that this narrow definition excludes a “significant portions of the cross-dressing population.”5 
Beyond being left out, many that do experience sexual arousal do not equate this with fetishism 
or paraphilia. In fact, rather than “fetishistic,” many in the community prefer the term “erotic 
arousal,” according to clinical psychologist and gender researcher Richard Docter.6 Regardless of 
the desires of those in the community, transvestism continues to be associated with paraphilia.  
The DSM-IV (1994) reflected similar language to that of the DSM III concerning 
transvestism, and associated the “fetish” most often with heterosexual men. However, the DSM-
V, published in 2013, further complicates the concept of paraphilia, differentiating between 
“paraphilia” and “paraphilic disorders.” According to a document concerning the proposed 
revisions for the DSM-V before it was published: “This approach leaves intact the distinction 
between normative and non-normative sexual behavior, which could be important to researchers, 
but without automatically labeling non-normative sexual behavior as psychopathological.”7 
Following this logic, a transvestite, or cross-dresser, could not be classified as having a disorder 
unless his cross-dressing “impaired” him or made him unhappy. In spite of the evolving 
classification of transvestism, it remains in the DSM as of 2016, adding stigma to the term by 
merely existing in a manual that constructs, and then diagnoses, mental disorders.8  
                                                       
5 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, III-R ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987). 220. 
6 Richard F. Docter, Transvestites and Transsexuals: Towards a Theory of Gender Behavior (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1988). 130-139. 
7 "Recent Updates to Proposed Revisions for Dsm-5," American Psychiatric Association. Many argue that these 
terms shouldn’t even be in the DSM. See: Alice Dreger, "Of Kinks, Crimes, and Kinds: The Paraphilias Proposal for 
the Dsm-5," Bioethics Forum: Diverse Commentary on Issues in Bioethics. Also see work by physician and 
sexologist Charles Moser. 
8 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, V ed. (Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In 2015, a transwoman was harassed at and eventually fired from her 
job at Cabela’s. Her lawyers are arguing that Cabela’s did not provide appropriate accommodations (bathroom use, 
for example) while she was employed. On December 10, 2015, the federal district court in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania heard a case challenging the exclusion of transgender people from the American with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) and the accommodations required by that act. According to The Advocate, the ADA is “a civil rights law 
that bans discrimination based on both physical and mental disabilities and requires employers to offer reasonable 




It was not until 1980 that transsexualism earned a place in the DSM with the publication 
of the DSM-III; the official diagnosis was “Gender Identity Disorder” (GID). As discussed in 
previous chapters, transsexualism was understood for many years as a more severe version of 
transvestism. Psychoanalyst Jack Drescher argues that the inclusion of transsexualism in the 
DSM-III was “based on the research and clinical contributions of John Money, Harry Benjamin, 
Robert Stoller, and Richard Green.”9 While the four men differed in their understanding about 
what caused transsexualism and what the best treatment should be, all four “took issue with the 
prevailing psychiatric view of their time that dismissed the existence of transgender subjectivities 
as a unique psychological phenomenon in its own right.”10 Furthermore, psychiatrists and others 
providing mental health care were encountering greater numbers of individuals describing 
themselves as transsexuals and were seeking treatment (specifically medical intervention) for 
their “condition.” Zucker and Spitzer also argue that:  
by 1980, there was a large enough database to support its uniqueness as a clinical entity 
and a great deal of empirical research that examined its phenomenology, natural history, 
psychologic and biologic correlates, and so forth. Thus, by the time DSM-III was in its 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
‘immoral,’ including ‘transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders 
not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders.’ However, the case is relying on the 
fact that transpeople are often given a physcological diagnoses which affirms that “trans workers' gender identity in 
workplace accommodations may fall under the ADA's far-reaching protections.” This approach is contentious, as 
many in trnas* communities do not consider themselves to have a “disability” in part because of the continuing 
ableism in our culture. However, the lawyers are hoping that the “ADA's broader legal definition may include 
protection for trans-related diagnoses if morality were removed from consideration.” Mitch Kellaway, 
"Pennsylvania Trans Woman's Lawsuit Tests Exclusions in Americans with Disabilities Act," The Advocate 30 
January 2015; "Court Hears Argument on Transgender Exclusion in Americans with Disabilities Act," GLAD News 
& Multimedia 11 December 2015. 
9 Jack Drescher, "Queer Diagnoses: Parallels and Contrasts in the History of Homosexuality, Gender Variance, and 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual," Archives of Sexual Behavior, no. 39 (2010). 437. According to independent 
scholar Pau Crego Walters, it was under Harry Benjamin recommendation that “gender identity disorder” was 
included in the 1980 DSM-III. Pau Crego Walters, "Trans Pathologization," in Trans Bodies, Trans Selves: A 
Resource for the Transgender Community, ed. Laura Erickson-Schroth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
308.  
10 Drescher, "Queer Diagnoses: Parallels and Contrasts in the History of Homosexuality, Gender Variance, and the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual." 437. 
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planning phase in the mid-1970s, there were sufficient clinical data available to describe 
the phenomenon, and to propose diagnostic criteria.11 
  
The DSM-III would not only include a diagnosis pertaining specifically to transsexualism, but it 
would also be widely influential well beyond the realm of psychology. Political scientist Rick 
Mayes and sociologist Allan V. Horowitz argue that the change produced by the new manual 
“extended far beyond psychiatry, because the DSM is used by clinicians, the courts, researchers, 
insurance companies, managed care organizations, and the government.”12 The following 
iterations of the DSM would follow suit.  
In addition to clinical familiarity with transsexualism and recommendations from 
respected medical professionals, other cultural factors played a role in the philosophical shift 
represented by the DSM-III. The shifting landscape of psychiatry and approaches to diagnostic 
categories, the growth of third-party insurance companies and their desire for specific and 
standardized diagnoses and outcomes, the increasing medicalization of psychiatry and 
recommendations by psychiatrists who worked with trans patients played a major role in the 
addition of GID in the DSM-III.13 The publication of the DSM-III marked a shift from dominant 
psychoanalytic approaches towards other, more demonstrably effective approaches and initiated 
a significant growth in psychopharmacology. Mayes and Horowitz argue that this new manual 
                                                       
11 Jenn Burleton to TransActive, TransMissions: Supportung Youth of All Genders Through Education & 
Advocacy, 9 May 2008. TransActive strongly opposes the appointment of Dr. Kenneth Zucker to Chair the Sexual 
and Gender Identity Disorders work group that will revise and develop the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V). This position is based upon 
his approach to clinical treatment of transgender and gender non-conforming identity in children & youth. Dr. 
Zucker, along with colleagues Dr. Ray Blanchard (also appointed to the DSM-V workgroup) and Dr. J. Michael 
Bailey are proponents of the theory that, in the vast majority of cases, gender non-conforming identity in children 
and youth is merely an indicator of an eventual homosexual identity in adulthood. KJ Zucker and RL Spitzer, "Was 
the Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood Diagnosis Introduced into Dsm-III as a Backdoor Maneuver to Replace 
Homosexuality? A Historical Note," Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy 31, no. 1 (2005). 37. 
12 Rick Mayes and Allan V. Horwitz, "Dsm-III and the Revolution in the Classification of Mental Illness," Journal 
of the History of Behavioral Sciences 41, no. 3 (2005). 265. 
13 The National Institute of Mental Health, a governmental institution, financially supported research and 
development of the DSM-III. Mayes and Horowitz argue that this helped legitimize the results and use of the DSM 
by “granting… the government’s seal of approval.” Ibid. 261. 
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“contributed significantly to a biological vision of mental health—which stresses the 
neurosciences, brain chemistry, and medications — superseding the psychosocial vision that had 
dominated for decades.”14 With increasing demand for medical intervention that included 
hormones and various surgeries, the medical model of transsexuality simultaneously 
pathologized transsexualism and provided some access to medical care for those seeking it.  
Prior to the DSM-IIIs publication, homosexuality, fetishism, and other sexual 
“perversions” were classified more generally. After physicians and psychologists began to 
develop terminology that distinguished one’s body (sex) from one’s identity (gender) around 
1957, the “misalignment” between the two was articulated as a definable diagnosis, as a 
psychopathological conditions or a psychosis, with its most well-known iteration from that time 
appearing in The Transsexual Phenomenon in 1966. Psychologist J. Koh in his work focused on 
the history of the concept of gender identity disorder summarizes the evolution of GID beginning 
with the DSM-III:  
gender identity disorder encompasse[d] a spectrum of conditions, and DSM-III -R 
categorized it into three types: “transsexualism, nontranssexualism, and not otherwise 
specified. The first two types were subsequently combined and standardized into the 
official diagnostic name of ‘gender identity disorder’ in DSM-IV. In contrast, gender 
identity disorder was categorized into four groups (including transsexualism and dual-
role transvestism) in ICD-10.15 
 
Many scholars and some psychologists believed that GID as a diagnosis was a backdoor attempt 
to control instances of homosexuality. Sexologist Kenneth Zucker, who defended the addition of 
GID and argued that it had nothing to do with the removal of homosexuality from the DSM four 
years previously, cited psychologist S.M. Moore’s blunt assessment: “the GID diagnosis ... is an 
                                                       
14 German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin in the late 1800s argued that classifying mental disorders according to “their 
unique symptoms, course of development, and eventual outcome” was more effective that attempting to find 
underlying causes. This new DSM would adopt a neo-Kraepelin approach, replacing vague and inaccessible 
descriptions of disorders driven by etiology with clearly outlined symptomology alongside what Mayes and 
Horowitz describe as “lengthy descriptions of each diagnosis.” Ibid. 261, 258. 




attempt to prevent adult homosexuality via psychiatric intervention with children.”16 The goal 
was to intervene in early childhood to prevent transsexualism from manifesting later in life. I will 
not fully engage the complexity of this assertion here, but it is worth noting that this debate is 
present and ongoing. This brief description of why and how transsexualism found a place in the 
DSM sheds light on the lasting implications of the very same debates occurring in the 1950s 
regarding the moral and medical implications of cross-gender desire. It also demonstrates the 
complexity of the power relations among government institutions, psychiatry, medicine, and the 
law.  
As of 2013, transsexualism falls under the category of “gender dysphoria” according to 
the DSM-V. According to this iteration of the diagnosis, one should only be diagnosed with 
gender dysphoria if an individual experiences “a marked incongruence between one’s 
experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender.” This latest iteration, as with the previous 
ones, is still presented to medical practitioners as a diagnosis appropriate for patients who wish 
to “transition” and live full-time in the “desired gender,” patients who want to and have 
undergone “cross-sex medical procedure or treatment regimen” such as hormones or surgical 
intervention.17 Many in both medical and trans* communities, though, believe that this newest 
iteration is less pathologizing and does not cast all transgender people as “mentally ill.” 
The Legacy of Official Transsexualism 
Even though transsexuality at the time fell under the umbrella diagnosis of 
“transvestism,” transsexuality became subject to refinement as a diagnosis on its own following 
Jorgensen’s debut in 1952. This occurred largely because transsexuality, unlike transvestism, 
required medical intervention beyond that of psychoanalysis. Many transvestites did not seek out 
                                                       
16 Cited in: Zucker and Spitzer, "Was the Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood Diagnosis Introduced into Dsm-Iii 
as a Backdoor Maneuver to Replace Homosexuality? A Historical Note." 34. 
17 Steve Bressert, "Gender Dysphoria Symptoms." 
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any medical intervention, psychological or otherwise. Transsexuals and those wanting to alter 
their bodies through hormones and surgery actively sought out sympathetic psychiatrists and 
medical doctors. Putting their stories and bodies under the microscope, as well as the fantastical 
stories published in the media about “sex changes,” allowed the concept of transsexualism to 
undergo a heightened amount of scrutiny by medical professionals, the popular press, and by 
transsexuals themselves as each group engaged the discursive constructions of the diagnosis.  
As is evidenced by both the sexological literature and the autobiographical writings, 
many transsexuals and sexologists believed that only those who could successfully pass and live 
as heterosexual women should pursue surgical intervention. The attainment of normalized, white, 
and ableist heterosexual femininity was the goal for surgical transition as declared by both 
transsexuals and their doctors. Despite the existence of myriad transgender embodiments both 
then and now there were particular expectations for those who were considered “true” 
transsexuals. Sociologist Berenice Alves de Melo Bento argues that “true” transsexuals can be 
understood also as “official transsexuals,” individuals that inhabit three key aspects of the 
diagnoses: they a) Hates his/her body; b) Is asexual; and … c) Wants to obtain surgery so he/she 
can exercise the normal sexuality—heterosexuality—with the “appropriate” organ.18 As is 
evidenced by the stories told in their autobiographies, many of the women narrated a position 
similar to this, even when they did not assume the term “transsexual.” They narrated desires that 
equated womanhood with being castrated at the very least, as well as with having a heterosexual 
desire for men. Most often they claimed that any other desire, particularly homosexual desire, 
was perverted and degenerate. Official transsexuality and its attendant gender and sexuality 
expectations remained the ideal outcome of diagnosis and treatment for many sexologists, and 
                                                       
18 Berenice Alves de Melo Bento, "From Official Transexuality to Transexualities," in Sexuality, Culture and 
Politics: A South American Reader, ed. Horacio Sivori, et al. (Rio De Janeiro: Latin American Center on Sexuality 
and Human Rights, 2013). 386. 
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perhaps for many transsexuals.  
 What are the specifics of this legacy, though? Several scholars have discussed the logic of 
medical science and normative gender, most notably Toby Beauchamp. In his essay about state 
surveillance, he argues that: 
Medical science itself determines normative gender through a particular form of raced, 
classed and sexualized body. To be classified as normatively gendered is also to adhere to 
norms of racial and economic privilege. Under this logic, marginalized gender identities 
can approximate the norm in part through clinging to ideals of whiteness and class status. 
It also necessitates altering one’s gender presentation to conform to white, middle class, 
able- bodied, heterosexual understandings of normative gendering.19 
  
Embodying normative gender has everything to do with race, class, and disability. But these 
embodiments are implicated in much larger systems that extend well beyond the individual, 
systems of diagnoses, and treatment steeped in eugenic histories. That the diagnoses remain in 
the DSM, regardless of the particular wording, is evidence of this.  
 
Our “Transgender” Legacy (1967-2016) 
Between 1967 and 2016, the term “transgender” emerged and grew in popularity. As of 
2016, it is used more often in both clinical and popular settings than “transsexual” or 
“transvestite” to describe cross-gender identification. There are as many definitions of 
“transgender” as there are scholars, activists, medical professionals, and transpeople themselves 
who engage with the term. While “transgender” was not widely used across the nation in 
communities, scholarship, and the press until the 1990s, transgender studies historian Cristan 
Williams identifies 1969 as the one of the first times Virginia Prince used “transgenderal,” an 
                                                       
19 Toby Beauchamp, "Artful Concealment and Strategic Visibility: Transgender Bodies and U.S. State Surveillance 





early iteration of “transgender.”20 According to Williams, as well as transgender studies scholars 
Richard Ekins and Dave King, transgender in the 1960s and 70s was used “to name the specific 
behavior of living full time in a chosen social gender role different from that typically associated 
with birth-assigned sex,” without undergoing genital sex-reassignment surgery.21 Not all uses of 
the word that were documented make this distinction. Prince and other heterosexual cross-
dressers used the term very exclusively, while other trans individuals and even medical 
professionals considered transsexualism a variation of transgender.  
Throughout the 1970s, both in medical literature and the popular press, transgender, 
transvestite, and transsexual were often used interchangeably, with medical professionals 
referring to “transgender surgery,” where “transgender” has been used as an umbrella term to 
describe both transvestites and transsexuals. Even Christine Jorgensen eventually adopted the 
term transgender where she had previously used transsexual almost exclusively.22 Between the 
1970s and the 2010s, the term “transgender” has been used in a variety of ways, but this 
variation in usage was not without controversy. The evolution of these terms within larger 
discourses of gender non-conformity illuminates commitments to various notions of sexuality, 
race, and ability – notions that reflect the historical discursive contexts from which some of the 
terminology originally emerged. A significant shift in the emergence of “transgender” occurred 
when those who occupied transvestite subject positions worked to distance themselves from 
these histories of medicalization and pathologization. 
Moving Away from “Transvestite” 
                                                       
20 Later, Prince would use “transgenderist,” then eventually “transgender.” 
21 Cristan Williams, "Transgender," Transgender Studies Quarterly 1, no. 1-2 (2014). 233; Richard Ekins and Dave 
King, The Transgender Phenomenon (London: SAGE, 2006). 
22 Jerry Parker, "Christine Recalls Life as Boy from the Bronx," Winnipef Free Press 18 October 1979. Cited in 
Williams, "Transgender." 233. 
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Just as it is almost impossible to engage discourses of transsexuality without referencing 
Christine Jorgensen, it is similarly difficult to discuss cross-dressing and transvestism without 
also acknowledging Virginia Prince. Assigned male at birth, Prince began to cross-dress in her 
later teenage years. She first appeared cross-dressed in public in 1930 at a Halloween party 
where according to Bullough and Bullough, she “won a prize for the best costume.”23 In the 
following years, Prince would begin to cross-dress more frequently, eventually deciding to live 
full-time as a woman. However, Prince’s understanding of herself as a transvestite stood in direct 
contrast to transsexuals like Christine Jorgensen. After considering it herself, Prince ultimately 
disapproved of surgical intervention. This disapproval was informed by her claim that 
transvestites were “normal heterosexual men who sought only to express the beautiful ‘woman 
within.’”24 Prince’s visibility and position within the publishing and club world allowed her 
understanding of transvestism to influence the public and medical discourse concerning cross-
dressing and transvestism, an understanding that excluded and further pathologized those most 
vulnerable to discrimination: “women, homosexual cross dressers, streetwalkers, hustlers, and 
female impersonators.”25  
Prince used multiple terms throughout her life to self-identify as a cross-dresser. 
Regardless of the term she was using at any particular time, she was always clear about who the 
terms should describe: individuals assigned male at birth who identified as heterosexual cross-
dressers. In 1959, Prince revived one of the first magazines geared toward the transvestite and 
transsexual community, Transvestia. Historian Robert S. Hill, who has written extensively about 
Prince, cites Prince’s belief about Transvestia: 
                                                       
23 Vern L. Bullough and Bonnie Bullough, Cross Dressing, Sex, and Gender (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1993). 
24 Ibid. 281. 
25 Ibid. 308. 
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Transvestia does not exist for the purpose of impairing or destroying the masculine but 
rather to allow those who are aware of their feminine side to extract the full benefits from 
it. We can experience some of the feminine side of life, express part of our personality 
that way, and be better persons and citizens for it IF we utilize and express our desires 
with WISDOM; in MODERATION; and apply PERSPECTIVE to keep the whole matter 
in balance and under control.26 
 
Hill, in his exploration of terminology utilized in Transvestia, highlights the hierarchies of 
identity and the ways in which “transgender” in its various iterations were originally used.27 
These hierarchies shifted, depending on who was writing and what their proclaimed investments 
were in these terms.  
Virginia Prince also started clubs for heterosexual transvestites. The first, the Hose and 
Heels Club, was established in 1961. It was not a formal organization, but rather consisted of 
transvestites meeting in hotel rooms and dressing in, as the name suggests, hose and heels. This 
club evolved into a national organization called the Foundation for Full Personality Expression 
(FPE) in 1962. By 1976 the group had changed its name to the Society for the Second Self, or 
Tri-Ess, after merging with a San Francisco-based group, Mamselle. Tri-Ess is still in existence 
today.28  
Outside of the organization, “transvestite” remained a term in the popular press that was 
defined any number of ways. Prince again claimed a very specific definition, one that applied to 
                                                       
26 Virginia Prince, "Virgin Views," Transvestia 16 (August 1962). Cited Robert S. Hill, "'As a Man I Exist; as a 
Woman I Live': Heterosexual Transvestism and the Contours of Gender and Sexuality in Postwar America," (PhD 
Dissertation, Program in American Culture: University of Michigan, 2007). 369. 
27 He argues that “the pages of Transvestia document an era when ‘trans’ identities, practices, and modes of 
personhood were created and contested by a variety of gender variant individuals and groups, many of whom would 
help shape and fill the category of ‘transgender.’” "'As a Man I Exist; as a Woman I Live': Heterosexual 
Transvestism and the Contours of Gender and Sexuality in Postwar America." 365. 
28 Prince originally referred to the organization as Tri-Sigma, and was clear about the purpose of the organization: 
“an organisation limited to heterosexual cross dressers and to those who are not involved in other such behaviour 
patterns as bondage, punishment, fetishism for rubber, leather, or other, or domination and humiliation." Virginia 
Prince, Understanding Cross Dressing (Los Angeles: Chevalier Publishing, 1976). 41. Cited in Dave King and 
Richard Ekins, "Pioneers of Transgendering: The Life and Work of Virginia Prince," in GENDYS 2000, The Fourth 
International Gender Dysphoria Conference (Manchester England2000). 
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anyone using the label “transvestite” in FPE.29 Members were required to be heterosexual males 
who were married. Stryker, when writing about Tri-Ess, has argued that the organization was 
“explicitly geared toward protecting the privileges of predominantly white, middle-class men 
who used their money and access to private property to create a space in which they could 
express a stigmatized aspect of themselves in a way that didn’t jeopardize their jobs or social 
standing.”30 Clearly excluding so many transvestites who did not meet their criteria is an action 
that Stryker characterizes as a “familiar pattern in minority identity politics in U.S. History - it is 
often the most privileged elements of a population affected by a particular civil injustice or social 
oppression who have the opportunity to organize first.”31 As a financially stable, white, and 
heterosexually identified cross-dresser, Prince was able to access opportunities that many other 
transvestites and transsexuals could not, reflecting the trends of access more broadly. 
In her attempts to normalize and rank differing transvestite subjects, Prince excluded or 
dismissed as pathological significant portions of those claiming transvestite subjectivities. 
Clothing fetishist and “simple transvestites” were at the bottom of her hierarchy. Distinguishing 
“true transvestism” from sexual fetish was a strategic move to distance transvestism from sexual 
perversion. “Simple transvestites,” according to Hill, were portrayed as “men in drag,” and were 
                                                       
29 According to feminist scholar Genny Beemyn, Tri-Ess is an organization for “cross-dressing heterosexual men 
and their partners… and has chapters across the country, yet it has not been the subject of a detailed history. As a 
consequence, it is largely unknown, even in the larger transgender movement.” Genny Beemyn, "A Presence in the 
Past: A Transgender Historiography," Journal of Women's History 25, no. 4 (2013). 117. Today, Tri-Ess uses cross-
dresser almost exclusively. The membership sign-up page asks those signing up to check several boxes, on of which 
indicates their identity as a cross-dresser and their heterosexuality: I am A Crossdresser; -defined as an individual, 
typically a heterosexual male, who occasionally chooses to make a social role presentation considered appropriate 
for persons of the opposite genetic sex, for the purpose of personal expression, without the intention of entering a 
program leading to sex reassignment surgery, and without attempting to attract a partner of the same genetic sex. 
While this is the official statement, some involved in the governance of the organization are less concerned about 
sexuality. Regardless, the organization exists largely apart from any transgender activism. "Tri-Ess Membership 
Online Application." 




thought to be unruly, lazy, and stubborn.32 Although few Transvestia writers identified with 
transsexualism, Hill notes that “attitudes regarding transsexuality were mixed” among both 
authors and readers.33 Hill’s interpretation casts the writers of Transvestia as both envious as well 
as judgmental: “Despite their envy and admiration for celebrity transsexuals, most of 
Transvestia’s writers held everyday transsexuals in low regard and considered them tragic, 
pathetic, or delusional individuals.”34 This dismissive rhetoric continued the discursive 
distancing utilized by many authors discussed in chapter three; transvestites were not like those 
“delusional” transsexuals. 
At the top of Prince’s hierarchy were those who identified as “true transvestites,” also 
using the terms “femmepersonators” or “feminiphiles,” who “successfully divided and balanced 
their masculine and feminine personalities.”35 Many writers of Transvestia supported this 
hierarchy. Susanna Valenti, the fashion and gossip columnist for the magazine, at first 
acknowledged and even celebrated the multiple ways in which transvestism manifested. 
However, after a transvestite gathering at Valenti’s New York resort space in 1962, she 
eventually began to align her views with Prince, with attempts to clearly demarcate boundaries 
of acceptability. Several transvestites attended this gathering who failed to conform to Valenti’s 
and Prince’s expectations of white feminine dress and comportment, with one transvestite even 
lighting up a cigar.36 Hill argues that “through a discourse of social uplift, Valenti, Prince, and 
many of the letter and history writers” began to explicitly characterize true transvestites as 
respectable and beautiful rather than the “compulsive, masturbating weirdoes popularly depicted 
                                                       
32 Hill, "'As a Man I Exist; as a Woman I Live': Heterosexual Transvestism and the Contours of Gender and 
Sexuality in Postwar America." 374. 
33 Ibid. 375. 
34 Most of Transvestia’s content was reader generated. Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 372. 
36 Ibid. 373. 
 
 187 
in the tabloid, medical, and pornographic press.”37 These anxieties, particularly concerning 
fetishism and sexual perversion, would shape the ways in which transvestite communities 
formed and advocated for themselves for the decades that followed.   
Despite Prince’s proclaimed disdain for homosexuality and disapproval of transsexual 
surgeries, her position as an academic, as a transvestite, and how these aspects of her subjectivity 
positioned her to engage in transvestite discourses cannot be ignored when examining this 
history. In this way, Prince utilized eugenic ideologies that helped incorporate heterosexism into 
notions of normality and what she claimed were legitimate manifestations of transvestism. With 
this logic, she made efforts to establish the transvestite community as distinct and non-
pathological, marking a shift in understanding about and by cross-dressers and their families. 
As of the 1990s, most transvestites prefer the term “cross-dresser.” The years in which 
this move away from “transvestite” occurred are difficult to pin down. Even members of Tri-Ess 
(as of 2016) are not fully clear on the historical shift from “transvestite” to “cross-dresser.”38 For 
many cross-dressers, though, this move was based on several factors. “Transvestite” carried with 
it notions of pathology and medicalization, and because of its context in the DSM, fetishization. 
As such, Prince and those like her – namely heterosexual males who wore feminine clothing to 
express the woman inside of them – began to adopt terms other than “transvestite.” “Cross-
dresser” became a more acceptable term, one less fraught with notions of pathology. Many who 
self-identify today as cross-dressers are explicit about occupying an identity that is distinct from 
those who have fetishistic intentions for their cross-dressing. Furthermore, communities of cross-
dressers in the U.S. formed distinct and separate organization apart from both homophile, and 
                                                       
37 Ibid. 
38 The Chair of the Tri-Ess Board of Governance indicated that for many members of Tri-Ess, “heterophilic 
crossdresser” is the preferred term, and refers to “a person who cross dresses out of an affinity for the opposite 
gender, that is, a desire to develop and express opposite gender components that are a part of his or her identity.” 
She also confirmed that the move away from “transvestite” occurred because the word carried “connotations of 
sleaze and mental pathology.” Email to author, 27 August, 2015. 
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later gay, organizations and groups, as well as transgender and transsexual organizations and 
activism.39  
The exclusion of homosexual transvestites and those whose experience was not one of 
erotic pleasure was reflected in scholarship and research as well. In their attempts to study and 
learn about transvestism, psychiatrists and psychologists in the 1980s adhered strictly to the 
definitions of transvestism in the DSM-III-R. As such, they excluded from their studies 1) 
transvestites who self-identified as homosexual - the DSM definition excluded them, as did the 
researchers, and 2) subjects who “did not admit erotic arousal and who reported that they cross 
dressed for relief from the masculine gender norms and obligation, for relaxation, or for social 
rewards.”40 Just as the DSM excluded these individuals from its definition of “fetishistic 
transvestism,” so too do the researchers. As a result, Bullough and Bullough estimate that these 
exclusions resulted in a “10 percent loss of the population” they could have studied, and that the 
distortion might also leave out older transvestites whose fetishism had waned or because they 
cross-dressed to “temporarily escape the pressures of being masculine rather than for any erotic 
experience.”41 While this number might seem small, it reflects a larger trend of excluding those 
who failed to conform to white standards of respectability.  
By the 1990s, cross-dresser was the term largely preferred by those previously associated 
with the term “transvestite.” Despite this preference, Hill provides a list of just some of the terms 
used by readers of Transvestia: Street queens, transvestite fetishists, simple transvestites, drag 
queens, whole girl fetishists, transsexuals, female impersonators, true transvestites, 
femmepersonators, male-women, and transgenderists. These terms delineated differences of 
                                                       
39 This has not been the case in Canada, for example. See: Darryl B. Hill, Trans Toronto (New York: William 
Rodney Press, 2012). 
40 Bullough and Bullough, Cross Dressing, Sex, and Gender. 295-6. 
41 Ibid. 296. 
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identity, embodiment, expression, and community. While, as Hill argues, many of these 
distinctions would go “undetected by mainstream observers,” for the community using them they 
were “important markers separating respectability from deviance… [and] it is these 
differences…” that would shape activist groups and communities over the next several decades.42 
Moving Towards “Transgender” 
By the 1990s, the term “transgender” was politicized and was defined in ways that 
departed drastically from Prince’s understanding of it. Cristan Williams characterizes the growth 
in popularity of the term as an “organic, grass-roots process that emerged from many sources, in 
many conversations happening in many different social locations.”43 Despite Prince’s 
proclamation that “transgender” should define only a very specific subject position, the 
proliferation of definitions helped to bring a community of individuals together with sometimes 
vastly different embodiments and subjectivities. “Transgender” as a subject position described 
any number of possibilities regarding sex, gender identity, and gender expression.  
Williams argues that “transgender” functioned to “group together different kinds of 
people who might otherwise have virtually no social contact with one another.”44 They argue that 
the term helped to form a community of individuals with varying experiences and identities, 
helping to form a movement with “overlapping and intersectional social needs and political 
goals.”45 Transgender studies, which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, became 
“transgender” studies rather than “trans” or “transsexual” studies in part because of the 
politicization of “transgender” that occurred during same years that the field was in its infancy. 
Stryker and Paisley Currah argue that the field in its most narrow sense, “revolves around the 
                                                       
42 Hill, "'As a Man I Exist; as a Woman I Live': Heterosexual Transvestism and the Contours of Gender and 
Sexuality in Postwar America." 144. 
43 Williams, "Transgender." 233. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 234. 
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category ‘transgender’ itself—its history, dissemination, application, uptake, logics, politics, and 
ongoing definitional and categorical transformations.”46 Scholars argued that the word was 
enticing because of how it emerged from a political movement, resisting the ways in which 
transpeople had been medicalized and pathologized, as well as how it was being used an 
inclusive term for a number of gender-variant identities.  
In a piece entitled The State of Transgender Rights in the United States of America, 
authors Currah, Green, and Stryker take a more scholarly and expansive approach to the term. 
They argue that “transgender” can be used, although not exclusively, to describe those who have:  
a sense of persistent identification with, and expression of, gender-coded behaviors not 
typically associated with one’s sex at birth, and which were reducible neither to erotic 
gratification, nor psychopathological paraphilia, nor physiological disorder or malady.47  
 
They argue that the term was self applied and reframed the individual as one outside the realm of 
pathology, but even more so it was indicative of a rejection of and resistance to 
“medicalization… pathologization… [and] the many mechanisms whereby the administrative 
state and its associated medico-legal-psychiatric institutions sought to contain and delimit the 
socially disruptive potentials of sex/gender non-normativity.”48 They locate the emergence of 
“transgender” firmly within the realm of identity politics, a desire to have a social identity that 
was intelligible and thus allowing those who used it to “enter[] into a productive relationship 
with social power.”49 
The emergence of “transgender” as an identity and a rallying point for those identified 
with the term resulted in vast changes in the ways in which community members inhabited 
transgender subjectivities, as well as how they interacted with how their desires had been 
                                                       
46 Susan Stryker and Paisley Currah, "Introduction," ibid. 5. 
47 Paisley Currah, Jamison Green, and Susan Stryker, "The State of Transgender Rights in the United States of 
America" (paper presented at the National Sexuality Resource Center, San Francisco, CA, 2008). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 3. Cited in Drescher, "Queer Diagnoses: Parallels and Contrasts in the History of Homosexuality, Gender 
Variance, and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual." 
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previously medicalized. Transgender studies scholar Dallas Denny argues that this new 
transgender model resulted in “increased contact among individuals,” and helped to form 
communities where transsexuals nurtured their resistance to being cast as “mentally ill.” Instead, 
they were better able to advocate for themselves as “emotionally healthy individuals whose 
expression of gender was not constrained by societal expectations… the pathology was shifted… 
to a society which cannot tolerate difference.”50 This shift did not depathologize psychiatric 
disability, but it was an important move in pulling apart historical associations among psychosis, 
psychopathology, and gender variance. 
More notable than what the term represented, though, is what the term has accomplished 
over time. In anthropologist David Valentine’s assessment, “transgender” describes “a collective 
category of identity” which includes transsexuals, transvestites, as well as a “broad notion of 
gender variant people regardless of sex assigned at birth.”51 In discussing what the term has and 
continues to accomplish, Valentine argues that, “the capacity of transgender to incorporate all 
gender variance has become a powerful tool of activism and personal identification.”52 Beyond a 
tool for activism and identification though, Valentine points to the ways in which the term has 
become institutionalized in spaces ranging from grassroots activism to social service 
organizations. More importantly he believes that the term has helped U.S. Americans understand 
and differentiate between gender variance and sexual variance, a distinction that sexologists and 
transpeople tried to make as far back as 1910.  
 
Counterdiscursive and Activists Legacies: Transpeople Fighting Back   
                                                       
50 Dallas Denny, "A Selective Bibliography of Transsexualism," Journal of Gay & Lesbian Psychotherapy 6, no. 2 
(2003). 43-44. 





Eugenic legacies and discourses shaped the environment in which many transvestite and 
transsexual individuals found themselves in the 1960s. Regardless of any explicit 
acknowledgement of eugenic discourse, activist efforts responded to that environment. For many 
years, the dominant discourses emerging from transsexual and transvestite communities focused 
on assimilation. However, transsexual and transvestite communities responded to how they were 
being constructed and subsequently treated. Some of the first documented community actions of 
resistance occurred in the 1960s. Responding to pathologizing diagnoses, as well as the influx of 
civil rights and social justice discourses during the time, activists worked to de-pathologize the 
terms, taking them on as identities to be proud of – creating space that the diagnoses previously 
had not offered. They also advocated for greater access to life-sustaining services like health 
care, legal documents reflecting their chosen gender, and protection from police harassment and 
violence. These advocacy efforts worked against the eugenicist aims that had shaped the 
trajectory of many transgender and transsexual lives in the previous decades. 
The medical distinction between transvestism and transsexualism traveled into 
community discourses during this time as well, shaping the types of activism and advocacy that 
emerged. Among these communities were various levels of engagement with the “official” 
diagnoses. It was at this time that discourses emerging from within transvestite communities 
began to diverge from those emerging from both transsexual and LGB communities. Many 
transvestites, not seeking medical intervention, worked to distinguish themselves from what the 
medical discourse was calling “fetishistic transvestism.” Other activists, shaped by radical social 
justice narratives focused on more immediate dangers and threats – housing, healthcare, and 
incarceration, for example - were less concerned about the “official” diagnoses, unless those 
diagnoses were a route to gain access to services. Regardless of a community’s relationship to 
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the official diagnoses, however, the emergence of the categories, particularly following the 
publication of Benjamin’s Transsexual Phenomenon, shaped the course of action, as well as the 
counterdiscourses, of these communities. 
1959-1969 
 Glimpses of resistance were visible in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This indicated a 
widespread feeling of frustration and anger with the ways in which transvestite and transsexual 
diagnoses had been pathologized, were visible by the late 1950s and early 1960s. Those who 
wanted medical intervention were being forced to fight for access, and those who did not were 
pathologized as fetishists. As a result of the ways in which the diagnoses were constructed, only 
certain people could access medical care. Many transpeople faced discrimination and violence at 
the hands of police and always risked arrest if dressed in public.53 Despite the resilience of those 
most vulnerable, and the advocacy for transsexual and transvestite communities that began in 
earnest in the late 1960s, those who were most vulnerable then continue to be the most 
vulnerable now – those with the fewest financial resources. However, activist efforts did change 
the material realities for many transpeople, and helped to shape a discourse of self-respect and 
pride in relation to the diagnoses, identities, and subjectivities. 
One of the first documented and spontaneous acts of resistance by transwomen occurred 
in 1959 in Los Angeles at a late-night coffee shop called Coopers Donuts. Stryker reconstructed 
this event based on interviews with those in attendance. In 2008, Stryker’s narrative of this event 
notes that both “transgender” people and “drag queens” populated the space. At the time 
“transgender” was not yet a common word for many of the individuals she interviewed. This 
move by Stryker was, perhaps, to make her narrative of the event more accessible to readers in 
                                                       
53 Susan Stryker lists just some of the municipal laws prohibiting “wearing dress of the opposite sex” in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century in Stryker, Transgender History. 32-33. 
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2008. Regardless of the various terms the individuals at Cooper’s used to identify, one 
commonality existed among them: police would often stop and harass customers, particularly 
those who were obviously in drag, gay, or were perceived as gender “deviant.” In May of 1959, 
“the customers decided to resist en masse.”54 Many were arrested. Six years later in 1965 in 
Philadelphia, a similar clash occurred at Dewey’s, a diner and coffee shop. Following the arrest 
of several activists, the group staged a sit-in at Dewey’s. Ultimately, they were successful in their 
efforts, with the management at Dewey’s agreeing to stop their discriminatory practices.  
Aligning themselves with these strategies, rather than with the discourses and strategies 
emerging from medical institutions, marked an important shift for how transvestite, transsexual, 
and later transgender communities would react to medical institutions and their pathologization 
of gender non-conformity. The mid- to late sixties were a significant time of growth for 
organized resistance by transvestite and transsexual communities, with activists adopting 
strategies and actions from their own experiences with the civil rights and the anti-war 
movements. Often, those most vulnerable to violence, discrimination, and oppression were the 
first to fight back. Low-income transpeople, transwomen of color, and transwomen involved in 
sex work faced higher levels of scrutiny and harassment, and as a result many were pushed into 
action by their anger and frustration, actions that led to resistance that occurred at locations like 
Cooper’s Donuts in 1959 and Dewey’s in 1965.  
The following year, 1966, would by identified by the Gay and Lesbian Historical Society 
of Northern California (GLHSNC) as “the beginning of contemporary transgender radicalism in 
the United States.”55 This year is named, in part, because of the Compton’s Cafeteria riot that 
occurred that August fueled by the harassment of individuals because of their sexuality or 
                                                       
54 Ibid. 61. 
55 Members of the Gay and Lesbian Historical Society of Northern California, "Mtf Transgender Activism in the 
Tenderloin and Beyond, 1966-1975," GLQ - A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 4, no. 2 (1998). 355. 
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perceived gender “deviance” fought back against police.56 Susan Stryker has written extensively 
on this riot and also directed a documentary about it: Screaming Queens: The Riot at Compton’s 
Cafeteria (2005). Additionally, Vanguard, the first queer youth organization, was founded in 
1966 in San Francisco with the support of the Glide Memorial Methodist Church and other 
homophile activists. Vanguard helped to incite the resistance to police harassment and violence at 
Compton’s.57 According to Stryker, Vanguard’s first “major political action” was to fight back 
against the discriminatory practices of Compton’s where they held their meetings as a group. 
After protesting outside of the cafeteria and being ignored by the management, “frustration 
boiled over into militant resistance.”58 Vanguard’s members fought back violently, forcing the 
police, as well as others wielding power over them, to pay attention and take them seriously. 
Stryker argues that the availability of new resources, such as medical protocols, helped to incite 
the riot. Transpeople, and transwomen in particular, were beginning to see change, and for the 
first time had medical professionals like Benjamin advocating for them as he recommended new 
and improved changes to medical-service provisions. Fueled by their own frustration with 
discrimination and violence and organizing to give voice to these frustrations, paired with 
changes that provided hope, communities were ready to fight back.  
The members of the GLHSNC note that, following the riot at Compton’s, an 
“unprecedented network of transgender- specific social resources and self-help groups” took 
shape, and by 1967 the transactivists became some of the first to organize in the nation.59 
Following the riot at Compton’s, transactivists would form and run the first support and 
                                                       
56 Ibid. 
57 Vanguard was smaller organization but continues to have an impact. In fact, from 2010 to 2011, “homeless queer 
youth in San Francisco broadcasted their own stories and organized their own political actions in the spirit of [the 
original] Vanguard.” For more information, visit to Archive, 2016. Vanguard Revisited, edited by Megan Rohrer 
and Joey Plaster. http://vanguardrevisited.blogspot.com/p/archive.html, 2016. 
58 Stryker, Transgender History. 73. 
59 California, "Mtf Transgender Activism in the Tenderloin and Beyond, 1966-1975." 357. 
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advocacy organization for transsexuals in the world, the National Transsexual Counseling Unit 
(NTCU). Two years later, a riot broke out in New York City on Christopher St., a riot that would 
later be known as Stonewall, named for the small bar where the fight began. Transwomen, some 
preferring the term drag queen, were a leading force during this act of resistance, inciting 
responses from others experiencing harassment and violence in their own communities. Others 
would become active on the heels of homophile organizing previous to and following Stonewall, 
but took their cues from a much broader social justice discourse, what some would argue is a 
necessary move to respond to the systems of privilege and oppression that connect seemingly 
disparate communities.  
Other forms of grassroots activism also began to gain traction in the mid 1960s. Officer 
Elliot Blackstone served as the community relation’s liaison for the SFPD during the time.60 
Already familiar with homophile activism in the area, Blackstone was the most likely ally for 
those wishing to organize for transsexual rights specifically. In an interview with members of 
GLHSNC published in 1998, the authors narrate an incident when, in 1966, Blackstone was 
approached by a transsexual woman who was also a sex worker.61 The woman was organizing a 
group of her peers and wanted Blackstone to help end the discrimination and harassment they 
faced as sex workers. She argued that “she and her friends engaged in prostitution only because 
they were denied other employment opportunities due to transgenderphobic discrimination.”62 
This is an early instance of making these connections between economic hardship, racism, 
workplace discrimination, and transsexual or transgender identity would come to define much of 
the grassroots organizing across the nation. 
                                                       
60 This interview and the commentary that contextualizes it are the fruits of a collaborative project by individuals 
associated with the Archives and Oral History Project of the Gay and Lesbian Historical Society of Northern 
California (GLHS). Ibid. 349. 
61 Sex work was, and remains, a common way for transwomen to earn a living because of social rejection and 
harassment – compounded by race and class – experienced by many poor transwomen of color. 
62 California, "Mtf Transgender Activism in the Tenderloin and Beyond, 1966-1975." 352. 
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Benjamin’s The Transsexual Phenomenon was published in the midst of this activism, 
bringing broader understandings of the various iterations of trans diagnoses to the public, but 
also to those who identified as trans. The members of the GLHSNC argue that the publication of 
this text “instituted a rather hegemonic notion of ‘proper’ transsexuality,” and as a result 
provided more clearly demarcated distinctions within communities that had previously been very 
heterogeneous and loosely allied.63 But, GLHSNC also asserts that “once medical intervention 
became more… available… differences in the self-concepts, body images, structures of desire, 
ethnicity, and other socio-economic attributes of individual transgendered [sic] people solidified 
all the more quickly,” and in ways that drew boundaries between gay men, transvestites, drag 
queens, and transsexual women.64 As such, much of the activism and organizing to follow would 
often not occur in inclusive organizations. The medicalization of gender “deviance” or non-
conformity was continuing to shape community and subject formation, thus shaping discourses 
of resistance and activism. 
While these more grassroots actions occurred, subtle shifts also occurred in larger, well-
funded organizations and the ways in which they shaped discourses of gender non-conformity. 
Reed Erickson, an independently wealthy transsexual man, emerged as part of this shift. 
Transgender studies scholar Aaron Devor, who has written extensively on Erickson, argues that 
when Erickson began his philanthropic efforts in the 1960s, “transsexualism was little known to 
either professionals or the public,” and “the present widespread recognition of transsexualism as 
a human condition can be partially attributed” to Erickson and his financial contributions to 
various organizations.65 More importantly though, Erickson funded organizations that not only 
shaped social discourse, but also medical discourses concerning gender variance. As a 
                                                       
63 Ibid. 354. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Aaron Devor, "Reed Erickson and the Erickson Educational Foundation," University of Victoria. 
 
 198 
philanthropist he provided millions to several organizations, as well as establishing his own: the 
Erickson Education Foundation (EEF). This organization, founded in 1964, brought attention to 
transsexualism, and disseminated information that was “instrumental in making tremendous 
improvements to the provision of health care and other services for transpeople” for years to 
come.66 Beyond focusing on access to quality medical care, the EEF also funded projects focused 
on education and advocacy, as well as negotiating media representation of transpeople on the 
radio, on TV, and in magazines. Furthermore, as Devor and Matte note, the organization “built a 
solid groundwork which fostered the growth of diverse advocacy and support groups and was 
foundational to the development of worldwide networks of transsexual researchers.”67 
In operation until 1984, the EEF also donated millions of dollars to other organizations 
for advocacy for transsexuals, and for outreach and educational efforts.68 EEF also sponsored 
international gender symposia and provided the initial funding for the Gender Identity Clinic at 
Johns Hopkins University. EEF built a nation-wide network of transpeople and professionals 
providing care to transpeople, the EEF was able to provide the first ever referral network for 
medical professionals sympathetic to transsexual individuals seeking medical or psychological 
help. Furthermore, because the EEF worked to educate medical professionals, they also shifted 
some medical discourses about transsexuals through their encouragement that physicians 
                                                       
66 Aaron Devor and Nicholas Matte, "Building a Better World for Transpeople: Reed Erickson and the Erickson 
Educational Foundation," International Journal of Transgenderism 10, no. 1 (2007). 48. 
67 Ibid. 
68 In their work, Devor and Matte mention two specifically: 1) in 1974 “Forum on Variant Sex Behavior,” a three-
day forum designed to expose a variety of professional including “physicians, social workers, psychologists, 
counselors, clergy, teachers, and other professionals,” to current information and new developments concerning 
“‘less well known types of behavior,’” and 2) in 1975, “Sex, Role, and Gender,” a similar event to the first, featuring 
transsexual speakers, including Christine Jorgensen. Sexologists had had international forums and conventions, but 
these two events were some of the first funded by and featuring the narratives (as told by themselves) of transsexual 
people. The EEF gave over two million dollars to ONE, a homophile organization, to help organize and fund several 
events and programs focused on transsexual lives. "One Inc. And Reed Erickson: The Uneasy Collaboration of Gay 
and Trans Activism, 1964-2003," GLQ - A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 10, no. 2 (2004). 191-192. 
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“develop the expertise they needed in order to be able to fulfill the health care needs.”69 This 
push offered a strategy for transsexual health that greatly differed from previous approaches. For 
the first time, transpeople across the nation were in conversation with one another about 
medicine and medicine’s construction and treatment of diagnoses of gender “deviance” or non-
conformity. 
Following the withdrawal of Erickson’s funds in 1977 from gender symposia that he had 
been funding for almost a decade, the symposia organizers were forced to navigate the future 
direction of the symposia. As a result in 1979, the Harry Benjamin International Gender 
Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA) was incorporated as a non-profit and would oversee the 
continuation of the symposia as well as establish standards of care for transsexuals seeking 
medical intervention. HBIGDA was at the forefront of shaping medical approaches and 
understandings of transpeople worldwide. They not only sponsored conferences and began The 
International Journal of Transgenderism, but they also played a significant role in having 
“gender identity disorder,” discussed above, added to the DSM-III. According to scholars Matte, 
Devor, and Vladicka, this move helped to bring “what had previously been less widely accepted 
thinking about transsexuals into mainstream psychiatry and opening up new legal and social 
possibilities for transsexuals in the United States.” One of their most notable contributions, 
though, was the set of guidelines they created to help medical professionals provide affirming 
care for transsexuals, transvestites, and transgender people: the Standards of Care (SOC).70 In 
2012, the seventh iteration of these standards of care were published, five years after HBIGDA 
                                                       
69 "Building a Better World for Transpeople: Reed Erickson and the Erickson Educational Foundation." 52. 
70 Matter, Devor, and Vladicka note the U.S. bias and focus of the Standards of Care written by HBIGDA, due 
largely in part to the overwhelming number of members of HBIGDA that were U.S. citizens or tied to the U.S. in 
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changed its name and as of 2016 is known as the World Professional Association for Transgender 
Health (WPATH).71  
1970-1979 
Histories of sexological and eugenical discourse continued to shape not only the 
dominant discourses of transgender diagnoses and subjectivities, but also many of the responses 
and counterdiscourses that emerged as a result. Some of these counterdiscourses emerged from 
smaller activist communities that engaged modes of resistance that responded directly to the lack 
of resources and access to not only medical intervention and health care, but also basic services 
like shelter and food.  
Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson, two transwomen living in New York City, 
countered the growing narrative of the larger organizations, many of which were using the 
assimilationist rhetoric of “we are just like you.” Rivera and Johnson, informed heavily by more 
radical social justice discourses focused on understanding the connections between homelessness 
and violence, were less concerned about assimilation. Focusing on providing housing and 
reducing violence for other transwomen of color, they formed the advocacy group and shelter 
mentioned above - Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaries (STAR) in the 1970s. In Rivera’s 
own words, “STAR was for the street gay people, the street homeless people, and anybody that 
needed help at that time.”72  
Transsexual Activist Organization (TAO), founded by Angela K. Douglas in 1970 in Los 
Angeles, took issue with the medicalization of transness. The organization published several 
political writings that “offered important countercultural critiques of the emerging transgender 
establishment,” most notably criticism of “the doctors, lawyers, and psychiatrists associated with 
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Harry Benjamin, the EEF, and the ‘police-run’ NTCU in San Francisco.”73 The members of the 
GLHSNC provide evidence that many of these criticisms were unfounded, but the existence of 
these critiques helped provoke a critical examination of the larger organizations like the EEF as 
well as the ways in which these organizations were shaping approaches to and understandings of 
transsexual health, understandings that were invested in the very same institutions from which 
the original diagnoses emerged.74 This radical and countercultural advocacy helped expand and 
shape transactivist discourses that were committed to grassroots organizing. The accusations 
emerging from TAO foreshadowed a larger rift in transactivism and discourse that would occur 
over the next several years.  
The members of the GLHSNC cite several events that would highlight the fragility of the 
movement, leaving the movement fractured: in 1973, Rivera intended to speak at the 4th 
Christopher Street festival, but was forcibly prevented from doing so; also in 1973, Beth Elliot, 
while attending the West Coast Women’s Conference, was ousted from the conference and then 
dismissed from the Daughters of Bilitis, the lesbian activist organization. These two incidences 
were “emblematic of a wider shift in radical sexual politics… the rise of ‘cultural feminism’ 
among lesbians, the… disparagement of drag among gay men, and pandemic hostility, apathy, 
and ignorance from society at large.”75 This shift also reflected a split in approaches to activism. 
Jen Richards of wehappytrans.com recently compared these two different trajectories for 
activism in her article about the “transgender movement” in The Advocate. Discussing Prince’s 
somewhat privileged group of cross-dressers in relation to Rivera’s and Johnson’s group of queer 
youth of color, Richards argues that this history set a precedent for the realities of transwomen 
                                                       
73 Stryker, Transgender History. 89. 
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today – where cross-dressers and members of organizations like Tri-Ess are in very different 
positions socially and politically than the queer youth of color who continue to face the brunt of 
violence, homelessness, and discrimination. This historical trajectory did not evolve 
independently from the precedent set by the original diagnostic categories and the assumptions, 
hierarchies, and power structures built into their very definitions.  
As a result of this trajectory, transactivists would organize apart from other progressive 
organizations and movements, engaging different social justice discourses that offered divergent 
understandings of “community.” The rifts among transgender, feminist, and LG communities 
would largely remain in place until the emergence of queer discourse and the queer movement in 
the 1990s. It was at this time when transgender communities began to engage in a “broader 
cultural struggle to redefine the possibilities of sexed and gendered embodiment.76 Stryker 
explains in part what caused this rift:  
the emergence of new political ideologies of gender, transgender people--particularly 
transsexuals--came to be seen as dangerously reactionary in their cultural politics, as 
people who had a false consciousness of gender oppression and who sought to mutilate 
their bodies rather than liberate their minds.77 
 
Similarly, though, many transpeople expressed disapproval of homosexuality and not wanting to 
be associated with yet another pathologized identity.78 Discourses that aligned “danger” with 
diagnoses of gender “deviance,” that created spaces where respectability politics resulting in the 
constructions of homosexuality as deviant seen throughout the early- and mid- twentieth century, 
were still fully present in these contemporary landscapes. While attempts were made to bridge 
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these divides, these discourses continued to circulate and would inform anti-trans* feminist 
sentiment for years to come. 
 In 1979, Janice Raymond published The Transsexual Empire. This text would become 
one of the most infamous anti-transgender texts, one that shaped anti-transsexual discourses for 
years. Raymond’s rhetoric in this book fueled and solidified an anti-transsexual sentiment that 
had been building among some feminists that led them to buy into the narrative that transsexuals 
were “the mindless agents of a nefarious patriarchal conspiracy bent on the destruction of 
women.”79 I will discuss the academic responses to this text in the next chapter, but it is 
important to note that this anti-transsexual sentiment within some feminist discourses led 
transactivists to organize separately from feminist activism for the next decade, rather than in 
collaboration with other feminist, social justice, and progressive movements.80  
1980-1999 
 The AIDS crisis in the 1980s affected transgender communities in devastating ways. 
Transwomen, particularly transwomen of color involved in sex work, were among those most 
affected by the epidemic. Because of the havoc it wreaked in gay and transgender communities, 
alliances were forged between L, G, and T communities, as well as drug users and other groups 
that were higher risk. These alliances had not occurred previously in many communities for a 
number of reasons, some of which lie in the histories of respectability politics that played out in, 
among other places, transvestite and transsexual communities and narratives. As I discussed in 
chapter three, many transsexuals did not want to align themselves with homosexuality, and many 
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gay or homophile individuals were not interested in associating with transsexuals or 
transvestites.  
The alliances forged—and in some way forced—by the AIDS epidemic also brought 
greater attention to systems of privilege and oppression that connected all of these communities. 
As Stryker argues, “An effective response to the epidemic meant addressing systemic social 
problems such as poverty and racism that transcended narrow sexual identity politics.”81 Despite 
these alliances, though, many transpeople failed to receive care or were never seen by medical 
professionals at all, in part because of fears concerning the disclosure of their transsexual status 
to healthcare providers.82 This failure further instigated counterdiscourses to emerge from 
transgender communities not only concerning the ways in which the diagnoses were accessed, 
but also to larger institutional barriers that had to do with more than just transgender diagnoses or 
identity.  
Among some of the smaller but important advocacy efforts in the 1980s, La Clinica del 
Pueblo was established in 1983 in Washington D.C. by Latina transactivist Ruby Bracamonte. 
This clinic would prove to be influential for transpeople for decades. Responding to the needs of 
individuals who were HIV positive, in the late 1990s the clinic focused its efforts towards 
providing resources for those now referred to as transwomen. Latina and Latino individuals 
seeking help were provided care, regardless of their ability to pay. The clinic is still active as of 
2016. Despite the efforts of Bracamonte and other health-care activists, widespread 
discrimination against transpeople continued.  
Janice Raymond, continuing to inhabit one of the most visible, anti-trans positions, was 
particularly vocal in relation to medical and governmental discourses about transpeople. In 1980, 
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Raymond wrote and published a paper for the U.S. government entitled “Technology on the 
Social and Ethical Aspects of Transsexual Surgery.” According to activist and public historian 
Monica Roberts, “this paper effectively eliminated federal and state aid for indigent and 
imprisoned transsexuals.”83 Written originally for the National Center for Healthcare Technology 
(NCHT), Raymond’s paper would later inform the official position of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) regarding transgender health care. Public intellectual and historian Cristan 
Williams argues that Raymond’s paper not only informed the position of HHS, but also created 
barriers to healthcare for transpeople that would last decades:  
Until Raymond’s HHS paper, the US government supported trans care as medically 
necessary… This meant that poor trans people could freely access psychological and 
medical care and it meant that public and private insurers had no basis upon which to 
reject coverage of trans care… Raymond’s hate became the government’s stance.84 
 
Janice Raymond denies these accusations and argues that her paper did not significantly 
influence approaches to care or coverage by insurers. However, the NCHT alongside the Office 
of Health Technology Assessment would cite Raymond as their only source for arguing that 
transsexual surgeries were “controversial.”  
Furthermore, Raymond claims that she did not affect the funding of care for transpeople. 
Several physicians have acknowledged, though, that the care transpeople received in the mid- to 
late-1970s was funded by programs established by individual institutions or through Medicare. 
Dr. Meyer, former president of WPATH, said in an interview with Williams that he remembered 
“one particular patient who was on Medicare and that patient was approved for genital 
surgery.”85 The change in policy, spearheaded by the NCHT and the Office of Health Technology 
Assessment, prevented Medicare funds from being available for these services. Activists 
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continue to fight for access to medical care for poor transpeople and for transpeople who are 
incarcerated.86 However, activists continue to grapple with the discursive influence of 
Raymond’s vitriol. 
Beyond the fight for medical care, legal battles were also being waged throughout the 
1980s, but the legal discourses and the institutions they shaped were slow to change despite 
community counterdiscourses and demands for equality. In 1984, a transwoman working as a 
pilot for Eastern Airlines lost a sex discrimination suit she filed against the company. The judge 
in the case argued that Title VII sex discrimination was discrimination against women, 
effectively dismissing Ulane as a man.87 This verdict followed a series of losses for transpeople 
in the courts during the 1970s and 1980s: several states ruled against allowing transpeople to 
change their sex marker on their birth certificates, in 1982 a parent lost custody of their child 
because the parent was transgender, and in 1989, according to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance 
Against Defamation (GLAAD), a Nevada Court not only denied a transgender parent the right to 
primary custody, but actually terminated parental rights solely on the basis of transgender 
status.88 The court held that the child should not be required to undergo the psychological 
adjustments necessary for coming to terms with a parent’s transgender identity.89  
By the end of the 1980s, transgender support groups emerged across the nation. These 
groups functioned to resist discourses of pathology and deviance, discourses that many who 
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claimed some variation of transgender subjectivity encountered on a daily basis. In addition, 
“transgender” became more widely used in these groups as well as among other activists and 
academics to refer to individuals from across the spectrum of what might be referenced in the 
2010s as gender non-conformity. Transgender inclusion in feminist circles continued to be a 
point of contention (and continues to this day), concurrent with feminist intellectuals and 
scholars engaging discursive constructions and understandings of “woman.”90 Just as issues of 
inclusion, social justice, and approaches to social change determined a groups overall goals, so 
too did it determine who counted as a “woman” and who was “authentic” in their womanhood.  
 The 1990s ushered in a wave of transgender activism and political agitation. While 
activists had begun using “transgender” in social movement discourse for several years, feminist 
scholar Finn Enke attributes the use of “transgender” as a specifically activist and contemporary 
label with Leslie Feinberg and hir use of it in the early 1990s when ze used it “to name a budding 
movement uniting all possible oppressed gender minorities.”91 Enke argues that “transsexuals, 
drag queens, butch lesbians, cross-dressers, feminine men, and masculine women all in some 
senses crossed, or transed, gender,” and most of these individuals and communities bore the 
burden of the “punitive measures to keep such crossings invisible or in check” by most 
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“‘Western societies.”92 While “transgender” had been previously used in various ways by others 
in the community without any single definition, Feinberg’s Transgender Liberation: A Movement 
Whose Time Has Come, published in 1992, publicly claimed a number of gender non-conforming 
individuals – transsexual, transvestite, and those who transgressed gender well before either term 
existed – as part of a larger transgender community and history.93 Considering the use of the term 
“transgender” in the twenty-first century, Feinberg, in similar ways to Stryker, utilized 
“transgender” ahistorically and anachronistically in that ze claimed individuals like Joan of Arc, 
for example, as “transgender.” However, Feinberg is clear about hir use of “transgender” to 
describe “everyone who challenges the boundaries of sex and gender” and that the book was 
intended to take a “fresh look at sex and gender in history and the interrelationships of class, 
nationality, race, and sexuality.”94 In using such an expansive definition, one that was widely 
available to a popular audience, Feinberg helped transgender to function within larger 
transgender discourses as an umbrella term for a variety of non-normative gender expression and 
embodiment.  
 The 1990s saw not only the rise of transgender activism and visibility, but also a growing 
recognition of the violence that transpeople faced across the nation and throughout the world.95 
Brandon Teena’s murder in 1993, for example, received national media coverage. Brandon, 
assigned female at birth, lived out a masculine gender expression and is speculated to have 
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identified as a man. Transsexual Menace, a group founded in 1993 by activist Riki Wilchins, was 
a central actor in the vigils and protests held during the trials of John Lotter and Tom Nissan, the 
men who beat, raped, and eventually murdered Brandon. By 1999, so many transgender 
individuals had been murdered, the Transgender Day of Remembrance (TDOR) was established 
as a day to remember and stand in solidarity with the lives of those who were lost. The first was 
a vigil held to honor Rita Hester, a black transwoman killed in Massachusetts in 1998.96 This 
issue has garnered attention worldwide, and even a “Trans Murder Monitoring” website was 
launched by Transgender Europe, an organization with LGBT activists from around the world.97 
Unfortunately, as of 2016 this continues to be a pressing issue all over the world. Over twenty 
transwomen of color were murdered in the U.S. alone in 2015.98 
Into the Twenty-First Century 
As a direct response to the lack of transgender inclusivity in larger organizations, Riki 
Wilchins of the Transsexual Menace formed the Gender Public Advocacy Coalition (GPAC) in 
1995. The organization, in operation for fourteen years, advocated for workplace fairness and 
worked with transgender and gender-variant individuals who experienced discrimination. 
Wilchins was adamant about focusing on a broad definition of gender variance, rather than 
exclusively on those who identified as transgender. GPAC was instrumental in some of the first 
studies and reports that documented violence that transgender and gender-variant individuals 
experienced.99 Eventually closing its doors in 2009, GPAC provided an explanation why: “There 
is a vibrant and expanding core of organizations committed to this work. Many of the early 
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challenges… are well launched and on their way… It is time for us to move on, to new 
challenges…in the growing struggle for gender rights.”100 In the fourteen years of GPACs 
existence, not only had lesbian and gay organizations begun to incorporate transgender 
communities, but a number of new organizations had emerged advocating for gender-variant 
individuals and communities.  
During the time of GPACs existence, national organizations began to add the “T,” then 
standing generally for transgender, to their mission statements and agendas. Devor and Matte 
trace this shift, noting that the National LGBTQ Task Force added transgender issues to their 
mission statement in 1997, with Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) following 
suit in 1998. It was not until 2001, though, that the largest advocacy organization, the Human 
Rights Campaign (HRC), would begin to incorporate transactivism into their larger agenda.101 
Alongside this shift, transactivists were establishing more organizations and advocacy groups to 
work for transgender equality. The Transgender Law Center opened its first office in San 
Francisco in 2002. The National Center for Transgender Equality (NCTE) was founded in 2003 
and stated that its explicit goals were to advocate for “policy change[s] to advance transgender 
equality.”102 
By the end of the 2000s, legal discourses shifted direction as well. In 2008, Diane 
Schroer won her discrimination lawsuit against the Library of Congress after they withdrew a job 
offer to her after learning that she was a transwoman. According to the New York Times, “A 
federal District Court judge concluded that the Library of Congress was in violation of Title VII 
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of the Civil Rights Act.”103 2009 saw the first murder of a transperson labeled as a hate crime. By 
the 2010s, the visibility of transpeople had increased exponentially in social media, popular 
culture, and transpeople were serving in government offices across the nation. In 2010, President 
Obama even appointed a transwoman as the senior technical advisor in the Commerce 
Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security. Medical approaches to transgender health care 
had begun to shift as well. WPATH issued new standards of care in 2011 that provided more 
agency to transpeople regarding access to medical intervention. As of 2014, those who had 
Medicare were able to apply for coverage for transition-related surgeries.  
 Yet, despite these dramatic changes, as of 2016, transpeople, particularly transwomen of 
color, continue to face incredibly high rates of violence and incarceration. Smaller organizations 
continue to do the work fueled by similar frustrations with harassment and violence that ignited 
the acts of resistance at Dewey’s, Compton’s, and Stonewall. The Sylvia Rivera Law Project, 
founded in 2002 by Dean Spade, “works to guarantee that all people are free to self-determine 
their gender identity and expression, regardless of income or race, and without facing 
harassment, discrimination, or violence.” In addition, their work helps trans* and gender non-
conforming individuals access social, health, and legal services. The Transformative Justice Law 
Project, founded by Owen Daniel-McCarter and a collective of radical activists in 2008, provides 
legal advocacy to “folks of color, poor and street-based people, folks who have experienced 
incarceration or policing, folks living with HIV/AIDS, youth, immigrants, undocumented people, 
people with mental/physical disabilities, and folks who are in the sex trade and street 
economies.” There are dozens of other local organizations doing this work, fighting the effects of 
histories steeped in racism, ableism, and transphobia – where eugenics is not overtly present but 
still effects the material realities of trans* and gender non-conforming communities. These 
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organizations exist in part because of the ways in which discourses of racial justice, prison 
abolition, and disability activism continue to intersect and inform one another. 
 
Intersex Activism and its Discursive Connections to Transactivism (1976-2016) 
During these decades of transgender activism, advocates from intersex communities were 
also fighting for access to legal rights and affirming medical care. Intersex activism is 
historically and discursively connected to transactivism in large part due to they ways in which 
transsexualism, transvestism, and “hermaphroditism” were (and in same ways remain) co-
medically constitutive.104 The first official organization advocating for intersex individuals was 
the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA), founded by Cheryl Chase in 1992. She saw 
similarities between transgender advocacy and intersex advocacy. Before founding ISNA, Chase 
found community in Transgender Nation and among transwomen. She cites similarities among 
the ways in which both communities had been medicalized and pathologized. Both communities, 
she argues, are working to “assert agency within a medical discourse that works to efface the 
ability to exercise informed consent about what happens to one’s own body.”105 Some 
organizations explicitly acknowledged these connections: the National LGBTQ Task Force 
added intersex advocacy to their larger agenda in the 1990s, and in 1996, Transsexual Menace 
worked with a group calling themselves “Hermaphrodites with an Attitude” to protest the 
American Academy of Pediatrics meeting that was being held in Boston.  
 While transgender and intersex activists struggled to shape the medical, legal, and social 
discourses about medical intervention in ways that were more affirming for those attempting to 
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access (or reject) care, the discourses shaping the physicians approach remained in many ways 
unchanged since the 1930s. Physicians continued to dismiss claims to transgender identity as 
illegitimate, and in relation to intersex patients, physicians—much like the doctors of the 
twentieth century—refused to attend to the desires of intersex communities and activists. In 
addition, Chase notes that “more than one ISNA member has discovered that surgeons actually 
operated on their genitals at no charge,” in part because of their fascination with their ability to 
“change sex.” Surgeries for intersex bodies are often seen as necessary as well, with the 
physicians claiming the need “to rescue parents from their intersex children,” and they proceeded 
with what they declared to be “heroic interventions.”106 This unequal distribution of access to 
surgery reflects the discursive legacies from the twentieth century and the justifications for 
surgery many physicians used during that time. If any individual is intersex, surgery is desirable, 
even necessary, to “fix” nature’s “mistake. Transsexuals must navigate the complexities of 
diagnoses, standards of care, and financial access in order to obtain medical intervention, but 
even then they are sometimes denied care because it is not discursively constructed as “medically 
necessary” intervention. This logic and justification for who “requires” or “deserves” surgical 
intervention are all too familiar. 
 
Eugenics to Neoliberalism: The Legacies of Trans* Death (1970-2016) 
Despite the dramatic changes over the past sixty years, most transpeople still cannot 
access legal, medical, or other necessary services. More transwomen are being murdered and 
incarcerated everyday. This continues to be the case, in part, because the legacies of eugenic 
ideology and scientific racism continue to shape not only the discourse of gender non-
conformity, but also the institutions in which these discourses are situated. Certain iterations of 
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trans* embodiment are constructed as interesting, fascinating, or worth a more in-depth 
exploration by the popular media. Others who inhabit these subject positions continue to be cast 
as freaks, as deserving of the violence they encounter, or as not even worth mentioning. Much of 
this inequality is the result of the legacy of eugenics, as well as the ways in which this legacy set 
the stage for neoliberal economic and social policies that reflect eugenic ideologies and goals 
from the twentieth century.  
Since the 1970s, neoliberal economic practices have shaped governmental approaches to 
social services, consumerism, and has demanded an ethics that focuses solely on the market to 
the exclusion of all else. Harvey, in his work on neoliberalism, has argued that it has become 
“hegemonic as a mode of discourse.”107 Feminist scholar Wendy Brown explained that 
neoliberalism “involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social 
action, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player.”108 Cultural studies scholar Jules 
Wight argues that as an “ideological orientation,” neoliberalism and its adherents only 
acknowledge the decline of social welfare, increased problems of inequity and injustice, as well 
as the rise of suffering and class disparities through a lens of the marketplace. Each of these 
definitions build a picture of neoliberalism that, at its very core, is focused only on a market 
concerned with the acquisition of capital. If proponents of neoliberal economic policy can only 
see problems of inequity and injustice through the “lens of the marketplace,” their concern for 
those that are considered a “burden” on the state is most likely non-existent. Notions of profit 
and capital and the rhetoric used to support them are a continuation of the discourses and 
rhetorics of eugenicists from the early 20th century who claimed to be concerned about the “cost 
of the socially inadequate.”  
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The results of this lack of concern for those understood as “burdens” has far reaching 
results for many oppressed communities, including trans* communities. Medical, legal, and 
social institutions have failed, and continue to fail, to provide adequate care and support for 
transpeople – these inadequacies are well documented. This type of engagement, one 
characterized by a lack of concern, with trans* individuals by medical, legal, and social 
institutions demonstrates what Harvey has characterized as a:  
clear extension of market values to the detriment of other values that may have otherwise 
been more prominent, such as democratic representation and access, community action, 
social interventions, and political mobilization.109 
  
Trans* individuals experience incredible amounts of violence at the hands of both individuals 
and the state as a result of the devaluation of access, action, and intervention. 
Other scholars have uncovered specific manifestations of neoliberal influence in various 
realms of social services. Choices made for what services to provide for community and 
organizations, including non-profits, are made almost exclusively by funders interested in the 
marketplace and in a return on their investment. Because services are generally rendered onto 
identifiable demographics, those that can be identifiable as consumers, often this funding and the 
services enabled by it are linked to fixed notions of identity and terminology. Instead of allowing 
service providers to evolve quickly with terminology and shifting subjectivities, they are often 
forced to navigate tricky terrain or their clients are coerced into assuming identity terms that fail 
to describe who they understand themselves to be. David Valentine’s work Imagining 
Transgender focuses largely on this issue. He describes his work with an organization doing 
outreach to “transgender” communities despite the fact that many in the community being served 
do not actually identify with the term “transgender.” As one reviewer quipped, this work and the 
struggle to identify people as transgender “poke[s] fun at the paradoxes of identity categories 
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while clarifying the risks (in terms of care, recognition, and access to institutional power) of 
falling out of those categories.”110 Furthermore, Valentine argues that these attempts to 
“operationalize” transgender “perpetrate violence against excluded subjects (by flattening 
difference), but in their appeal to the state they ignore broader structural and, indeed, state-based 
violence.”111 While the path differs, the results of these economic and organizational policies that 
rely on the marketplace often are very similar to the results of eugenic policies in the first half of 
the 20th century.  
 Eugenicists claimed to be concerned with “bettering the race” and to “improve 
humanity.” They operated within discourses that shifted power in whatever form towards those 
who occupied white, heterosexual, cisgender, ablebodyminded, male subject positions. 
Neoliberal discourses, economic and otherwise, are interested in shifting power (read: capital) 
into the hands of these same individuals. While bettering the “white race” is not an explicit goal 
of these contemporary economic policies, it is well documented that the wealthiest benefit, and 
the poor become even poorer. Furthermore, as has been documented by numerous scholars, class 
is always raced, and is shaped by gender and ability; white, cis, ablebodyminded people continue 
to benefit from this system. As such, the results of both neoliberal and eugenic ideologies are 
shockingly similar. Both discourses advocate a withdrawal of social resources from people 
considered to be “burdens.” Both result in an increase in institutionalization of these “burdens” – 
although the form of that institutionalization has shifted from asylums to prisons.112 While there 
are always exceptions to these rules, where individuals with enough power or capital might be 
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temporarily exempt from being considered a “burden,” the discursive constructions of 
transpeople as “burdens” continues.  
  
From Activism to the Academy 
Recognizing and articulating the lasting impact of eugenics on contemporary 
terminology, diagnoses, and trans* activism is necessary in order to respond adequately to 
decades of violence and injustice. Movements that respond to these legacies in their advocacy 
strategies will more fully understand how we got here and why. Eugenic legacies continue to 
shape economic and governmental policies that result in the withdrawal of resources and access 
to services that too often result in the death of those inhabiting trans* subjectivities, but activist 
approaches that attend to the root causes of these inequalities will be better able to push back 
within these co-constitutive discourses. 
Competing discourses continue to shape the direction of transactivism as well as legal, 
medical, and social understandings of transgender, transsexual, and cross-dressing subjects. 
While some of the terminology has remained consistent, what it means to exist as a “transsexual” 
or “transgender” person has shifted and changed along with the discursive milieu from which 
these terms emerge. While major shifts in the discourse emerged from other activist and social 
justice discourses, the academy has also played a significant role in the directions not only of 
activism, but approaches to medical care and the ways in which trans* subjects are theorized. 





CHAPTER 5  
Disciplining Effects: Transgender Studies and the Legacies of Eugenics 
 
“[A]ll modern subjects are engaged in [a] process of disaggregation, reintegration, 
refinement, and education of the self… the categories we live by—must live by have 
histories, politics, and economies and produce effects that can be as  
debilitating for some as they can be liberating for others.” 
-David Valentine, 2007 
 
Reclaiming and Theorizing our Own Bodies 
 The counter-discourses emerging from transactivist communities began to move into 
academic institutions in the United States during the late 1980s. This development is evidenced 
by the growth in transgender scholarship within interdisciplinary fields like women’s studies, but 
also through the establishment of transgender studies (TS) as a field in its own right by the mid-
1990s. As transgender studies scholars Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle note, “the work of 
trans activists and trans academics has always been linked,” in large part because some of the 
first academic pieces considered to be part of transgender studies were written by transactivists.1 
Many of the discourses within activist communities challenged the pathologization of 
transsexuality, transvestism, and transgender embodiment, and these debates took shape in the 
academy, drawing upon theories and methods from across the humanities, but especially from 
                                                
1 Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle, The Transgender Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 2006). xii. It is 
important to note that throughout this chapter I will cite many activists and scholars, but Susan Stryker will 
dominate the citation list. Stryker has been a leading voice in the academy and has written extensively about 
transgender activism, history, and theory. Stryker has shaped the field of transgender studies and her publications 
have shaped the discourse of “transgender” in the last two decades. As of this writing, she is an Associate Professor 
of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of Arizona. In addition, she is the director of the Institute for 
LGBT Studies, co-editor of the first academic journal dedicated to transgender studies Transgender Studies 
Quarterly (TSQ), and has spoken extensively to both academic and community groups about her research and 
transgender concepts more broadly. As one of the top scholars in the field, she has also paved the way for 
transgender studies as an interdisciplinary field, helping to create the first faculty hires in transgender studies, as 
well as helping to elevate the status and legitimacy of the field in the academy through venues like TSQ. I do not 
believe that it is just by mere coincidence, however, that Stryker is a white transwoman rather than a transwoman of 
color. I am in no way indicating that her scholarly contributions are less important because of that. In fact, Stryker 
has used her position of privilege to create space for trans* voices of color, both inside the academy and in activist 
circles. However, her perspectives and experiences are fundamentally different than transwomen and men of color, 
which undoubtedly influences what is possible in terms of her scholarship, its reach, and whose voices dominate the 
discourse.  
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feminism and queer theory.2 Until the early 1990s, what little scholarship existed about 
transgender subjectivities had as its primary concern the pathologization and medicalization of 
transsexualism, and most often the reification of both. In the introduction to the first Transgender 
Studies Reader, Stephen Whittle characterized the shift that occurred in the early 1990s:  
New scholarship, informed by community activism, started from the premise that to be 
trans was not to have a mental or medical disorder. This fundamental shift was built upon 
within academia, and enabled trans men and women to reclaim the reality of their bodies, 
to create with them what they would, and to leave the linguistic determination of those 
bodies open to exploration and invention. To this extent, trans studies is a true linking of 
feminist and queer theory.3  
 
That some scholarship within the field “started from the premise that to be trans was not to have 
a mental or medical disorder” speaks to an important move to distance trans subjects from 
pathologization. However, this move often relied on differentiating diagnoses of gender non-
conformity from psychiatric disability and entailed ableist language that framed psychiatric 
disability as pathological. The need for transgender studies scholars to reframe language around 
psychiatric disabilities and able-mindedness will be discussed more below, but coalitions among 
disability and transgender activists and scholars would push these conversations forward over the 
next several decades.4  
In this chapter, I will trace the emergence of the academic and activist discourses that 
allowed for transgender studies (TS) as a field to emerge in the early 1990s. The context of its 
emergence shaped TS and helped to define some of its objects of study. After highlighting some 
directions the field has taken and the functions it has served for transpeople in the academy, I 
                                                
2 TS emerged with significant influence from women’s studies and queer studies, two fields that helped to shift 
identity knowledge discourse to thinking beyond “identity” as the limiter of their scholarly work and instead towards 
larger analyses of power within discourse and how subject positions, like “trans,” are constructed.  
3 Stryker and Whittle, The Transgender Studies Reader. xii. 
4 See: Eli Clare, "Body Shame, Body Pride: Lessons from the Disability Rights Movement," in The Transgender 
Studies Reader 2, ed. Susan Stryker and Aren Z. Aizura (New York Routledge, 2013). Ashley Mog and Amanda 
Lock Swarr, "Threads of Commonality in Transgender and Disability Studies," Disability Studies Quarterly 28, no. 
4 (2008). 
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will demonstrate several ways that eugenics continues to shape not only transgender studies but 
the medical and political discourses with which the field is continually engaged. A century-long 
history of transsexual and transvestite diagnoses, identities, subject positions, and self-making 
steeped in eugenic, racist, and ableist ideologies continues to affect transgender studies. 
Recognizing the co-constitutive work of the diagnosis alongside practices of self-making must be 
a part of the discourses within transgender studies today. Eugenics cannot be ignored because of 
how discursively intertwined with the emergence of the very categories that, in part, constitute 
the field’s existence. Transgender studies must engage eugenic ideology and its ongoing role in 
the construction of trans* subjectivities in the twenty-first century.  
 
Transgender Studies and the Limitations of Identity 
Transgender studies emerged in the 1990s as a distinct field based on an identity, but also 
as a field critically engaged with the shifting discourses of identity, post-structuralism, and 
subject formation; transgender studies from the beginning included questions well beyond that of 
identity. As a field of study often categorized as an identity field, though, some of the limitations 
of the field are linked to the very notion of “identity.” Identity, as a basis for a field or discipline, 
can limit the discursive possibilities within that field or discipline. Categories of identity, while 
liberating for some as a practice of self-making, are always also other-making. “Transgender” 
functions as an identity, but also as a phenomenon, one that is anything but stable.  
It is important, though, to consider the role identity plays in a field called “transgender” 
studies. The question is less about “what makes one identity field different from the others” or a 
question like “what is transgender studies about.” Our line of inquiry should instead focus on 
what Kandice Chuh has identified as the “specific historicities” of academic fields, historicities 
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that shape and define the “priorities and paradigms and pedagogies of each” interdisciplinary 
field. Attending to these historicities will illuminate the relationship among identity knowledges 
within institutions of higher education. Tracing these historicities will also provide insight into 
what Chuh notes is the “compartmentalization of knowledge that is the architecture of the 
normative and normativizing university.”5  
Disciplines function as “mechanisms of control” where “scientific rationalism becomes 
the privileged means… of producing knowledge,” but they also determine “what counts as 
knowledge” or expertise. Chuh connects these mechanisms of control to the very rationalities 
that “produced racial, sex, gender, and class difference among others as, variously, unhuman, 
savage, pathological, and incompetent.”6 The effects of this disciplining, too often, is that the 
knowledge and expertise that is considered legitimate relies on the very epistemologies that, as 
she argues, “racialize as a mechanism of producing and sustaining inequality, deprioritize 
nonempiricist methods, and/or reproduce patriarchal heteronormativity—that is, arguably exactly 
those rationalities that contemporary politically engaged knowledge practices intend to 
dismantle.”7 In other words, the partitioning of knowledges and its attendant results and 
rationalities are often the very things that interdisciplinary fields, like transgender studies, work 
to dismantle. The question remains, though: To what degree is TS now engaging in these 
practices, and with what discourses is the field engaging in order to work against these 
partitioning tendencies?8  
Beyond the subject position of “transgender,” tracing the interaction between various 
discursive fields that led to the emergence of transgender studies reveals how, as an 
                                                
5 Kandice Chuh, "It's Not About Anything," Social Text 32, no. 4 (2014). 128. 




interdisciplinary field, it offers a space for possibilities in thinking not only through “trans*” as 
an analytic, but also as a subject position. It also allows for study of the ways in which notions of 
gender and gender “deviance” have emerged and evolved through discourse over the past 
century. The discourses TS engages are informed by historical forces like eugenics. Eugenics, 
because of how embedded it is in the histories of these discourses, continues to shape the 
hierarchies—even if the new hierarchies are a response to the original diagnoses and to scientific 
racism and eugenic ideologies. It is necessary to actively reckon with these histories and the 
various ways in which they manifested in the lives of individuals, and we must continue to 
engage them to more fully understand and – moving forward –influence their lasting effects in 
ways that make lives more livable for those who inhabit trans* subject positions.  
 
Feminism, Transphobia, & Women’s Studies 
A major factor that spurred the emergence of a new field in the 1990s was the years of 
exclusion and dismissal of transpeople from within feminist discourse both inside and outside the 
academy. This is not to dismiss the impact WS had and continues to have on TS and its 
trajectory. While transgender studies would be shaped most notably by questions of gender non-
conformity and its embodiment, other identity fields – although separate and distinct from TS – 
would help define its lines of inquiry. In fact, feminist scholar Gayle Salamon argues that trans 
studies would be unable to “understand gender as a historical category” without the work of 
feminist scholars from the 1970s, 80s, and 90s.9 However, she also acknowledges that 
historically, feminism has not engaged in satisfactory ways with the emergence and evolution of 
nonnormative genders.  
                                                
9 Gayle Salamon, "Transfeminism and the Future of Gender," in Women's Studies on the Edge, ed. Joan Wallach 
Scott (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 115-116. 
 223 
 One text in particular – mentioned in chapter four – that engaged the concept of 
nonnormative genders incited a number of academic and popular responses. First published in 
1979, feminist Janice Raymond’s now infamous polemic against transsexuals, The Transsexual 
Empire: The Making of the She-Male, instigated a rise of scholarship about transsexuality. 
Raymond argued for the outright rejection of “male-to-constructed-females” from feminist 
circles.10⁠ Raymond quickly dismissed any transsexual desire (particularly the desire to identify as 
a lesbian), arguing that it was nothing more than dissatisfaction with the current sex-role 
system.11 She concluded her polemic arguing, “transsexualism would best be served by morally 
mandating it out of existence.”12 Transsexual Empire was, and remains, a well-known text by 
scholars in Transgender and Women’s Studies.  
 One of the first responses to emerge from the trans community was an essay written by 
transwoman Carol Riddell in 1980. The essay, “Divided Sisterhood,” has been characterized by 
scholars in TS as an early example of transgender feminism. Riddell is unabashed in her critique 
of Raymond, claiming that Raymond, rather than transsexuals, reified the patriarchy with her 
faulty and exclusive logic and that Raymond caused divisions among feminists by dictating who 
could and could not be a woman. She takes Raymond to task for her faulty methods, arguing that 
“Ms. Raymond’s method… uncritically accepts the male academic establishment’s separation of 
personal feelings and factual presentation.”13 Towards the end of her response, Riddell discusses 
the implications of Raymond’s arguments for the feminist movement:  
The denial of female experience in the name of ideological purity is not a product of, nor 
a contribution to, feminist culture. As trans-sexual women, we must claim the integrity of 
                                                
10 Janice G. Raymond, The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979). x, xvii. 
Raymond also uses the term “man-made ‘she-males.’”  
11 Talia Mae Bettcher, "Feminist Persepctives on Trans Issues," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
N. Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-trans/: Stanford University, 2014). 
12 Raymond, The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male. 178, emphasis mine. 
13 Carol Riddell, "Divided Sisterhood: A Critical Review of Janice Raymond's the Transsexual Empire," in The 
Transgender Studies Reader, ed. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle (New York: Routledge, 2006). 150. 
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our own life experience, and other women who know us, are also asserting that their right 
to their own experience is fundamental. When we have to assert this right against other 
women, for whatever reason, confusion reigns, and patriarchy gains. Following the 
dogmatists will come the enforcers of the “law.”14 
 
Riddell identifies the repercussions of a feminist dogmatism that excludes transwomen and 
connects it to larger systems of discrimination and oppression.  
 The publication of Raymond’s book in 1979 and Riddell’s response occurred alongside a 
wave of feminist scholarship engaging in questions concerning the concept and subject position 
of “woman.” Women’s Studies (WS) emerged in the 1960s, with the first courses being offered 
at several institutions across the nation.15 As WS grew and established itself in the academic 
world as a legitimate field over the next several decades, one of the many critical issues that have 
shaped the debates concerning the development of the discipline is the category “woman” as a 
basis for the discipline – how is it defined, how do we understand the term “woman,” and who 
can claim to be a woman?  
Feminist theory and writing for many years was synonymous with feminist activist theory 
and writing. That women’s studies as a field emerged from within activist movements and was 
shaped by activist discourse is a reality that continues to shape the field and its object of study. 
For example, an early text written by Black feminist Cellestine Ware in 1970, Women Power, 
was an early analysis of intersectional oppression. While the term “intersectionality” would not 
emerge until Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term in the late 1980s, Black feminist thought 
would be shaped by texts like Ware’s. An interdisciplinary field emerging from within activist 
communities and discourses would set a precedent for the emergence of transgender studies in 
the 1990s. 
                                                
14 Ibid. 158. 
15 While I recognize that many departments and programs might use different names, I will us WS throughout to 
reference women’s studies departments and programs.  
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The most pressing theoretical issue for many feminists in the academy during the 1980s 
was the definition of “woman,” both inside and outside of the academy. Linda Alcoff 
summarized the concerns posed by differing conceptions of “woman.”  She argues that this 
problem stemmed from the fact that “woman” remained a “central concept for feminists 
because… it is the necessary point of departure for any feminist theory and feminist politics.”16 
However, it was a problematic concept because “it is crowded with the overdeterminations of 
male supremacy, invoking in every formulation the limit, contrasting Other, or mediated self-
reflection of a culture built on the control of females.”17 Too often, she argues, feminists 
assumed to know exactly what women were or how to define the term the source of these 
knowledges were always already emerging from misogynist and sexist discourses. These 
questions over how to define “woman” would prove central to debates about the inclusion of 
transpeople, and transwomen in particular, in feminist circles and in WS more broadly.  
 For many activist, academic, and scholar-activist feminists in the early 1980s, reclaiming 
the exclusive right to define women was a radical move – it symbolized a reclaiming of power 
for women in the feminist movement. Women defining women, rather than men defining 
women, led many feminists to articulate an essentialness to womanhood, one that often reframed 
masculinist characterizations of women. Women’s passivity, for example, was instead an 
inherent disposition to peacefulness, and sentimentality her “proclivity to nature.”18 Some, like 
Adrienne Rich, wanted this renewed focus on women and femaleness. Not all feminists, though, 
had been or were essentializing ideas of what it meant to be a woman. 
                                                
16 Linda Alcoff, "Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory," Signs 13, 
no. 3 (1988). 405. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 407. Mary Daly believed that because men could not reproduce, women and specifically the “female 
spirit/body” became the “primary target in [a] perpetual war of aggression against life.” Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology : 
The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990). 355. 
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 The work of feminists with a racial analysis of feminism leading up to and during this 
time, for example Cherríe Moraga, Gloria Anzaldúa, and Elizabeth Spelman, reflected a more 
complex and nuanced approach to theorizing the concept of “woman.” Moraga, for example, 
acknowledged that “when you start to talk about sexism, the world becomes increasingly 
complex... power no longer breaks down into neat little hierarchical categories [where] the 
enemy is not easy to name.”19 Responding to the essentialism permeating dominant discourses of 
gender, she occupied a counter-discursive position that refused the notion that “woman” could be 
defined once and for all because race and class would always complicated its definition. 
Moraga’s insights, her engagement with WS, and response of both white feminist scholars and 
feminists scholars of color reflected ongoing counterdiscourses from within the field concerning 
approaches to theorizing “women” and intersections of gender and race.20 The push to expand 
not only feminist analysis but to consider and include a variety of experiences by women not 
previously discussed in the academy shifted the discursive approach not only in content but also 
in method. Rather than “adding in” other women’s experiences, feminist authors called for a 
                                                
19 Cherrie Moraga, "From a Long Line of Vendidas: Chicanas and Feminism," in Feminist Studies/Critical Studies, 
ed. Teresa de Lauretis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). 180. 
20 Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga published what some feminist scholars believe was one of the most notable 
feminist texts of the 1980s: This Bridge Called My Back. Feminist scholar Jennifer Pierce, considering the 
interventions within feminist thinking that set the stage for this test, characterized it as a text wherein the writers 
challenged white feminists to analyze how the “very nature and structure of the[ir] group may be founded on racist 
and classist assumptions which preclude the involvement of Third World women.” In their 1981 introduction, they 
frame the project as one that “began as a reaction to the racism of white feminists,” but that it “soon became a 
positive affirmation of the commitment of women of color to our own feminism.” The six sections of the book 
engaged in issues of visibility, feminist political theory, racism, divisions among women of color based on class, 
culture, and sexuality, the ways in which writing can be used as s tool for revolution, and the “ways and means of a 
Third World feminist future.” This Bridge is evidence of a shift in some feminist approaches to thinking about race 
and colonialism at the intersection of gender. Not only was the book intended to document the oppression 
experienced specifically by women of color, but also to serve as a book to be used in the classroom, as a book that 
functioned “as a consciousness-raiser for white women… working… on the issues of racism.” The vision of the 
authors is prescient in a way only a few early feminist texts were – they envisioned a feminist movement that 
earnestly engaged not only issues of race, but a movement that would “feel at home” for “the colored, the queer, the 
poor, the female, the physically challenged.” Jennifer Pierce, "Review of This Bridge Called My Back," Berkeley 
Journal of Sociology 27 (1982). 179. Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, "Introduction, 1981," in This Bridge 
Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, ed. Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa (Berkeley: Third 
Woman Press, 2002). lii, lvi. "El Mundo Curdo: The Vision," in This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical 
Women of Color, ed. Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa (Berkeley: Third Woman Press, 2002). 218. 
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fundamentally different consideration of how approaches to feminism must attend to racism, 
ableism, classism, and heterosexism, setting the stage for an approach that would later open itself 
to a consideration of cissexism and transphobia.21  
 The emergence of post-structuralist thought and its influence on theoretical approaches to 
identity marked another important shift in WS. Alcoff argues that post-structuralist methods 
were able to respond to the failure of some feminists to “criticize the fundamental mechanism of 
oppressive power used to perpetuate sexism,” where the mechanism is “the construction of the 
subject by a discourse…that operates within a “coercive structure.”22 While post-structuralist 
thinkers varied greatly in their understanding of social construction, one consistent belief was 
that the subject was not a “locus of authorial intentions,” but instead a subject created within 
discourse without any essential core or naturalness. Using a poststructuralist approach, woman, 
instead of naming an essential “female spirit/body” was instead a fiction created in discourse, 
and many feminists adhered to this notion. In 1981, for example, French feminist thinker Julia 
Kristeva argued that “a woman cannot be.”23 Some feminists, though, argued that the space 
created by essentialism offered a starting point for a more inclusive, complex, and nuanced 
approach to defining “woman.” Biddy Martin observed that “the assertion even of a fiction of the 
unity of woman… has created a space for us from which to interpret as well as to speak.”24 
Rather than continue to simplify “woman,” the task was instead to “deconstruct,” to “refuse to be 
content with fixed identities or to universalize ourselves as revolutionary subjects.”25 This 
approach would be necessary in order to avoid taking the concept of post-structuralism to the 
                                                
21 This Bridge, while generally considered a foundational text, continues to be engaged in a perfunctory way by 
feminist scholars who understand race and racism to be secondary to sexism and sexist oppression.  
22 Alcoff, "Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory." 415. 
23 Julia Kristeva, "Woman Can Never Be Defined," in New French Feminisms, ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de 
Courtivron (New York: Schocken, 1981). 137. 
24 Biddy Martin, Femininity Played Straight: The Significance of Being Lesbian (New York: Routledge, 1996). 16. 
25 Ibid. 
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extreme and divest from the material consequences of sexism, which would make the “question 
of women’s oppression obsolete.”26 
This poststructuralist discourse is also evidenced by the ways in which connections were 
being drawn between essentialism, racism, and sexism. Elizabeth Spelman critiqued essentialism 
alongside racist notions of “woman.” Spelman’s book Inessential Woman, published in 1990, 
reflected the growing critique surrounding essentialist understandings of “woman” that emerged 
from cultural feminist theorizing – the notion that “underneath or beyond the differences among 
women there must be some shared identity—as if commonality were a metaphysical given.”27 
Beyond arguing that not all women necessarily have some feature in common with others, her 
work highlighted the inseparability of gender from other aspects of identity like race and class. 
This idea is laid out clearly in the introduction:  
The woman in every woman is a woman just like me, and if I also assume that there is no 
difference between being white and being a woman, then seeing another woman ‘as a 
woman’ will involve seeing her as fundamentally like the woman I am. In other words, 
the womanness underneath the Black woman’s skin is a white woman’s.28  
 
Reflecting the shifting epistemologies concerning gender, she asserts that gender is culturally 
and historically specific and also “constructed and defined in conjunction with elements of 
identity such as race, class, ethnicity, and nationality.”29 Spelman’s insights, along with other 
feminist scholars using an intersectional and anti-colonialist lens, were evidence of the shifting 
discourses within the academy that paved a path for not only more intersectional feminist 
analysis, but also provided space for transwomen to claim womanhood and for feminists in 
                                                
26 Ibid. 17. 
27 Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1988). 13. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 175. Feminist philosopher Iris Marion Young argued that Spelman’s work critiques the very starting point of 
most feminist engagements with the concept of woman: “feminism… is about understanding the oppression women 
suffer as women [and] studying this oppression seems simplest by looking at the situation of women whose lives are 
uncomplicated by oppressions other than sexism.” Iris Marion Young, "Review of Inessential Woman," Ethics 100, 
no. 4 (1990). 899. 
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general to reject essentialist notions of “woman” espoused by individuals like Janice Raymond. 
While much of the feminist scholarship emerging from within the academy was transformed by 
these early debates, some scholars failed to account for these intersections, reflecting the 
negative aspects of situating ourselves in distinct and separate identity fields that sometimes 
preclude a consideration of subjectivity beyond “women.” 
It was during this time that WS as a field also began to shift its focus from exclusively 
“women” to instead focusing more largely on “gender.” Joan Scott’s foundational 1986 essay 
“Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” was evidence of a new generation of 
scholarship that was beginning to emerge from the intersections of traditional academic 
discourses and discourses concerning gender, sexism, and the role of women in history and 
culture.30 Scott engaged feminist theoretical tools to interrogate “woman” and gender more 
broadly as a “primary field within which or by means of which power is articulated,” arguing 
that “gender is implicated in the conception and deconstruction of power itself.”31 Another 
indication of these shifts was Judith Butler’s 1990 book Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity, a text that fundamentally interrogated not only the fluidity of gender, but 
questioned the fixedness of sex as a category of being.32 These two texts, along with many 
others, utilized the shifting discourse concerning women and gender in WS departments.33 
However, they posed particular challenges to what many understand to be the founding category 
and reason for WS existence within the academy: women. Gender, some might argue, displaced 
                                                
30 Joan W. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," The American Historical Review 91, no. 5 
(1986). 
31 Ibid. 1067-8. 
32 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
33 A few influential texts are Gayle Rubin, "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality," 
in The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, ed. Michele Aina Barale Henry Abelove, David Halperin (New York: 
Routledge, 1993). Adrienne Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence," Signs 5, no. 4 (1980)., 
Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman, "Doing Gender," Gender & Society 1, no. 2 (1987). Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
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the importance of focusing on women as a gender category and of the ways in which women 
need to retain a certain amount of focus and attention. 
 Feminist Wendy Brown engages these concerns, recognizing the importance of the 
question “what constitutes fundamental knowledge in WS?”34 As WS shifted its focus, the 
discipline accommodated inquiries that engage the category “gender” rather than “woman,” and 
used theory that “destabilizes the category of woman, racial formations that disrupt the unity or 
primacy of the category, and sexualities that similarly blur the solidarity of the category” of 
“woman.”35 Brown argues that some feminist scholars are particularly committed to a category 
of “woman” that affect efforts to resist, restrict, and even colonize the term “woman” in order to 
preserve it as a stable category.36 For Brown, the embracing of “gender” does not function as an 
erasure of “women” or feminism. Rather, it would function within discourse as one way to 
“radically reconfigure WS programs without sacrificing the feminism they promulgate among 
students,”37 a place where the future of WS moves beyond “simplistic” and homogenous 
understandings of both women and the basis of feminism as a mode of inquiry within the 
Academy.38  
It was at this same time that LGBT Studies and Queer theory began to emerge as separate 
spheres of knowledge production. In the 1980s, LGBT studies became a field that focused on the 
lesbian and gay rights movement and was based largely in the social sciences. Queer theory, 
emerging around the 1990s, aligned itself more with poststructuralist theory and philosophies. 
                                                
34 Wendy Brown, "The Impossibility of Women's Studies," in Women's Studies on the Edge, ed. Joan Scott 
(Durham: Duke Unversity Press, 2008). 20. 
35 Ibid. 21. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Young, "Review of Inessential Woman." 35. 
38 This shift would affect not only the discourses of women and gender, but even the very names of departments – 
many WS departments would change their name to incorporate “gender” and even “sexuality.” These name changes 
that were, and continue to be, hotly debated, as the name of a department reflects, and can help define, the 
boundaries of where the department focuses its academic inquiries. 
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Discussing both fields, David Lee Carlson summarizes the difference between the their 
methodologies: “LGBT studies relies on rational and  scientific research methodologies while 
queer theory employs postmodern  critiques of essentialism and determinism.”39 Where LGBT 
studies relied on identity as a central concept, queer theory tapped into poststructuralist 
understandings of discourse and subjects created within discourse, rather than identity as an 
agential and self-contained notion.  
 It is within this context and shifts in the academy, and women’s studies in particular, that 
Sandy Stone wrote the most well-known response to Raymond’s polemic, “The Empire Strikes 
Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto” in 1988.40 This essay, often credited for inaugurating the 
field of transgender studies, created a space for discussions about gender and transsexualism as 
genres of being, rather than a fundamental essence of who one might be. Stone connected 
colonial discourse and rhetoric to existing concepts of transsexuality, and argued that just as 
women had been theorized by men, so too were transwomen theorized by ciswomen. When she 
examined and compared scholarship about women and transwomen, she saw that:  
as with genetic women, transsexuals are infantilized, considered too illogical or 
irresponsible to achieve true subjectivity, or clinically erased by diagnostic 
criteria; or else, as constructed by some radical feminist theorists, as robots of an 
insidious and menacing patriarchy.41  
 
Stone, however, discussed how difficult it was to generate a counter-discourse when transwomen 
were being dismissed as women and therefore their voices were dismissed as illegitimate and 
unable to express an authentic experience.42 Furthermore, as Stone argued, “it is difficult to 
                                                
39 David Lee Carlson, "Postqueer? Examining Tensions between Lgbt Studies and Queer Theory: A Review of Lbgt 
Studies and Queer Theory," Journal of LGBT Youth 11 (2014). 1. 
40 Sandy Stone, "The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto," Camera Obscura 12, no. 2 29 (1992). 
This essay was first presented as a conference paper in 1988 at ““Other Voices, Other Worlds: Questioning Gender 
and Ethnicity,” in Santa Cruz, CA. It was later published in Body Guards: The cultural Politics of Gender 
Ambiguity, eds. Kristina Straub and Julia Epstein,(New York: Routledge) in 1991. 
41 Ibid. 163. 
42 Stryker claims that in its most radical iteration, transgender studies offers a “critique of the reproduction of 
 232 
generate a counter-discourse if one is programmed to disappear.”43 She articulated a specific 
experience of oppression for transsexuals, and offered the notion of transsexuals as a “genre – a 
set of embodied texts whose potential for productive disruption of structured sexualities and 
spectra of desire has yet to be explored.”44 Stone was expanding the possibilities not only for 
transsexual subjectivities, but also for gender more broadly.  
 
The Emergence of Transgender Studies 
Following the publication of Stone’s essay, transgender studies began to take shape as a 
rapidly changing field – one that emerged and evolved to reflect the changing landscape of trans, 
intersex, and queer politics. Susan Stryker, in her introduction to the transgender issue of GLQ, 
acknowledges that perhaps the single most impactful piece of scholarship that helped to shape 
transgender studies as a field was Stone’s essay, one she characterized as “a rejoinder to Janice 
Raymond’s polemic against the concept of transsexualism itself.”45 Beyond this essay, though, 
Stryker identifies two key factors that led to the increased attention to transgender phenomena in 
the academy: 1) the growing impact of postmodernism and the ways in which “‘transgender 
phenomena’ emerge from and bear witness to the epistemological rift between gender signifiers 
and their signifieds” where the significance of the signifier “gender” not referencing a signified 
“sex” in the way most would assume, and 2) the inability to avoid encountering individuals who 
                                                                                                                                                       
normativities,” and political movements that utilize them to secure “greater access to citizenship” for those who 
embody these norms. There are generally agreements about what makes a “man” a man and a “woman” a woman, 
and transgender studies puts pressure on that tacit agreement.” It was this tacit agreement that made Jorgensen a 
spectacle, because of what so many understood as her mimicry of heterosexual white womanhood. Her mimicry, 
though, also highlights the very instability of the categories she embodied. Jorgensen ability to “pass,” called into 
question the very stability of a white, heterosexual womanhood so often thought to be stable and “authentic. Her 
difference was titillating, but her familiarity was unsettling. Susan Stryker, interview by Petra Dierkes-Thrun, 20 
August 2014. 
43 Stone, "The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto." 165. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Susan Stryker, "The Transgender Issue: An Introduction," GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian & Gay Studies 4, no. 2 
(1998). 
 233 
claim transgender or gender non-conforming identity – and identity that she argues was caused in 
part by “the global, grass-roots transgender political mobilization of the 1990s, which has made 
living a transgendered [sic] life more socially feasible.”46 This increased attention, instead of 
being incorporated into existing identity fields, led to the creation of a field where transgender 
phenomena could be the focus.  
 Considering the previous 100 years of discourse concerning transsexual, transvestite, and 
transgender subjectivity and diagnoses, it was groundbreaking for transgender people to not only 
shape the discourse from their own positions, but to respond directly to, and against, the ways in 
which they had been pathologized. TS scholar Talia Mae Bettcher characterized these responses 
as “the coming-to-voice of (some) trans people who have long been the researched objects of 
sexology, psychiatry, psycho- analysis, and (non-trans) feminist theory.”47 TS was becoming a 
space where, unlike in Raymond’s worldview, transgender subjects fought back against the 
mechanisms that programmed them to disappear.48 
 An important move in relation to transgender subjectivities was the field’s focus on 
experiential knowledge. Where sexologists had for decades dismissed the validity of transvestite 
and transsexual experience, this experience is where much TS scholarship was grounded. Henry 
Rubin argued in 1998 that transgender studies should reclaim and focus on phenomenology as a 
method of and for transgender studies, a method that he believed could “return legitimacy to the 
knowledges generated by the experiencing ‘I.’”49 Regardless of the method or approach to 
scholarship, scholars began to take seriously the embodied experience of those claiming a 
transgender or gender-variant identity. This serious consideration of experience proved to be 
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transformative and allowed counterdiscourses of transgender subjectivity to emerge from within 
the field of TS, counterdiscourses not rooted in pathology. 
The field not only provided space for experiential knowledge to be taken seriously, it also 
allowed scholars to directly challenge the discursive construction of “trans” as always already 
subject to the “expertise” of medical professionals. James Nelson in 1998 asked these questions: 
“Ought physicians have the authority to legitimate or block people’s attempts to change their 
sex? Should the standards that govern such decisions be socially mediated?”50 Allowing for a 
space to question the role and power exerted by physicians, scholars engaged medical discourse 
in ways that challenged it from within an institutional space. Not only was the discourse within 
the academy challenging medical authority, it was also helping to reframe how transpeople 
conceived of their own subject positions. Transgender studies, though, benefited from the 
expertise emerging from women’s studies and queer theory; as the field began to claim a space in 
the academy, TS scholars were already involved in discourses framing bodies and identities not 
as natural or with a predetermined politics but as constructed and shaped by discourse.  
 By the end of the 1990s, transgender studies could lay claim a number of disciplinary 
scholars from sociology, political science, English, LGBT studies, history, and queer studies 
under its interdisciplinary umbrella, and was at a precipice that would result in exponential 
growth of scholarship, theorizing, and movement over the next decade. The challenge that faced 
those in the field was one that feminists were grappling with as well: “Was the basis of gender 
identity essential and biologically based, or is it socially constructed?”51 This question recalls 
eugenic discourses of the early 20th century, discourses that shaped approaches to etiology by 
both eugenicists and sexologists and their search for the origins of transvestism and 
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transsexuality. However, TS approaches to this question differed greatly because, rather than 
extending the research agenda of sexologists and medical professionals that understood 
“transgender phenomena as appropriate targets of medical, legal, and psychotherapeutic 
intervention,” TS challenges this regime of knowledge and utilizes critical theories from across 
the academy.52 This work was important and even transformative for many transpeople and 
communities. However, just as so many identity fields struggled with accounting for race (WS, 
for example), or disability, or sexuality, or transnational perspectives, so too did transgender 
studies.  
In 2006, Stryker, along with Stephen Whittle, edited the first Transgender Studies 
Reader, a text that marked a milestone in the field. The fifty essays, not including Whittle’s 
foreword and Stryker’s introduction, spanned over 100 years of writing. Included were original 
writings by the early sexologists who helped create transvestite and transsexual diagnoses, essays 
on feminist analysis of transgender subject positions and the implications of these subject 
position for feminism (including both supportive and dismissive perspectives), queering gender, 
trans-identities and trans-communities, masculinity, embodiment, and finally essays focused on 
the intersections of gender, nationality, and race. In the second iteration of this text, Stryker and 
Aizura look back on this reader as a text that was able to “definitively mark out a place for a 
transgender studies within the academy.”53 Transgender studies scholars Talia Bettcher and Ann 
Garry recognized the publication of this reader as “evidence of the remarkable growth of trans 
studies—its ‘coming of age.’”54 Transgender studies scholar Bobby Noble also hails this reader 
as groundbreaking, but recognizes that it should not go without critique. He highlights the fact 
that the Reader “tells the singular story of a subject emerging only through dominant Western 
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frameworks.”55 Just as Western frameworks of race, normality, and identity shaped the evolution 
of transvestite, transsexual, and transgender diagnoses throughout the 20th century, these 
frameworks continued to haunt the development of a field that came about, in part, to disrupt 
those very frameworks.  
 Beyond the limitations of a very U.S.-centric field, Noble also highlights a need to create 
space for subjugated knowledges and narratives, knowledges and narratives that have been 
suppressed or dismissed as illegitimate, from within trans* communities. From his vantage point, 
he has observed “epistemologies that are repeating themselves across social movements as they 
travel inside academic knowledge production” which results in only some of the transpeople’s 
lived realities “being heard, codified, acknowledged, and theorized even as, wittingly or 
otherwise, these same knowledges have the effect of subjugating other knowledges to those of 
imperial, sexual, and racialized hegemonies.”56 He acknowledges the usefulness of the reader, 
but frames it as an “important, albeit double-edge work documenting counterdiscursive 
knowledge production.”57 In spite of its drawbacks and limitations, the Transgender Studies 
Reader signified an achievement for the field, one that would help legitimate transgender studies 
as an interdisciplinary field in its own right.  
 The second Transgender Studies Reader, mentioned above, was published in 2013 with 
Stryker and Aren Aizura as editors. In the seven years between the first and second volume, the 
field grew exponentially. In their assessment of the first volume, Stryker and Aizura 
acknowledge its limitations, and characterize the reader as “an account of field formation.”58 
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Reflecting the current cultural context of neoliberalism, militarization, increased state 
surveillance, and the emergence of “transgender normativity,” the second reader “takes critical 
aim at such developments.” The authors in the second reader often critique the inadequacies of 
the first in order to, according to Stryker and Aizura, “tak[e] aim at its implicit whiteness, U.S.-
centricity, Anglophone bias, and the sometimes suspect ways in which the category transgender 
has been circulated transnationally.”59 While remaining cognizant of the history and emergence 
of the field, this reader engages new developments within the field that occurred since its 
inception.  
 As with the struggle of feminism to define “woman,” scholars in transgender studies have 
struggled with “transgender” as a term that defines both the field as well as its analytical focus. 
As with the emergence of different terminology over the twentieth century to describe and 
diagnose gender non-conformity, terminology emerged from within activists and scholarly 
communities that attempted to name the evolving meaning of “transgender.” Stryker and Aizura 
link this evolution to the emergence of the field, arguing that among the many goals of 
transgender studies, one central goal is “an effort to account for the profound shifts in culture, 
society, and political economy that are indexed by transgender’s dramatic emergence and rapid 
dissemination more than two decades ago.”60 They caution scholars to attend to the possibility of 
“transgender” becoming static and conservative, of signifying “specific ways of being in the 
world,” rather than remaining malleable. They also urge scholars in the field to articulate “new 
modes of embodied subjectivity, new cultural practices, and new ways of understanding the 
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world, rather than becoming an enclosure for their containment.”61 With the field becoming more 
institutionalized (two readers for the field, a new journal, faculty lines in transgender studies), 
the field risks what Stryker and Aizura see as a “kind of theoretical imperialism that masks and 
marginalizes a more heterogeneous class of phenomena than can ever be encompassed 
adequately within transgender’s conceptual framework.”62 This occurs not only because of 
institutionalization, but also because of the implicit class, race, and cultural biases inherent in the 
term “transgender,” biases that have, for many, made “transgender” intelligible while 
simultaneously precluding the complexity of those inhabiting “transgender” as a subject position.  
 Considerations of the term “transgender” are numerous. Finn Enke argues that the 
“power of transgender does not depend on how many named categories we develop,” but instead 
because it names “a politics stemming from a tri-fold awareness,” namely binary gender norms 
and hierarchies, the recognition that many fail to conform to gender expectations, and the value 
of gender variation.63 This awareness, they argue, helps to form alliances and analysis that make 
change for those most vulnerable to violence. Enke also questions the effects of limiting the 
definition of transgender to those with “significant cross-gender identification.”64 The positive 
aspect of this is that it attends to the specificity of experience and is also linked to the histories of 
the institutions that have created limited access to medical care and legal documents, among 
other things, for transgender individuals. However, they argue that limiting the definition to only 
this “may perpetuate the marginalization of trans by reinforcing the misconception that ‘trans’ 
                                                
61 Ibid. 7. This same debate occurs also in queer studies, with concerns about the possibilities of the term “queer,” 
with some uses remaining radical and subversive and others becoming conservative, static, and normative in their 
exclusivity. 
62 Ibid. 8. 
63 A. Finn Enke, "Introduction: Transfeminist Perspectives," in Transfeminist Perspectives: In an Beyond 
Transgender and Gender Studies, ed. A. Finn Enke (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012). 4-5. 
64 Ibid. 5. 
 239 
describes a very small number of visible people.”65 Feminism and transgender studies must, they 
argue, acknowledge the proliferation and variation of gender expression and embodiment.  
 The field is officially called “transgender studies,” but many scholars and activists refer 
to it as “trans,” “trans*,” or “trans-” studies. Enke, writing in 2012, believes that this is an 
attempt to “rename the binary-resistant ontologies that exist within and beyond our grasp,” to 
emphasize and highlight the numerous identities and subject positions of what “trans” has come 
to signify. This conversation is ongoing and began early in the field’s development. In a 2008 
special issue of Women’s Studies Quarterly, Susan Stryker, Paisley Currah, and Lisa Jean Moore 
begin their introduction discussing the title of the issue: 
The title that appears on the cover of this journal is Trans-, not Trans, and not 
Transgender. A little hyphen is perhaps too flimsy a thing to carry as much conceptual 
freight as we intend for it to bear, but we think the hyphen matters a great deal, precisely 
because it marks the difference between the implied nominalism of “trans” and the 
explicit relationality of “trans-,” which remains open-ended and resists premature 
foreclosure by attachment to any single suffix.66 
 
They continue, discussing the CFP that read “Trans: -gender, -national, -racial, -generational, -
genic, -species.” Their goal, they argue, was to leave “trans” open, to not offer it up as if it were 
a stable category or “class of people, things, or phenomena” but rather phenomena that always 
changes, evolves, and cannot be definitionally fixed.67 Stryker et. al. even propose a verb form of 
trans – “transing” – that they believe begins to articulate the movement and practice of crossing 
among and between gendered spaces. This speaks to their understanding of gender as a practice 
rather than as a fixed or established sphere, but also to what they understand as the possibilities 
of the field that extends beyond one solely of identity.  
The usefulness of any of these terms, though, must reflect the tensions and directions 
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within the growing field of transgender studies. Any term must have the potential to recall both 
failures and success of intersectional and transformative analysis for the lives discussed within 
the field. Despite the ways in which transgender normativities have emerged, and how 
“transgender” has operated as a site of struggle in failed attempts to account for race, class, and 
other aspects of identity, Stryker et. al., remain optimistic for the term’s possibilities. They argue 
that “transgender” has generated counter-narratives; it has highlighted subjugated knowledges 
and counter-discourses of gender and bodily differences.  
 
Topics in the Field 
Almost two decades after its inauguration, scholars within transgender studies recognized 
the need for a broader dialogue within the field. Bettcher and Garry suggested that this dialogue 
undertake a “more inclusive vision of the racism, sexism, heterosexism, and transphobia inherent 
in a modern, colonial, and capitalist system.”68 The issues are contemporary iterations of the 
racist, ableist, heterosexist, transphobic, and colonialist discourses that shaped and continue to 
shape trans* subjectivities. Beyond narratives of self-making that continue to result in other-
making, the field has also seen the emergence of new dominant trans* narratives, has struggled 
to be inclusive of and account more fully for queer and trans* people of color (QTPOC) voices 
and experience, and has also been forced to reckon with the development of hierarchies of trans* 
subjects as well as the continuing institutionalization of the field in an academy that is becoming 
ever more corporatized.69 
Positioning transsexual and transgender subject positions as not perverted was a central 
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aim for transgender studies, but much of the scholarship emerging from the field constructed a 
“false dichotomy between authentic/real and constructed/mutable,” a dichotomy that resulted in 
juxtaposing the “subversive transgender” with the ‘‘conservative transsexual.’’70 With these 
shifts in discourse and the construction of new, more “subversive” subject positions, a new 
master narrative, one that privileged gender benders, intentionally and explicitly disruptive 
gender subject positions, and cast individuals who transitioned and embodied normative 
expectations of femininity and masculinity as reflecting a false-consciousness about who they 
were and the power that disciplined them to follow that course. This new transgender narrative 
came to dominate the field because it countered earlier transsexual narratives legitimated by 
sexologists and other medical professionals. Another reason, though, was because these 
narratives emerged in ways that de-pathologized non-normative embodiment and explicitly 
critiqued normative expectations of masculinity and femininity rooted in historically racist 
ideals.  
Critiquing this normative, even “master,” narrative of transsexuality predicated on white 
heterosexuality that continues to be informed by eugenics, racism, and ableism, is a crucial move 
to expand who is legible and who has access to life-sustaining resources. However, at what point 
does this critique become conservative, discouraging subject positions that counter what 
currently exists at the dominating narrative? This continues to be a point of contention for 
transgender studies scholars – thinking through and analyzing how to create space for a variety 
of narratives without privileging one narrative over another, even if it is “more” subversive than 
another. At what point does a seemingly radical “self-making” make those who do access the 
master narrative other? Transvestites and transsexuals utilized the very discourses and power 
structures Stryker articulates in order to establish their own place in the hierarchy of legibility 
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and acceptability. While much of the scholarship that has emerged from transgender studies 
depathologizes transpeople and gives voice to the experience and expertise of those living as 
trans* in the 21st century, the field has also privileged the notion of creating “gender disorder,” of 
creating chaos through gender subversion.71 However, according to Bettcher et. al., the effects of 
this privileging leaves little to no “theoretical space” for “accounts of oppression/resistance that 
may be at work even in the case of trans people who have been dismissed as gender 
conservative.”72 They cite the scholarly work of Jay Prosser, Viviane Namaste, and Henry Rubin 
who have all voiced their concerns about subsuming “trans” into a “largely queer paradigm,” one 
that valorizes queer gender and is suspect of everything else.73  
TS scholar Bobby Noble and anthropologist David Valentine both highlight the historical 
discourses the field must reckon with in the midst of these contestations. For example, they 
mention the “truth” of the ways in which the scholarship distinguishes between gender and 
sexuality. They argue that the “truth” is “simply one way of carving up how we know about 
ourselves and other.”74 What is problematic, they argue, is that these assertions about “truth” are 
often communicated as linear progress narratives, as teleologies, with a clear beginning and a 
clear end, wherein the “truth” about oneself is discovered. This narrative, regardless of its 
efficacy for liberation, should not be used to accuse trans* identified people who “reproduce 
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binary gender” of being complicit with or responsible for the ways in which patriarchal power is 
exercised. Rather, they argue, it is crucial that the work emerging from the field recognize that 
the categories we inhabit have “histories, politics, and economies,” and that we are all engaged in 
the process of category-making.  
The result of this process can produce both liberatory and debilitating effects, but the 
central goal, Valentine argues, is to question “how, why, when, and with what effects self-making 
is other making.75 Rather than criticize people for “the supposed capitulation to gender 
normativity,” Rubin for example urges scholars to ask instead “what function these identities 
serve for the subjects who claim them.”76 This line of questioning allows scholars to grapple with 
the historical trajectories of transvestite and transsexual narratives alongside more contemporary 
transgender and trans* subject formations. Intersex activist Cheryl Chase argues that, for 
instance, Stone’s “Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto” was able to refigure open, 
visible transsexuals not as gender conformists propping up a system of rigid, binary sex but as “a 
set of embodied texts whose potential for productive disruption of structured sexualities and 
spectra of desire has yet to be explored.”77  
 Noble connects these issues to the ways in which the disciplinary fields are discursively 
constructed and bound. He highlights a weakness in transgender studies, similar to one that 
occurred in queer theory and feminist studies, and argues that the “public face of academic 
‘transgender studies’ materializes… [as] white, North American, secular, and always already 
liberatory.”78 He questions the cost of institutionalizing transgender studies, a field born from a 
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complex social movement and asks, “at what cost to our paradigms of decolonization and white 
supremacy will such coherence come?”79 He demands a critical analysis of “any singular master 
narrative—disciplinary or colonial,” believing that this will allow transgender studies and 
scholarship to take into consideration colonialism and its attendant discursive techniques.80 
 Editors Susan Stryker and Aren Aizura reflect on similar questions in their introduction 
to the Transgender Studies Reader II. They begin their introduction with a critique of their first 
reader with the hope that the second will help challenge and fundamentally change the way the 
field reflects an “implicit whiteness, U.S.-centricity, Anglophone bias, and the sometimes 
suspect ways in which the category transgender has been circulated transnationally,” critiques 
voiced by other scholars following the first reader.81 This change requires that attention be paid 
to what scholars have recognized as “the relationship between transgender issues and other 
structural forms of inequality and injustice,” and also the ways in which the discourses emerging 
from the field are shaped by race, hierarchies of identity, and effects of the institutionalization of 
the field within the academy.  
Transgender studies has been critiqued by scholars for its lack of not only racial analysis, 
but its focus on white subjects and the ways in which transpeople of color are objectified and 
“made to represent the traumatic violences through which claims for rights are articulated.”82 
While these are not the same discursive moves made in the 1950s and 1960s, the same logics are 
being utilized, where whiteness buttresses an individual’s claim to legitimacy and legibility. 
Transsexual and transvestite women, alongside sympathetic doctors like Harry Benjamin, relied 
on white norms of femininity to try and legitimize their claim to womanhood, white norms that 
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are defined over and against femininities that are understood as other, or not as femininity at all. 
Some of the scholarship emerging from transgender studies, as well as some activist groups, 
engage rights discourses that, if successful, will benefit mostly white and middle or upper-class 
transpeople, while using the violence experienced by trans* people of color and poor trans* 
people as justification for that advocacy.83  
In the last decade, however, trans* of color critique has received more attention across 
the field of transgender studies and this critique, as described by Stryker and Aizura, attends to 
these moves for legitimacy, disrupting the “racialized logic through which white gender-variant 
bodies become – more often than not – the only gender variant bodies recognizable as the 
legitimate subject of rights.”84 They continue: 
The production of transgender whiteness as a process of value-extraction from bodies of 
color both within and outside of the global north and west therefore remains an important 
target of criticism, even as we promote transgender studies as a site where radical anti-
racist and anti-imperialist work can be accomplished.85 
 
Stryker and Aizura here highlight the paradox of a field dominated by white scholars based on 
experiential knowledge as a place where radical anti-racist and anti-imperialist work can be 
accomplished. This work, though, requires scholars already in the field to focus on this work in 
earnest, and by opening up literal spaces (faculty lines, spaces in graduate programs) for 
individuals, people of color and otherwise, who will push the field in these directions. Stryker, 
Aizura, and other leading scholars in TS are working to change the historical trajectory of whose 
voices have been showcased since the 1910s and focus on questions like: whose stories are being 
told, and to which audiences; whose lives are theorized/objectified and to what ends; and how do 
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we make transgender studies a place of resistance even as its institutionalization becomes more 
established? 86  
 Stryker focuses on what she sees as another paradox: her position at the University of 
Arizona. She was hired in 2011 and UA agreed not only to fund her, but also to assist with the 
establishment of Transgender Studies Quarterly (hailed as the field’s first non-medical journal 
focusing on transgender subjects), fund a cluster hire in transgender studies, as well as entertain 
the possibility of establishing a graduate degree in transgender studies. This occurred in what she 
describes as an “era when the teaching of Chicano/a studies is literally being outlawed in 
Arizona public schools, when xenophobic attitudes inform the state’s border politics…” She 
asks, when tension around racism, economics, and citizenship run high, how:  
transgender identities and practices can appear palatable[?] How does institutional 
investment in transgender studies at this particular historical juncture play into a deep 
logic of “managing difference” through expert knowledges, or get positioned as less 
threatening than calls for racial and economic justice?87 
 
She understands her position to be one where she can advocate and advance these concerns 
within transgender studies, as one way to resist the cooptation of transgender studies by 
neoliberalism and its dehumanizing agendas.  
  On a related front, Stryker claims that transgender studies is begging to take seriously 
transnational critiques of the ways in which the non-West too often “forms a premodern 
backdrop for the civilizing, tolerant liberalism of a homonationalist or trans-normative 
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modernity.”88 In other words, Stryker, and others within the field, are interrogating the ways in 
which a “transnational transgender imaginary” can begin to shift scholarly approaches to this 
work. Newer work in the field acknowledges that a transnational trans* rights movement located 
as much in the global north as in the global south has “taken shape over the last decade, enabled 
by new media technologies that are as symbolic of later capitalist industrial modernity as are the 
body technologies of changing sex.”89 In fact, the third issue of Transgender Studies Quarterly 
pushed scholars to ask, “How does imagining globally networked communities of trans people 
interact with already-existing global flows… [h]ow might transgender studies contribute to the 
decolonization of the sex and gendered imaginaries through which we grasp a world of 
difference?”90 Stryker also identifies the difficulties of this work, particularly in terms of 
fundamental categories like “human being,” “man,” and “woman,” that are not “ontologically 
given, but rather are themselves historically and culturally variable and contingent.”91 
Furthermore, she points to the problem of translation across language and culture, and the ways 
in which this problem grows when translating incommensurable categories of being.92 Arguing 
that the field is particularly suited for growing in these directions, Stryker and Aizura argue that 
part of “transgender critique” involves “demystifying and analyzing the ontological labor 
performed by man, male, female, and woman, and insisting on their historicity and cultural 
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contingency.”93 Each of these terms is just as constructed and discursively bound as the others, 
and Stryker and Aizura highlight the ways in which “they circulate transnationally in discourse 
and analysis with… risk of being conceptually colonizing.”94 Rather than simply being 
understood as colonizing, with transgender as an “export,” they hope that the transnational turn 
of the field will help counteract that concept, as well as the notion that what emerges from the 
field is only accessible or appropriate for other scholars.95  
Transgender studies will continue to face the difficulty of being an interdisciplinary field 
within an institution founded on disciplinary departments. Robyn Wiegman in Object Lessons 
(2012) attends to the difficulty of several fields, WS included, as knowledge projects committed 
to justice as well as interdisciplinarity within a disciplining institution. Beyond discussing the 
specifics of women’s studies as a field, she argues that scholars must always be engaged and 
self-reflective in ways that negate a teleological progress narrative of our inquiries. Transgender 
studies is in a similar position as an identity-studies discipline. Stryker and Aizura discuss the 
danger of institutionalization: 
One implication is that the academic institutionalization of transgender studies, which 
advances the goal of transgender social legitimization through the development of an 
expertise structured by the foundational preconditions of transgender’s intelligibility 
(which is implicitly raced/classed and Anglocentric/Anglophone), risks a kind of 
theoretical imperialism that masks and marginalizes a more heterogeneous class of 
phenomena than can ever be encompassed adequately within transgender’s conceptual 
framework.96 
 
Transgender studies, if not attuned to this risk, can and will reproduce hierarchies of 
intelligibility that function in similar ways to those hierarchies produced by the sexologist and 
trans people in the mid-twentieth century. Transgender studies instead must push the discourse to 
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accommodate evolving subjectivities. Simultaneously, when “transgender” as a term fails to be 
specific, or to indicate a particular and historically situated understanding of sex, gender and 
sexuality, Stryker and Aizura argue that we risk “erasing… violent colonial histories of 
knowledge production about sex and gender,” histories that exploit and fetishize difference 
“according to the developmental logic of colonialism and capitalism [that] have all been central 
features of Euro-American societies for over five hundred years.”97 
In the conclusion of Wiegman’s text, she argues that “the problem for identity 
knowledges is not how to make our conception of politics accord with reality alone, but how to 
register the projections, transferences, anxieties, and aspirations that comprise it.”98 With spaces 
carved out explicitly for these conversations in women’s studies departments, American studies 
departments, and within new publications like TSQ, the field is able to reflect on the implications 
of institutionalization. These spaces also provide room to consider the ways in which, as a 
distinct field of study, TS might remain vigilant against the institutionalization that would curb 
the radical and liberatory potential of the field.  
 
Which Bodies Are Wrong? 
Transgender studies has prided itself on moving beyond the medicalization of transgender 
and its diagnoses, on resisting the disciplining of medical approaches to transness, and of 
reappropriating the language of pathology for the purposes of resistance. However, despite TS 
scholars’ resistance to and critique of it, scientific racism and the discourses from which it 
emerges continues to shape not only public opinions about difference and social ills, but also 
scientific approaches. Washington Post writers W. Carson Byrd and Matthew W. Hughey argue 
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that “scientific racism is creeping back into our thinking.”99 As I have demonstrated in the last 
four chapters, eugenics never ceased to influence the discourses surrounding difference. As Byrd 
and Hughey assert, eugenic discourse continues to carry influence and is once again adapting and 
changing.  
Byrd and Hughey cite a working paper written for the National Bureau of Economic 
Research published in 2015 that argues that “ethnic conflict throughout history is a result of 
genetic diversity among communities… genetic diversity is the dominant force behind conflict 
among groups.”100 Byrd and Hughey believe that “such an argument places the history and future 
of human conflict in genes, as if human interaction and environmental influences cannot match 
their power.” The writers also reference two studies that analyzed racial essentialism in relation 
to biological determinism.101 In the first, “A Level Playing Field? Media Constructions of 
Athletics, Genetics, and Race” published in 2015, Matthew W. Hughey and Devon R. Goss 
found that “media narratives uncritically parroted and perpetuated the belief that African-
descended groups excel in athletics, such as sprinting, because of genetic racial differences — 
despite the research debunking that belief.”102 They also argue that “white supremacist groups 
use news from increased research on genetics and racial differences to explain not only athletic 
results, but larger racial inequalities in the world… People of varying social and political views 
employ these explanations in order to legitimate the claim that racial inequalities occur 
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reality that regulates how we behave.” Ibid. 
102 Matthew W. Hughey and Devon R. Goss, "A Level Playing Field? Media Constructions of Athletics, Genetics, 
and Race," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 661, no. 1 (2015). 
 251 
naturally.”103 Beyond this study, Byrd and Hughey referenced a 2014 volume by journalist 
Nicholas Wade, A Troublesome Inheritance, that suggests that “Africa’s underdevelopment was 
a result of genetic inferiority of the communities on the continent, eschewing the devastating 
effects of colonialism.”104 This volume, they note, was highly praised by readers. Byrd and 
Hughey argue that these views “exacerbate racial inequality, twist history and circumvent 
effective policy strategies.”105 This is evidence that eugenics remains influential to this day in 
both racial and national discourses, discourses with which transgender studies must attend. 
While eugenic medical discourse is interacting and shaping the ways in which individuals 
claim transgender identity today, it also continues to be used to explain the “causes” of 
transgender existence, particularly through engaging scientific discourses that focus only on 
genetics and biology and result in the idea that being “born this way” is the only legitimate 
narrative one can claim. While transactivism is varied and multiple, as is evidenced by the 
previous chapter, some transactivists, individuals, and communities continue to engage in the 
“born this way” discourse as a strategy for legitimacy, discourse that dominated in the early 20th 
century and in some ways continues to do so as of 2016. Some even compare or analogize race 
to advocate for this logic. 
When discussing the difference between racial identification and gender identification, 
Meredith Talusan writes for The Guardian that, “transgender people’s decision to transition is 
almost always involuntary.”106 As an example of this, she argues that when we are born, “doctors 
don’t announce our race or color… they announce our gender.”107 She continues, appealing to 
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what she understands as historical evidence of transgender existence: “People who are alienated 
from their presumed gender and define themselves according to another gender have existed 
since earliest recorded history; race is a medieval European invention,” thus some people not 
born black might identify “as black, but I am a woman, and other trans people are the gender 
they feel themselves to be.”108 This logic, pitting constructions of race against constructions of 
gender, is shortsighted. Constructions of race and constructions of gender have similar and 
intertwined histories, but denying their specificity elides the lived realities of both. Also, as I will 
discuss more below, discourses of who can and cannot access womanhood are always fraught 
and often employ racist, classist, and transphobic logics. 
These overlapping narratives serve as evidence that the reliance on medicalized 
explanations of inherent and biological “trans” existence continues. This discourse, regardless of 
one’s ‘buy in,’ has dominated and thus shapes all activist discourses to a degree, in that activists 
must engage it, respond to it, and engage in counter-discursive measures to demonstrate their 
stance in relation to the medically dependent “born this way” discourse.  
Searches for “biological” and scientific explanations proliferated among researchers 
interested in sexology and transvestism in the early years of the diagnoses. Telling a narrative of 
being born “in the wrong body” and relying on a physiological explanation for their desires 
allowed many transwomen to access medical intervention. A biological cause “justified” the 
actions of physicians. Yet, today these very same logics are used to “prove” that “racial 
inequalities occur naturally.” These narratives were linked long ago, and reliance upon medical 
discourses of “born this way” will always fail to do justice for transpeople and communities. 
Sociologist Shamus Khan argues that this kind of biological determinism has a “long career of 
serving oppressive and deadly cases… It was only a few decades ago that genetic difference was 
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a way to identify and exterminate.”109 Despite the proliferation of scholarship that challenges any 
neat explanation concerning biology or environment in relation to trans* subjectivities, it is 
crucial to see the connections between these racist discourses and their intersections with 
explanations of “transgender.” It is also of central importance to acknowledge how the medical is 
always already political.  
Many parallels and “threads of commonality” exist between the ways in which disability 
and trans subjectivity is theorized, but what I want to acknowledge here is the political nature of 
medical interventions and the medical framing of “diagnoses” and bodies.110 While critiquing the 
medical approaches to trans* diagnoses is an important move, and in particular framing trans* 
subject positions as not pathological, following disability scholar Eli Clare, I do not want to 
suggest that medical intervention is always already bad or always already pathologizing. It is, 
however, always political. In her book Feminist, Queer, Crip, feminist disability scholar Alison 
Kafer offers a framework for thinking about disability that recognizes both the “possibility of 
simultaneously desiring to be cured of chronic pain and to be identified and allied with disabled 
people.”111 Kafer wants to move past an individual model of disability where individuals are 
framed as a “problem” in need of a cure. Simultaneously, she complicates the notion of a social 
model that wholly dismisses the medical establishment in favor of only acknowledging the social 
and environmental barriers that prevent people with disabilities from accessing spaces, from 
experiencing discrimination, and what she identifies as “ideological systems that attribute 
normalcy and deviance to particular minds and bodies.”112 Ultimately, she argues that the ways 
in which medicine frames disability is political, a formula that parallels that of trans* diagnoses. 
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 Transfeminist scholars have also engaged these debates about bodies, biology, medicine, 
and belonging, debates rooted in decades of feminist scholarship. Talia Mae Bettcher, for 
example, engages a long-standing question feminist scholars have grappled with since the 
emergence of the field, and feminists outside of the academy long before that: who can access 
the category of “woman?” Bettcher engages the discourses regulating which bodies and which 
individuals have access to womanhood, and what kind of womanhood. Access to womanhood, as 
numerous scholars have indicated, is tied to a number of other discursive constructions such as 
race, sexuality, and disability, and the focus on constructions of womanhood have been 
numerous both inside and outside of the academy.  
As recently as 2015, Elinor Burkett published an opinion piece in the New York Times 
where she took issue with transwomen’s “disregard for the fact that being a woman means 
having accrued certain experiences, endured certain indignities and relished certain courtesies in 
a culture that reacted to you as one.”113 These experiences, according to Burkett, include having 
to “cope with the onset of their periods in the middle of a crowded subway, the humiliation of 
discovering that their male work partners’ checks were far larger than theirs, or the fear of being 
too weak to ward off rapists.”114 While Burkett’s article ignited a swift backlash of critique, her 
rhetoric speaks to the ongoing and complicated discourse about who can lay claim to “woman.” 
 Significant shifts in this discursive history are marked by a number of feminist 
interventions. In 1966, Barbara Welter’s work—mentioned in chapter one—analyzing literature 
and constructions of womanhood in the early to mid- 19th century named the attributes of “True 
Womanhood” of that time, attributes of piety, purity, submissiveness, and domesticity by which 
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“a woman judged herself and was judged by her husband, her neighbors and society.”115 These 
racialized and classed descriptions of womanhood could only have been applied to white women 
of the ruling class. Higginbotham, recognizing this trend within discourses of gender, challenged 
feminist scholars to bring “race more prominently into their analyses of power,” and to 
incorporate particular strategies into these analyses, one of which is to “expose the role of race as 
a metalanguage by calling attention to its powerful, all-encompassing effect on the construction 
and representation of other social and power relations, namely, gender, class, and sexuality.”116 
In her assertion that understanding race’s historical and material grounding, which in the U.S. in 
particular means recognizing its roots in U.S. slavery, Higginbotham highlights the ways in 
which race is intricately intertwined with class and property relations.117 Discussing the 
contradictions in whose bodies were protected by the law (white women’s bodies, not black 
women’s), she demonstrates how Sojourner Truth’s now famous 1851 speech “Ain’t I a 
Woman?” “demonstrated gender’s racial meaning.”118 Womanhood, Higginbotham clearly 
shows, did “not rest on a common female essence, shared culture, or mere physical appearance… 
gender identity was reconstructed and represented in very different, indeed antagonistic, 
racialized contexts.”119  
 Angela Davis makes theses connections undeniable in her analyses of women, race, and 
class, particularly during slavery in the United States. Davis demonstrates how “woman” as a 
concept became synonymous with whiteness, with “‘mother’ and ‘housewife’… But among 
Black female slaves, this vocabulary was nowhere to be found.”120 Hazel Carby, in 1987, 
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described the cultural effects of these images, these racialized understandings of what constituted 
“true womanhood.” The image was dominant, according to Carby, in that it was understood to 
describe and govern proper “female behavior,” but that it was also a “dominating image, 
describing the parameters within which women were measured and declared to be, or not to be, 
women.”121 Carby demonstrates how this conception of womanhood as described by Welter 
influenced not only constructions of, but also expectations about what constituted “true” 
womanhood for the majority of the 20th century, a womanhood predicated on one’s proximity to 
whiteness and wealth.122  
 Following the logics of Welter, Higginbotham, Davis, and Carby, Bettcher connects these 
conversations about race, class, sexuality, and womanhood to evolving discourses about 
transgender subject construction and the narratives of the “wrong-body” so many transpeople 
rely on. She contends that rather than having or relying on “wrong-body” narratives, we are 
using the “wrong theory:” 
Since the wrong-body narrative is deeply connected to genital reconstruction 
technologies, the narrative, just as the technologies, is open to worries about class- and 
race-differentiated access. The wrong-body narrative outlines a standard telos (genital 
reconstruction surgery), and any identity that fails to desire that telos is ruled ineligible. It 
thereby attempts to restrict access to womanhood (or manhood) itself through hegemonic 
class-, race-, and culture-inflected modalities… the wrong-body narrative can never quite 
free itself from the source of oppression that it has sought to contest through reversal.123  
 
Through the continual separating of authentic, or ‘official’ transsexuality from mere cross-
dressing, certain individuals are provided access, however limited, to legitimacy through 
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diagnoses, treatment, and recognition. These debates emerge and are informed by original 
distinctions between transvestite and transsexual.124 Transgender studies has provided a place 
within the academy for scholars to engage with and interrogate not only discourses of gender, 
sexuality, and normativity, but also these discourses of scientific inquiry that attempt to ‘explain’ 
how and why “transgender” exists in the first place.  
 These histories and discourses of womanhood infused with racism shaped the logics of 
eugenic ideology. Of the many legacies of eugenic ideology is the myriad ways it inflects and 
shapes these constructions, constructions that scholars must continually attend to both within and 
outside of transgender studies. However, focusing on these legacies is necessary for TS as a field 
to engage these discursive histories. While the field works to more fully incorporate voices and 
critiques from scholars of color, indigenous scholars, and non-U.S. based scholars, the field must 
also attend to how this history has shaped our analysis of power in relation to the multiple 
iterations of “trans*.”  
 
“Truths” and Hopes for the Future 
 As this work has demonstrated, this terminology evolves over time, reflecting shifts in 
the discourses surrounding these terms. As such, what will the future hold for transgender 
studies? What will become its proper object of study when “transgender” becomes an outdated 
term? 
These questions also speak to the relevance of transgender studies for the political 
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movements and activist discourses that helped shape it, discourses with which transgender 
studies is still actively engaged. Wiegman states that part of her aim in writing Object Lessons 
was to interrupt faith in the ideas that “if only we find the right discourse, object of study, or 
analytic tool, our critical practice will be adequate to the political commitments that inspire it.”125 
She explains that she had two goals for the book:  
to inhabit identity’s aspirations in the critical trajectories, discursive practices, and 
methodological priorities that it has so profoundly inspired, while exploring how various 
fields reach or exact a limit, become disciplinary instead of interventionist, and mimic 
radicality instead of teaching us how to become radically undone.126 
 
Her concern stems from ways in which academic discourse has evolved – where scholars hope 
that “gender” will overcome the issues posed by “woman,” where queer studies’ normativity is 
its commitment to antinormativity. While identity knowledges, including transgender studies, are 
rooted in discourses of social justice, she questions if these fields can reach a political resolution 
between progressive politics and scholarship’s critical practices.  
The limitations of identity are also apparent when considering what sustains transgender 
studies as a field. Using Wiegman’s consideration of queer theory will be useful here. She argues 
that as queer theory institutionalized its theoretical commitments, the field made normativity and 
the identities produced by normativity its “primary disciplinary identity and critical aim.”127 The 
result of this is that the: 
reproduction of normativity [is] absolutely central to disciplinary authority, which is why 
so much effort in Queer Studies is currently expanded to name and at times even to 
shame those normativities that are inhabited, desired, and pursued within gay, lesbian, 
trans, and queer discourses and political projects as well as outside of them. In this, 
antinormativity serves as the single most important disciplinary norm for critical 
legibility in the field.128  
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I understand transgender studies to function much in the same way. In an effort to critique 
normativity, and in particular cisnormativity, the field and the discourses with which it engages 
often shame those who embody or desire to embody the norms that sustain cisnormativity, 
particularly when these individuals claim the moniker of “transgender” or some iteration thereof. 
This is a delicate balance of critiquing identity politics and notions of agency while 
simultaneously making efforts to affirm the various ways in which subjects access legibility.  
Part of the issue might be that the field, by taking up the label “transgender,” and 
engaging with discourses of trans* “identities,” still struggles with and against histories of racist 
and eugenic dominance. The field also struggles within the academy with newer technologies of 
injustice, like neoliberal political and economic policies. These policies, according to higher 
education scholar Camille Kandiko Howson, result in “declining public funding, a concentration 
of research funds in technology and science fields, and expanded relationships with 
corporations,” changes that often fail to benefit interdisciplinary humanities fields such as 
transgender studies and women’s studies.129 While the effects of neoliberal political and 
economic policies manifest in the growth of the carceral state, the dismantling of the public 
sphere and social safety nets, they also affect the academy.130 Those most affected are often 
those who also are either barred from accessing the diagnoses, or who become illegitimate 
through diagnoses—individuals for whom accessing either diagnoses or identities, or accessing 
them differently might make their lives more livable. Transgender studies often waxes 
philosophic about the limitations of identity, but there are also limitations to the displacement of 
identity over and above other formulations of subjectivity. We must be able to find a balance 
among critiquing the identity politics of sex and gender while considering the lived effects for 
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those most affected by the unequal withdrawal of resources and the differential effects of 
disciplinary discourses.  
David Valentine highlights the ways in which so much of contemporary critical social 
theory is inconsistent in its analysis when it comes to sexuality and gender. He discusses 
specifically the assertion that scholars make concerning the distinction between sexuality and 
gender, one that has come to be regarded as the “truth.” He argues that rather than “recognizing 
that it is simply one way of carving up how we know about ourselves and others, contemporary 
critical social theory engages all those aspects of modernity” that it would otherwise critique, in 
particular any “master narrative, unfolding within a historical teleology, characterized by 
progress and a coming-to-truth.”131 He continues, and he is worth quoting at length: 
These are practices and discourses deeply rooted in U. S. American culture and in the 
working out of personhood in late modernity, evident as much in the growth of 
psychiatric diagnostic categories, the assertion of ‘identity’ as a central paradigm in 
politics, and the elaboration of niche markets for consumption as it is in the construction 
of ‘transgender’ … This is not the same as saying (as Janice Raymond does) that 
transgender-identified people ‘reproduce binary gender’ or holding them responsible for 
patriarchy’s power. It is, rather, to argue that all modern subjects are engaged in this same 
process of disaggregation, reintegration, refinement, and education of the self… The goal 
is to reveal how the categories we live by—must live by—have histories, politics, and 
economies and produce effects that can be as debilitating for some as they can be 
liberating for others.132  
 
He then asserts, and I have mentioned this previously in the chapter, that “The goal is to question 
how, why, when, and with what effects self-making is other making.”133 These questions about 
categories and self-making are linked to what some argue is the purpose of transgender studies. I 
am proposing that a vigilant attention to eugenic discourse and the continuing influence of 
eugenics will help those in the field to recognize the patterns and strategies that link self-making 
to other-making, thinking through how self-making might happen without producing hierarchical 
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relationships with othering where the “self” is always better than “other,” where difference is not 
a strength but a principle for division. This attention must at least be a part of the strategy for 
how we move forward. As a field committed to engaging counter-discourses emerging from 
within both academic and activist communities, transgender studies must not only attend to but 
make foundational the recognition of these histories, of scientific racism and eugenics and their 
intersections with sexology and the academic study of “trans” in its various iterations.  
Stryker and Aizura directly address what they believe transgender studies must do as a 
field to remain relevant to communities outside the academy. After highlighting the ways in 
which trans* and GNC people “live lives that are abstracted and theorized in ways that do not 
materially benefit them,” the authors link this reality to “differences in opportunity and 
vulnerability.”134 Furthermore, they argue, these differences “map starkly onto the intersections 
of structural racism, gender inequality, and neoliberal economics.”135 Because of the structural 
inequalities facing the very communities that are the ‘objects’ of study, transgender studies must, 
they argue: 
address itself to these injustices and be part of the process of redistributing financial, 
cultural, and intellectual resources from pockets of greater abundance to broader 
territories of greater need… Such work reminds us of the need to keep transgender 
studies relevant to its roots in social justice work—without… defining beforehand 
precisely what justice might consist of, or who the proper subject of transgender politics 
ought to be.136 
 
Is it possible for critical academic fields to remain critical of the academy from within the 
academy? Some fields, including TS, employ the strategy of pursuing interrelationships with 
activists and communities outside of the academy, with the hopes that they will continue to 
incorporate activist and anti-corporatization discourses into how they shape and are shaped by 
                                                




the academy. The success of this strategy is predicated on a perilous and contentious 
relationship, but one that can help to develop fruitful counter-discourse on all sides.  
Highlighting the interaction between various discursive fields that led to the emergence 
of transgender studies reveals how, as an interdisciplinary field, it offers a space for possibilities 
in thinking through “trans*” as an analytic, but also as a subject position, an identity, as 
diagnoses, as well as space to trouble the relationships between the discourses producing 
“trans*” in these various ways. While identity based fields provide space to engage discourses of 
pathologization in relation to trans* subjectivity, they can also function to shame those who 
claim a “normatively gendered” trans* identity. Fields often function to organize and understand 
topics such as gender or race beyond identity politics that take people away from talking about 
power. However, as transgender studies constructs an intellectual project for itself, the question 
then becomes: Who is worthy of being a part of this theoretical model and what does it mean in 
terms of making some lives legible and livable?  
Existing in relationship to the diagnoses, as I have shown, is complicated. Just as the 
discourses of “transsexual” and “transvestite” served to provide individuals with a language to 
describe themselves, to legitimate (in some ways) their desires, it also further marginalized those 
who could not access the diagnoses or turn the diagnoses into pathways of identity that made life 
more livable. While some access the diagnoses and are affirmed by or find useful the space of 
inhabiting the subject position delineated by the diagnoses, others have a more tenuous 
relationship with the medical establishment. Some access the diagnoses (or have them applied to 
them non-consensually) and experience further marginalization because of exploitation by 
medical apparatuses. Sometimes others are even less legible at the intersection of diagnoses and 
medical surveillance, where their inability to be contained by the ‘official’ diagnoses places them 
 263 
in precarious relationship to who is constructed as il/legitimate. These pathways of life, 
legibility, and legitimacy are shaped by histories of who and what has counted as legible and 
legitimate, and whose lives are livable. 
Tracing the emergence of transvestitism and transsexualism as they have travelled in an 
out of many different discourses has revealed a history steeped in racism, colonialism, ableism, 
and transphobia. Eugenics has not always been overtly present, but has consistently affected the 
material realities of trans* and gender non-conforming communities. The discourses that 
construct people like me as transsexual remain inseparable from that history, as do the 
discourses circulating in both academic and activist circles. These, in turn, are shaped by 
competing discourses about trans* diagnoses within medical and legal institutions. In an era 
when the Pope of the Catholic Church compares nuclear arms to “gender theory” and 
transgender individuals, it is obvious that work remains to be done both in the academy and in 
activism in response to discourses that allow for the emergence of analogies between people and 
weapons.137 Moving forward we must attend to these discursive histories that have shaped what 
is possible in terms of identification, that have disciplined bodies, subjects, and communities. We 
must also consider how we might work for less violent and more affirming material realities for 




                                                
137 In an interview, the Pope said: “Let’s think of the nuclear arms, of the possibility to annihilate in a few instants a 
very high number of human beings…Let’s think also of genetic manipulation, of the manipulation of life, or of the 
gender theory, that does not recognize the order of creation… With this attitude, man commits a new sin, that 
against God the Creator…The true custody of creation does not have anything to do with the ideologies that 
consider man like an accident, like a problem to eliminate.” "Pope Francis Compares Transgender People to Nuclear 





It [is] impossible to excavate the roots and the reach of the medicalization of queers  
without an understanding of scientific racism and other eugenics endeavors.  
Not only were they ideologically tethered, but they had 
the same champions and often the same victims. 
-Nancy Ordover, 2003  
 
 
In 2012, 60 years almost to the day after the New York Daily News announced Christine’s 
transition, BBC Magazine published an article entitled “Christine Jorgensen: 60 Years of Sex 
Change Ops.” The author, Chloe Hadjimatheou of BBC World, summarized Jorgensen’s journey. 
Hadjimatheou narrates Jorgensen’s return to New York after surgery in Denmark as the 
“glamorous” Christine: “As the slender, blonde 27-year-old woman wrapped in a fur coat 
stepped out of the plane… her long eyelashes, high cheekbones and full red lips betrayed little of 
the shy man she had once been.”1 Hadjimatheou distances Jorgensen from homosexuality: 
“young Jorgensen never identified himself with homosexuality but rather as a woman who 
happened to be in a man’s body.”2 She also provides evidence of Jorgensen’s “natural” 
heterosexual sexuality. Hadjimatheou asserts that Jorgensen’s surgery was “successful enough 
for [her] to feel satisfied.”3 Jorgensen’s own words help substantiate this claim: “ Of course I can 
never have children but this does not mean that I cannot have natural sexual intercourse.”4 
Jorgensen’s use of “natural sexual intercourse” and Hadjimatheou citation of this statement 
function to support several aspects of what has become the normative transsexual narrative. 
Jorgensen fulfilled and helped to shape this narrative, one in which her access to womanhood 
was predicated on the desire to engage in only heterosexual sex. 
                                                
1 Chloe Hadjimatheou, "Christine Jorgensen: 60 Years of Sex Change Ops," Witness 29 November 2012. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. Emphasis mine. 
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 Every aspect of this narrative emerged and evolved amidst discourses of gender and 
sexuality that were, and remain, invested in whiteness, heterosexuality, ability, and a singular and 
diagnosable narrative of gender deviance. The desire to have or keep one’s penis was antithetical 
to the desire to be a woman. Sixty years after Jorgensen’s story gained international attention, 
after so many other transpeople have come out, after having had access to new terminology in 
addition to the old, many of the same tropes and narratives are still utilized to describe and 
collapse the complexity of gender. After decades of medical advancement and knowledge about 
the variation in bodies, children’s bodies must fit a two-sex system despite the knowledge of 
multiple sexes beyond male and female: if bodies do not fit, they are surgically altered to fit. 
After decades of violence and dismissal, most transpeople still have to tell one particular 
narrative and align themselves with a narrow telling of transsexualism to access medical 
intervention. These are only some of the many legacies that continue to shape trans* 
subjectivities today.  
 
Legacies 
Eugenic medical discourse shaped the ways in which individuals, especially sexologists, 
explained what “caused” transvestism and transsexualism. Eugenics continues to have an 
influence, particularly through explanations of “transgender” that engage scientific discourses 
that focus on genetics and biology. We can trace this influence throughout the twentieth and into 
the twenty-first century. Some instances are more explicit. Christian Hamburger, Jorgensen’s 
surgeon from Denmark, wrote specifically about trans people in 1953: “From a eugenic point of 
view it would do no harm if a number of sexually abnormal men were castrated and thus 
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deprived of their sexual libido.”5 He was a man that claimed to be sympathetic towards 
transsexuals, but still was concerned about their reproduction. Today, these anxieties have 
evolved but can still be seen in debates over what “causes” trans* identification and how, or 
whether it should be, “cured.” What is hard to navigate, though, is when those who advocate for 
the community use arguments that are in most instances more subtle than those used in the early 
twentieth century, but are just as steeped in eugenic ideology, biology, and genetics.  
In a recent debate about the “cause” of transness, for example, Dr. Paul McHugh, the 
University Distinguished Service Professor of Psychiatry at Johns Hopkins Medical School, 
vehemently denies any biological cause for transgender identification. Writing in 2015, but 
reflecting the ideologies of many in the medical profession in the 1950s, McHugh argues that the 
very notion of transgender identities is a “meme.” Rather than a reality, he believes it to be “a 
myth that has spread across society.”6 Furthermore, he believes that transpeople and individuals 
suffering from anorexia should be treated in similar ways – as people with disorders, and that 
treatment plans should target “psychosocial conflicts.” Specifically, he argues that “no evidence 
supports the claim that people such as Bruce Jenner [sic] have a biological source for their 
transgender assumptions. Plenty of evidence demonstrates that with him [sic] and most others, 
transgendering is a psychological rather than a biological matter.”7 It is also important to note 
that the first Gender Identity Clinic opened in 1965 at Johns Hopkins, the first academic 
institution to perform “sex reassignment surgery”—or what many transpeople in 2016 refer to as 
“gender affirmation surgery.” McHugh was a key player in shutting this clinic down in 1979.  
Many, of course, disagree with McHugh. Veteran, journalist, and transwoman Brynn 
                                                
5 Stürup G. K. Dahl-Iversen E. E. Hamburger C, "Transvestism: Hormonal, Psychiatric, and Surgical Treatment," 
Journal of the American Medical Association 152, no. 5 (1953). 
6 Paul McHugh, "Transgenderism: A Pathogenic Meme," Public Discourse 2015. 
7 Ibid. 
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Tannehill, for instance, writes that “McHugh must ignore at least fifteen studies that have found 
exactly that kind of evidence showing a biological origin for transgender identities,” and she 
references other articles that “prove” that “transgender individuals are wired to physically 
experience bodies of the opposite sex.”8 Tannehill is engaging rhetoric used by both LGB and 
transactivists – that of the “we’re born this way” argument. While I am in no way implying that 
Tannehill believes transness is a sign of degeneracy, placing the cause firmly in the body and 
genetics treads on all too familiar ground. Discourses that utilize this kind of strategic 
essentialism can be politically efficacious for groups advocating for rights, but rely on the very 
same discourses and logics from which eugenic ideology emerged. And these explanations are 
not uncommon. In an interview with Diane Sawyer in 2015, Caitlyn Jenner asserted that “my 
brain is much more female than it is male.”9 This rhetoric reflects histories of diagnoses that rely 
on biological explanations for what “causes” trans* identities, irreversible causes that one is 
“born” with.10 In a 2011 interview, transman Chaz Bono remarked, “There’s a gender in your 
brain and a gender in your body. For 99 percent of people, those things are in alignment. For 
transgender people, they’re mismatched. That’s all it is. It’s not complicated, it’s not a neurosis. 
It’s a mix-up. It’s a birth defect, like a cleft palate.”11  
 Since the 1950s, counterdiscourses have emerged alongside those of the medical fields, 
engendering terminology that counters medical definitions of transness. Yet, those earlier 
narratives, the discourse of gender, race, and disability from the turn of the century, often frame 
and limit what conversations are possible today, as well as what kinds of subject positions we 
can inhabit, subject positions that are bounded by race at the intersections of sexuality, gender, 
                                                
8 Brynn Tannehill, "Do Your Homework, Dr. Ablow," Huffpost Queer Voices 2016. 
9 Caitlyn Jenner, interview by Diane Sawyer, 24 April 2015. 
10 The articulation of how Jorgensen came to desire a “sex change” is also provided; she felt “trapped in the wrong 
body.” Hadjimatheou, "Christine Jorgensen: 60 Years of Sex Change Ops." 
11 Cintra Wilson, "The Reluctant Transgender Role Model," Fashion & Style 2011. Chaz Bono is Cher’s son.  
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and disability. As transgender studies scholar Bobby Noble argues, there “is still the 
medicalization of bodies, genders, and lives, and as much as the diagnosis ‘gender identity 
disorder’ is a formal alibi, it still reflects the reality that trans-folks are forced to make the best 
choices for ourselves in a field of overdetermined possibilities.”12 Not only are the choices 
overdetermined, but also transsexualism (along with some intersex conditions) is still considered 
an “abnormal defect,” a term that has historical roots in notions of degeneracy.  
These roots manifest themselves in various ways in our current moment: “gender 
dysphoria” remains in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, now in its fifth 
iteration; the “wrong body” narrative is still one of the only narratives considered legitimate; 
trans people are still criminalized not only for being trans, but poor transwomen, transwomen of 
color, and those engaged in sex work, are subject to violence at the hands of police and the 
carceral state; ableist rhetoric is still used against transpeople in a way that marginalizes both 
trans* people and people with disabilities (although these are not distinct and separate 
communities).  
As is evidenced by both the sexological literature throughout the twentieth century, and 
even today, many transsexuals and sexologists believed that only those who could successfully 
pass and live as heterosexual women should pursue surgical intervention. The attainment of 
normalized, white, and ableist heterosexual femininity was the goal for surgical transition as 
declared by both transsexuals and their doctors – and many of these surgeries, still required today 
by some states to change one’s gender marker on their I.D., sterilizes those who undergo them. 
Despite the existence of myriad trans* embodiments both then and now, just as there could only 
be one gender per body, there are still expectations for those who are considered “true” 
                                                
12 Bobby Noble, "Our Bodies Are Not Ourselves: Tranny Guys and the Racialized Class Politics of Embodiment," in 
Trans-Forming Feminisms, ed. Krista Scott-Dixon (Sumach Press, 2006). 254, emphasis mine. 
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transsexuals, or “trans* enough” to count. This version of transsexuality and its attendant gender 
and sexual expectations remain the ideal outcome of diagnosis and treatment for many 
physicians, and perhaps for many transsexuals.  
These expectations are rooted in eugenic ideologies. Despite the evolution of sexology 
and eugenics within the changing political climate in the U.S. in which the technologies of 
diagnosis evolved, the emergence of each discipline and the ways in which they were intertwined 
had a lasting impact on the ways in which we think of and access trans* diagnoses. As activist 
and ethnic studies scholar Nancy Ordover rightly asserts, these truths, scientific and otherwise, 
are:  
bound up with other truths. It would be impossible to excavate the roots and the reach of 
the medicalization of queers without an understanding of scientific racism and other 
eugenics endeavors. Not only were they ideologically tethered, but they had the same 
champions and often the same victims.13  
 
Because of the ways eugenics was foundational to medical approaches at the time of its 
emergence as a diagnoses, the medicalization of transsexuality was coterminous with 
transsexuality as a tool of eugenics. What do I mean by this? I mean that codifying racist, ableist, 
and heterosexist standards, and demanding that one must meet them in order to access diagnoses 
and medical care fall in line with eugenic ideals and goals. These demands are intertwined with 
the very narratives we tell of “being born in the wrong body,” being “born this way.” These 
narratives are not inherently bad claims, but they are bound up in this history and web of power, 
one that demands a physiological or psychiatric justification for treatment. An investment in 
eugenicist notions of race betterment, which entailed flexible but specific ideals of gender, 
sexuality, and ability, fundamentally shaped the medical diagnoses of transvestism and 
transsexualism. These are the legacies with which we are left.  
                                                
13 Nancy Ordover, American Eugenics: Race, Queer Anatomy, and the Science of Nationalism (Minneapolis: 
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